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PRESENTED BY 





FRIEDRICH GENTZ 

an Opponent of the 
French Revolution and Napoleon 



PAUL F. REIFF, Ph.D. 



Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 

of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate 

School of the University of Illinois 



CHAMPAIGN-URBANA 

FLANIGAN-PEARSON CO. 

1912 






y& 



Copyright 1912 
By the University of Illinois 



.. 3 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction Q-i i 

I. The Causes of the Struggle 

i. Environments of t he Younc Gentz 12-21 

Berlin between 1780 and 1700, 12. Prussia under Fred- 
erick II and Frederick William II, 13. Conditions 
in the "Empire", 14. German patriotism and cosmo- 
politanism, 16. Political and intellectual tendencies in 
Germany between 1780 and 1790, 18. German ration- 
alism, 19. Position of the German author, 21. 

2. Gentz's Character 22-30 

Influence of environments, 22. Physique, 22. Relations 
of intellect to sentiment, 22. Love of discussion, 23. 
Gift of conversation, 24. Receptivity and originality, 
25. Secondary traits of character, 26. Relation to 
romanticism, 26. Sociability, 27. Ideals of life, 27. 
Qualifications as a politician, 29. Literary ability, 30. 

3 . Gentz's Poutical Theories 30-52 

Difficulty of presenting them, 30. Their general sources, 
31. Natural law, 31. Political theories of Cicero, 
Garve, Rousseau and Montesquieu, 32. 

Gentz's political theories until 1790, 36. Burke's theories, 
38. 

Gentz's views on government since 1793 : Relation to 
natural law and positive-historical law, 39. Ideal of 
human progress, 42. State of nature and social com- 
pact, 43. Later view on the basis of the authority of 
the government, 44. Duties of the state, 44. Forms 
of government, 45. Liberty, equality and popular 
sovereignty, 46. Defects of government, right of 
revolution and progress, 47. "Eternal laws", 48. 

Gentz's views on international law since 1793 : Idea of a 
world state, 48. Rights and duties of the individual 
states toward one another, 49. International con- 
gresses, 49. The European balance of power, 50. 
War, 50. 

Problem of priority of Gentz's political theories to his 
political struggles : influence of Cicero, 50. 
3 



II. The Struggle Against the Revolution 

i . Before the Struggle : 1789-1792 53-60 

Germany and the Revolution, 53. Gentz's state of mind 
on the eve of the movement, 56. His early sympa- 
thies with it, 57. Observation of events, 57. Change 
of attitude, 58. 

2. 1793-1799 60-83 

Gentz's official position and life in Berlin, 60. Anti-revo- 
lutionary publications, 61. Early relations to foreign 
governments, 62. Causes of activity, 64. Influence 
of Burke and Mallet du Pan, 64. 
Gentz's conception of the Revolution and the duties of 
Europe : Conditions in pre-revolutionary France, 67. 
Immediate causes of the Revolution, 67. Rousseau, 
69. Beginning and end of the Revolution, 69. Its 
importance, 70. Its fundamental principles, 71. Its 
relations to Europe, 74. Europe in 1800, 76. Secret 
of the successes of the Revolution, jj. Proper policy 
of Europe, 79. Relations to England, 80. 
Temporary suspension of the struggle, 82. 

III. The Struggle Against Napoleon 

1 . Before the Struggle : 1798-1802 84-88 

Napoleon and the Revolution, 84. Gentz's attitude to- 
ward Napoleon until the Coup d fitat, 85. Beginning 
of opposition, 87. 

2. 1803-1809 88-134 

Gentz's appointment in Vienna, 88. His life and ambi- 
tions, 90. 

General features of Gentz's struggle against Napoleon : 
Its causes, 91. Idea of coalitions, 94. Attitude to- 
ward Russia and England, 95. Memorials in general, 
97. Correspondence, 98. Publications, 98. Other 
methods of opposition, 99. Ultimate aims, 99. Judg- 
ment on the personality of Napoleon, 99. 

Spring, 1803,-summer, 1805 : Gentz's life and frame of 
mind, 102. Memorials, 103. Relations to St. Pe- 
tersburg, Berlin, and London, 104. Organization of 
the Austrian cabinet, 105. Career of Cobenzl, 106. 
Difficulty of his task, 107. His policy until the con- 
clusion of the alliance with Russia, 108. Gentz's op- 
4 



PAGE 

position to Cobenzl, no. Suggestions as to Cob- 
enzl's successor, 112. Memorials and their effect, 
112. 

Summer, 1805,-fall, 1805 : Gentz's views on the Euro- 
pean situation and the prospects of Austria, 117. 

Fall, 1805,-end of 1805 : Opening of the war by Napoleon, 
119. Effect of Ulm, 119. Gentz's flight from Vi- 
enna, 120. Effect of Austerlitz, 122. Further flight 
and stay in Dresden and Prague, 122. 

Beginning of 1806-beginning of 1809: Gentz's life and 
state of mind in general, 124. His plans concern- 
ing Prussia, 126. The Fragmente, 127. Memori- 
als, 128. Social activity, 129. Meetings with Baron 
Stein, 130. Suspicions of Napoleon, 130. Visit at 
the Prussian headquarters, 131. Relations to Eng- 
land, 132. Return to Vienna, 133. 

Gentz's activity during the war of 1809, 133. 

3. 1813-1815 134-153 

1809-1812: Gentz's life and activity in general, 134. His 

attitude during the Russian campaign, 137. 
Spring, 1813,-summer, 1814 : Gentz's views on the best 
Austrian policy, 138. His stay and activity at Rati- 
borzitz, 142. At Prague and Freiburg, 144. Return to 
Vienna, 145. Growing need of comfort, 145. Opposi- 
tion to the continuation of the war after Leipzig, 146. 
Views on the reorganization of Germany and the best 
policy toward Napoleon, 147. Motives for distrust of 
the allies, 149. Relations to Metternich, 150. 
Gentz at the congress of Vienna, 151. During the Hun- 
dred Days, 152. 

Conclusion 154-156 



SSj 



ABBREVIATIONS 

Aus dem Nachlasse — Aus dem Nachlasse Friedrichs von Gents, 2 voU 

1867-1868. 
Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents — Brief e von und an Friedrich von Gents, ed. by 

F. C. Wittichen, 2 vol., 1909-1910. 
Brief w. zw. Fr. Gents u. A. H. M tiller — Briefzvechsel swischen Friedrich 

Gents und Adam Heinrich Miiller, 1857. 
H. J — Historisches Journal, ed. by Friedrich Gentz, 6 vol., 1 799-1800. 
Mem. et lett. ined. — Memoirs et lettres inedits du Chevalier de Gents, ed. 

by Schlesier, 1841. 
Schlesier — Schriften von Friedrich von Gents, ed. by Schlesier, 5 vol., 

1838-1840. 
Weick — Ausgezvahlte Schriften von Friedrich von Gents, ed. by Weick, 

5 vol., 1836-1838. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

For bibliography it will be sufficient to refer here to that given by 
Friedrich M. Kircheisen and Friedrich Carl Wittichen in Mitteilungen des 
Instituts fur Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, XXVII (1906), 91-146 
and 682-694. , 



Narrow personalities are easy to understand and to 
classify ; rich personalities, on the other hand, seem to defy 
definition. 

That, at least, is one of the teachings that may be 
derived from a study of the career and character of the 
publicist, Frederick Gentz. Gentz's life was not an unusu- 
ally long one, yet it was unusually rich in activities and 
complex tendencies. But the causes of this lay less in the 
tremendous vibrations of the era in which Gentz lived 
than in the man himself; they lay in a versatility of mind 
which was truly astonishing. An official in the Prussian 
and Austrian civil services, a diplomatic agent of England 
on the Continent, the self-appointed adviser of ministers and 
rulers, one of the busiest and ablest writers of his time, 
the arch-enemy of the first French revolution and the first 
Napoleon, the secretary of Europe during nine highly im- 
portant months, one of the pillars of the Reaction, a social 
genius of the first order, the bohcmien par excellence, and a 
romanticist as well as a rationalist — all this Gentz was. 
His youth fell in the era of enlightenment and of Frederick 
the Great, his manhood coincided with the first French 
revolution and with Napoleon, and his later life belonged 
to the age of Metternich. 

The question who Gentz was would thus seem to be 
difficult to answer. However, if we consider only his po- 
litical activity and the intellectual traits of his nature, 
leaving aside its sentimental and social features, the 
answer will be easier. We will then have the choice be- 
tween two chief conceptions of the man. One of these 
would be to see in Gentz an eighteenth century type in 
general, and a practical exponent of the rationalistic doc- 
trine of government in particular. This conception is in one 
way undoubtedly the deepest and truest, for Gentz was 
indeed rooted in the doctrines of rationalism, at least as 

9 



10 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [496 

regards his political activity. It lias, however, one serious 
drawback, the fact that in its light the life-work of Gentz — ■ 
his struggles against the Revolution, against Napoleon and 
for the Reaction— appears as nothing but a mere appendix 
to his theories; and that, of course, would be a rather 
abstract way of looking at him. We have thus to turn to 
the other conception which puts actions first and theories 
second. Viewed from this angle, Gentz would be seen 
chiefly as a participant — more or less a negative one, it 
is true — in the great European movements between the 
first and second French revolutions. 

And thus, it seems, Gentz must indeed be viewed. He 
was essential ly a theorist whom the course of events 
aroused, but in fact a man of action. He started out with 
highly idealistic principles, those of human brotherliness 
and human progress, of liberty, equality, justice and peace. 
Some of these he retained and championed for many years; 
others he soon dropped or at least modified, taking up in 
their stead, as a new principle, the defence of that system 
which was threatened with overthrow by the events of 1789 
and the following decades. The French Revolution, Bona- 
partism and Liberalism alike were hateful to him; they all 
meant democracy or at least a drifting towards it, and 
democracy he abhorred. But his special foe, his nightmare 
for more than ten years, was Napoleon. On his account he 
suffered many a bad hour and gained immortality; for such 
is the character of true greatness that mere opposition to 
it brings fame. He helped to arouse and to organize the 
opposition against whatever was revolutionary and aggres- 
sive; but nowhere was he more fervent than in his crusade 
against this hated man and gigantic child of the Revolu- 
tion. His whole life, indeed, centers about the ten years 
of his anti-Napoleonic activity. 

The following study will, in general, be in accordance 
with the second of the two conceptions. It aims, in the 
first place, at a careful representation of Gentz's struggle 
against the first Napoleon. Its second object — historically 
I lie first — is an account of Gentz's relations to the first 



497] INTRODUCTION 11 






French revolution. The introductory chapter will try to 
give the causes of Gentz's attitude in both cases. 

Gentz was born in 1764 at Breslau, the capital of the 
Prussian province of Silesia, and died in 1832 at Vienna. 
His father held until 1779 a position in the royal mint at 
Breslau and then became director of the mint at Berlin; 
through his mother he was related to the later Prussian 
minister of state, Ancillon. He received his first education 
in the public schools of his native city and in the Joach- 
imsthal-Gymnasium at Berlin; from 1783 to 1785 he at- 
tended the university at Konigsberg, where Kant was still 
teaching. Entering the Prussian civil service in 1785, he 
worked during the following years in various central boards 
of the monarchy. In 1802 he was taken over into the Aus- 
trian civil service. His official position there was at first 
a very vague one ; he was attached to the ministry of for- 
eign affairs, the Staatskamlei, but had little to do and 
nothing to say. After about 1811, however, he gradually 
became the right hand man of Metternich and was as such 
of course, important and influential. 



I. THE CAUSES OF THE STRUGGLE 

1. Environments of the Young Gentz. 

Although Gentz was not a Berliner by birth, yet he 
lived long enough in the Prussian capital to be counted as 
one. The first milieu of his youth was then the Berlin of 
about the years 1780-1790. Beyond it lay, as larger circles, 
the condition of Prussia and of the "Empire". Beyond 
these again extended the atmosphere of European life and 
thought in general. 

Berlin was at the time of the death of Frederick the 
Great a city of about one hundred and fifty thousand 
people, the strong garrison included. A modest-sized place 
then, one might say, if everything had not been smaller in 
those days. Scenic charms it never possessed, although 
the near-by Havel lakes are not without their quiet, mel- 
ancholy attractions. Its streets were none too clean, rather 
badly lighted and unsafe at night. There were perhaps a 
few noteworthy buildings here and there, but the general 
level of architecture was rather low. The present univer- 
sity had not yet been founded ; the academies of science and 
of arts, however, already existed. 

The intellectual and artistic life of the city could not 
claim any special distinction. No famous philosopher or 
scholar, no great poet or artist lived within its precincts; 
there were, of course, Mcolai and Mendelssohn, but they 
could not be called great, and Lessing had long since left 
the city. Berlin was too new and young, too sober, too 
busy and too poor to be a centre of learning and of art ; it 
possessed many soldiers, plenty of sand, an invigorating 
climate and a great king, but no Hesperian gardens and 
no zephyrs, few books and hardly any history to speak of. 
Nevertheless, in a certain sense the city could even then 
boast of intellectual preeminence: it was the center of Ger- 
man rationalism and already endowed with that critical 

12 






499] EARLY ENVIRONMENTS 13 

mind for which it has ever since been famous. Socially 
the nobility predominated; the other classes — the officials 
and the professions, the wealthier merchants, the descend- 
ants of the French emigres and the Jews — still counted 
for little. The moral standard was unsatisfactory in many 
regards, but probably not so bad as anti-rationalists would 
have it; it had already been on the decline in the later 
years of Frederick the Great, and under his successor mat- 
ters went from bad to worse. 

All in all, then, it must be admitted that the Berlin of 
those days was rather uninteresting. One great attraction 
it did possess, however, and that was Frederick himself. 
His fame still brought distinguished visitors from abroad; 
but they came more and more rarely, afraid of disturbing 
the great man in his work. To the general public the king 
was generally not visible. At military parades he could, 
perhaps, be seen, or when he occasionally rode into town; 
aside from these occasions, however, he never left his be- 
loved Hanssouci except for the annual visits to the prov- 
inces. He had become a stern old man ; a terribly exacting 
taskmaster whom few loved and all respected. Physical 
ailments troubled him, his friends had mostly died, and 
Berlin grumbled; but that mattered little. Patriae in 
serviendo consumor — this was his kingly program, to be 
observed by himself no less than by his subjects ; as for the 
rest, he was the King, and every malcontent was at liberty 
to grumble, provided that he obeyed. 

The political system of Frederick was in some respects 
based on rationalistic principles, in others, again, it was 
shaped according to practical considerations ; to call it en- 
lightened absolutism would, therefore, not be quite correct. 
Frederick maintained a big army; he waged three wars 
which were, at least in part, wars of conquest: and he 
thought remarkably little of the individual as such — in 
all this he was not a rationalist. Likewise, his confirmation 
of the privileges obtained by the Prussian nobility during 
previous reigns exceeded that which was permissible from 
the rationalistic standpoint. On the other hand, Frederick 



14 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [500 

was in harmony with the latter when he called himself the 
first servant of the state, when he put the common weal 
above all private interests, and would allow every one to 
seek salvation according to his own fashion. 

Under his successor, Frederick William II, the gen- 
eral organization of the state was retained, but in less im- 
portant points changes were made. The two notorious 
laws of his reign — the ordinances concerning public wor- 
ship and the censorship of the press — were of great actual 
importance, but did not affect the formal structure of the 
state ; they proceeded from the individual character of the 
king or of his nearest advisers and were intended as a blow 
against the hated rationalism. Although fundamental re- 
forms did not come until after the debacle of 1806, there 
was, even then, a good deal of discussion whether steps in 
this direction should not, after all, be seriously considered. 
Personally Frederick William did, of course, not enjoy ttae 
respect paid to his uncle, yet he was not unpopular with 
his people, rather the contrary, it would seem ; but his reign, 
as a whole, was undoubtedly pernicious to the state. Sub- 
sequent events showed that under him Prussian efficiency, 
thrift and devotion to the common interests retrograded 
with sinister rapidity. 

Beyond Prussia lay the "Empire." It had gradually 
become the most complicated as well as one of the least 
important political bodies of Europe. The emperor at 
Vienna, the diet at Regensburg, the supreme court at 
Wetzlar, traditions centuries old and the lack of something 
better kept it, in a way, together ; yet its doom was near at 
hand. Austria, Prussia, and the more important of the 
smaller German territories had become absolutistic and 
centralized states; in the "Empire" the old German 
Libertdt remained. The emperor still had to be elected, 
and the case of Charles VII showed that this meant more 
than a mere formality ; he presided over the imperial diet, 
the strangest element of this strange political organization. 
This body, in general, contained the territorial lords; but 
these might be neutra, as was the case with the free eities 



501] EARLY ENVIRONMENTS 15 

and perhaps, the free abbots. Represented or actually pres- 
ent were the temporal princes, high and low, the great dig- 
nitaries of the Catholic Church, the free abbots, the col- 
leges of the imperial counts, knights and cities, and finally 
such foreign powers as possessed German territory. The 
Catholic votes still preponderated numerically; however, 
that involved hardly any danger to the Protestants, since 
in strictly religious matters the old itio in partes had been 
retained. As a rule, the august body would proceed with 
no undue rashness; time-honoured traditions had to be 
observed, and that being accomplished, little else remained 
to be done. The weakness and stagnation of imperial Ger- 
many resulted, of course, largely from the antagonism be- 
tween Austria and Prussia. United, these two powers 
would have presented a most formidable combination, but 
the time was not yet ripe for that. There were the smaller 
German states and there was PolaDd; who would control 
the one and absorb the other? Neither power was willing 
to allow the other to do it, and thus the relations between 
them remained strained, witli a tendency to become deli- 
cate at any moment. 

The internal conditions of the different German terri- 
tories outside of Prussia and Austria varied considerably. 
Bavaria stood apart. A Chinese wall was carefully drawn 
around it to exclude all possibility of protestant, ration- 
alistic or pan-German influences; for these the ruling class 
considered dangerous. The country was to be their own 
reservation; besides, it really needed no suggestions from 
"abroad,'' being a self-sufficient state and, if you were 
ready to admit the facts, quite a power. West and north 
of Bavaria began the "Empire" in the narrowest sense of 
the word. The common features of this whole part of Ger- 
many — it comprised, roughly speaking, Suabia, the Black 
Forest district, Franconia, the Rhine country, the strip 
east of it as far as the Weser, and Thuringia — were three- 
fold : the territorial incoherence of all the states, the 
smallness of most of them and, as regards the population, a 
certain intellectual liveliness and love of independence. 



10 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [502 

Take, for instance, the Suabian district of the "Empire"; it 
contained one duchy, Wurtemberg, forty ecclesiastical ter- 
ritories, thirty imperial cities, many princely seigniories 
and the domains of the numerous free counts and free 
knights. Or take the electorate of Mainz; its nucleus con- 
sisted of the rich estates in the Rheingau and along the 
lower Main, but besides these it possessed also Bischofs- 
heim on the Tauber, Starkenburg in the Odenwald, Fritz- 
lar in Hesse, Erfurt, and the whole Eichsfeld. Territories 
of that configuration and insignificance would, of course, 
not think of having any independent policy. The smallest of 
them trembled for their very existence. They, the free cities, 
knights, counts and abbots, the bishops and petty temporal 
princes, then the archbishops and ecclesiastical electors 
mostly attached themselves to Austria, while the larger 
political states, during this period, sought the protection of 
Prussia. The nobility was almost everywhere firmly en- 
trenched, if it was not the sovereign itself; in the imperial 
cities, of course, no nobility in the technical sense of the 
word existed, but there were the patrician families and in 
their hands the political power lay. The authority of the 
sovereign was nowhere unlimited or undisputed; the no- 
bles, the chapters of the cathedrals, the lower classes in the 
free cities and sometimes even the peasants jealously 
guarded whatever rights they happened to possess. 

Such then were the conditions in the "Empire." They 
resembled somewhat those of Italy, but aside from this 
there was not the like of them in all Europe; not even the 
moribund Poland could be referred to as a parallel. Obso- 
lete and unsound they must have appeared to many; 
but they had also their attractive sides: they were 
venerable, interesting and indicative of great regard for 
historic rights. One of those who felt a sentimental attach- 
ment to the "Empire" on account of these reasons was 
Gentz. 

The fact that Germany then was not much more than 
a geographical notion naturally resulted in a certain 
quiescence of national pride and sentiment. The poets of 



503] EARLY ENVIRONMENTS 17 

the Storm and Stress and of the Gottingen group — the 
young Herder, the young Goethe, Schiller during the first 
years of his literary career, Lentz, Holty, the two Stolbergs 
and others — had been fervent pan-Germans; but their 
patriotism referred more to the German past than to the 
German present, and they themselves belonged, with the 
exception of the young Schiller, to the preceding decade. 
Among the lowest classes there was if any but a local or 
provincial patriotism. The common theatre-going public, 
it is true, remained in the eighties as susceptible to the 
Storm and Stress spirit as it had been in the seventies ; yet 
the numberless knightly dramas which swept the German 
stage of the time pleased the spectators less by their pat- 
riotism than by their ponderous sensationalism. In gen- 
eral, it may therefore be said that the masses were rather 
void of pan-German sentiment; the attachment to the 
province, the city, or the state preponderated with them. 
F. K. Moser, the Suabian publicist and politician, remarked 
shortly after the close of the Seven Year's War : "Yes, we 
have a national spirit as we have wine-producing terri- 
tories and beer-producing territories, at every bend of 
the road another one." In a similar strain Wieland wrote : 
"There are, perhaps, Marckian, Saxon, Bavarian, Wurtem- 
bergian, Hamburgian, Nurembergian, Frankfortian patri- 
ots and so on; but German patriots who love the whole 
German Empire as their country and love it above every- 
thing else, ready to make real sacrifices for it, where are 
they?'' The cultured classes, as a rule, believed in cosmo- 
politanism : they considered themselves first of all citizens 
of the world. There existed, however, important sections 
in this group which were less cosmopolitan than particu- 
laristic. The nobles, for instance, thought very little of the 
citizenship of the world; but, perhaps, they could not be 
called cultured. Winckelmann, the Goethe of that time, 
Heinse and the Romanticists of the following decade were, 
in a way, cosmopolitans too ; Germany, at any rate, found 
little favor in their eyes, being, as they thought, an alto- 
gether too Cimmerian part of the globe and no home for 



18 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [504 

the Graces. At the same time, it is true, each of them would 
love some far-away land beyond the mountains, ancient 
Greece, Italy, Spain, India, or the Orient in general, which 
was to him his real, his own country. Leaving these sec- 
tions aside, there remained, as the bulk of the cultured 
classes, the out-and-out rationalists; and they were un- 
doubtedly thorough cosmopolitans — men without a coun- 
try. In Prussia the attachment to the province prepon- 
derated : the Pomeranian was first of all a Pomeranian, 
and the Silesian a Silesian. There existed, however, also a 
national Prussian spirit and that semi-national feudal 
bond of loyalty which connected the army with the person 
of the king. 

The French prestige still suffered from the Woav of Ross- 
bach, and the internal conditions of France were not such 
as to raise it; among the literati, Lessing's attacks on the 
French drama, too, were remembered. Nevertheless, the 
old Gallomania largely continued; only it had now to com- 
pete with a rival, the budding German Anglomania. 
Shakespeare and Ossian, the idols of the Storm and Stress, 
disappeared, it is true, for the time being, from the literary 
horizon together with the windy heaths and foggy shores 
of their poetry; and likewise the great king felt, in his 
later years, none too kindly towards the British. But it 
had become somewhat the fashion to learn English, and 
at the side of the old French Mademoiselle there appeared 
now, as a governess, the new Anglo-Saxon Miss. Eng- 
lishmen were more frequently seen traveling through the 
country and they found that reverential treatment which 
they expected and which they obtained far into the nine- 
teenth century. 

German public opinion was not yet strongly devel- 
oped, and so far as it existed it was rather conservative. 
Nobody seriously thought of infringing upon the constitu- 
tion of the "Empire." The system of limited absolutism was 
even unanimously recommended by the rationalistic polit- 
ical writers of the time. There were a few republicans, 
some enthusiasts for liberty in general, and numerous un- 



505] EARLY ENVIRONMENTS 19 

willing tax-payers; on the whole, however, the spirit of 
opposition had been louder in the seventies than it was in 
the eighties. The condition of the peasants was conceded 
by many to be hard and indefensible; but these same per- 
sons were unwilling to endorse the abolition of the nobility 
as an institution, for that would have meant a revolution 
of the whole existing order of things. They favored slight 
changes ; at the same time they considered the existence of 
a nobility as necessary to the welfare of the state, appre- 
hending that without it the power of the sovereign might 
know no limits. The attitude of public opinion would thus 
seem to have been unduly submissive; appearances, how- 
ever, are often deceptive. It was universally and most 
strongly insisted upon by all the rationalistic writers 
on political science that the rulers held their offices only as 
a trust, to be administered solely for the common weal; 
they would not have government by the people, but they de- 
manded government for the people. 

Intellectually, the years 1780-1790 may, as regards 
Germany, best be defined as a period of transition. The 
great intellectual movements of this country during the 
eighteenth century were rationalism, pietism, Empfindsam- 
keit or sentimentalism, the Storm and Stress, Hellenism, 
philosophical idealism and romanticism. Of these ration- 
alism had undoubtedly been the most powerful; but its 
force was spenr and it now abated visibly. The German 
pietism continued to hold its position, and the same may be 
said about the German Empfindsamkeit, inasmuch as the 
latter became one of the chief sources of the German roman- 
ticism; both of them were essentially German movements 
and thus proof against the flatter of fashion. The Storm 
and Stress began to decline with the end of the seventies. 
German Hellenism had already reached its first zenith 
in the sixties; now it was to experience a second classical 
age. The year 1781 marked the beginning of the new 
philosophical idealism, and between 1786 and 1795 German 
romanticism sprang into existence. 

The European movement which is commonly called 



20 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [506 

that of enlightenment was not a mere intellectual ten- 
dency; it amounted to nothing less than a new ideal of 
civilization. Its three main principles were the primacy 
of reason, utility, and humanity. Reason had now become 
the supreme judge in all human matters, and from the ver- 
dict of this judge there was no appeal; about that every- 
body agreed. But what was to be understood by "reason"? 
Only clear logical thinking, or certain innate ideas and 
tendencies, or both? Most of the rationalists, especially 
those in Germany, favored the third of these conceptions. 
They talked of a natural religion, of natural laws and 
natural rights, indicating by the epithet "natural" that 
disregard for these ideals was tantamount to disobedience 
against nature itself; and to bring humanity under the 
sway of this nature was to them a most sacred duty. The 
acceptance of the authority of the Bible and of the dogmas, 
the reverence for history and for tradition, the belief in 
miracles, religious intolerance, all and every shade of mys- 
ticism, every indulgence in sentiment, and the whole Mid- 
dle-Age were, therefore, stigmatized as so many aberrations 
of the human mind. The cultivation of poetry and art in 
general they tolerated in a way ; but only with many reser- 
vations. Art was then little cherished in Germany and 
for this reason left alone. Poetry, on the other hand, had 
become a matter of great interest to the Germans and could, 
consequently, not very well be ignored : it had to be advised, 
and thus the poets were gravely told that passion and 
sentiment were of no use and their expression, therefore, of 
still less; that every poem should try to give some profit- 
able instruction and that the best instruction was a moral 
one. A certain indefiniteness clouded the third of the 
rationalistic principles, that of humanity. It could mean 
the ideal of developing all the human faculties, or the 
doctrine of altruism, or the recommendation of milder 
habits and manners in general, and in fact it did mean all 
this; the individual rationalistic writer might have in view 
only the one or the other of these meanings, but rationalism 
as a whole stood for all of them. Much enthusiasm was 



507] EARLY ENVIRONMENTS 21 

manifested for the perfection and progress of the human 
race, for the idea of international fraternalism and for re- 
ligious tolerance; likewise much interest was shown in the 
promotion of industry and agriculture. Few, if any, would 
advocate war and its cause ; war was declared to be a waste 
as well as a crime and unworthy of enlightened men. 
Everybody, on the other hand, believed in the efficacy 
of education; training was everything: able men were not 
born, they were made. 

Of particular interest for the student of Gentz's career 
is the position of the German author of the time. In coun- 
tries like England and France an author in those days 
often acquired considerable wealth and political influence. 
In Germany, however, he was poor and of little conse- 
quence in matters concerning the conduct of public affairs ; 
for there the government lay chiefly in the hands of the 
rulers, and perhaps the only German writer of that age 
who wielded any real influence upon them was Schlozer 
in Gottingen. If the conditions were favorable, then an 
author might, by his writings, obtain some respectable po- 
sition at court or in the service of the government, as was 
the case with Goethe, Wieland and Herder; but that could 
not be depended upon. Schubart, for instance, never at- 
tained any such recognition; Lessing died as a librarian in 
the world-forsaken Wolfenbiittel; and Schiller was at this 
very time a homeless man, wandering from place to place. 
Literary careers such as Voltaire's in France could then 
not be thought of in Germany ; even that of Mallet du Pan 
in the pre-revolutionary Paris would have been well-nigh 
impossible. Yet the literary career had after all, even in 
Germany, one very attractive side : it was the simplest and 
straightest way to fame and to popularity, provided that 
the writer knew his readers. The German of that day had 
little interest in politics, but he cared very much for poetry 
and philosophy; there, then, lay the golden opportunity 
for the writers, and in this way Klopstock, Gellert, Goethe, 
Schiller and Kant had become the favorite sons of the 
nation. 



22 friedrich gentz [508 

2. Gentz's Character. 

To what extent this environment helped to form 
Gentz's character is, as always in such cases, somewhat 
hard to say. His theories without a doubt were influenced 
by it in considerable measure; his character, however, de- 
veloped more independently. Its chief characteristics 
were probably inborn, for they remain on the whole as fixed 
as was possible amid the tumult of such a life and such an 
epoch. They were characteristics affected by misfortune 
only temporarily at most, but rather susceptible to sick- 
ness and age. 

Among the gifts with which fate had endowed this re- 
markable personality, a fine physique was not the least. 
Gentz was not really handsome; he possessed, however, 
captivating eyes and a very pleasant voice. His vitality 
must have been very great to start with, for despite the 
magnificent recklessness with which he spent himself in 
pleasure and in work, he reached, after all, well-nigh the 
threshold of three score years and ten. The weak point 
of his make-up was his nerves. He easily lost patience 
and was fearful of any uncertainty. Wind, rain, and above 
all storms were highly repulsive to him, and his interest in 
the condition of the weather is reflected in many of his 
letters. What he loved was to have a blue sky above him, 
to see the sun, and to breathe the quiet air; and when he 
once discovered that a place was meteorologically unsafe, 
then no amount of feminine charms, no gathering of illus- 
trious names could make him stay there. The restless and 
at times wild life which he led did not, however, re- 
main without consequences. His finances were almost from 
the start in hopeless confusion; in 1814 his health, too, be- 
gan seriously to suffer. From 1825, perhaps, the latter be- 
came somewhat improved; but the old strength was after 
all gone, and at last death came as a consequence of general 
debility. 

Intellect and feeling were equally developed in Gentz. 
Personalities of this sort are able to avoid the threatening 



509] CHARACTER 23 

inner conflict only by allowing both sides of their natures 
to express themselves, and such also was Gentz's experi- 
ence. Until 1819, he was firm in his determination to sub- 
ordinate everything to the judgment of reason; nothing 
would, however, be farther from the truth than to attempt 
to term him on this account a rationalist pure and and sim- 
ple. Even in the sphere of statesmanship, the emotions — 
confidence, reverence, benevolence and content — were for 
him factors of the highest significance, and likewise did he 
feel sentiment to be of the greatest importance in the 
provinces of art and religion. How much he allowed him- 
self to be influenced by emotions, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, in his moods and in his relations with other peo- 
ple, will be seen later. More correctly could we call Gentz, 
therefore, a sentimentalist as well as a rationalist, recog- 
nizing in him one of those complex natures as rich as they 
are hard to define. In his youth, it is true, Gentz seemed to 
give little promise for the future, if we are to credit his 
oldest biographer ; a good boy, amiable and easy-going, with 
but little talent if not actually dull — so the estimates of him 
run. 1 The judgment of a later biography is, however, 
rather different ; according to it the young Gentz was not at 
all dull, and well thought of by the teachers of his Gym- 
nasium in Berlin. 2 The two accounts seem contradictory, 
but in reality both are credible ; Gentz may have been easy- 
going at home and active at school, combining within him- 
self tendencies for pleasure and work in a way which still 
persisted in later years. From 1793 on, he certainly left no 
doubt as to his mental capacity, astonishing, we may well 
assume, not a few of those earlier skeptics. 

One of the prominent features of Gentz's character 
was his love for the discussion of problems. Orally and in 
writing, in treatises, letters and official notes, he gave way 
to this passionate pleasure; in the broader sense of the 
word, he argued almost all his life, with Kant and Hamann 

^arnhagen von Ense, Galerie von Bildnissen aus Rahels Umgang und 
Brief wechsel, II, 162. 

2 Schmidt-Weissenfels, Friedrich Gentz, I, 8 f. 



24 FRIEDKICH GENTZ [510 

in Konigsberg, with friends such as von Humboldt and 
Adam Miiller, with the Revolution, with the hated Cobenzl 
and the equally detested Napoleon, in short with well-nigh 
every one with whom he came into positive or negative con- 
tact. His motives in this were sure to be various. One 
was his interest in the analysis of problems as such, to 
which we have before referred; a second was his wish to 
be able to enjoy his dialectic superiority ; still another was 
his endeavor to see his political ideas realized; a fourth, 
finally, was the great sociability of his nature. With his 
equals he was in these discussions open and direct; with 
his superiors, on the other hand, Cobenzl excepted, truly 
deferential. In all argumentation he was concerned with 
truth alone. It would have been impossible for him to 
defend something, of the correctness 6f which he was not 
convinced; for that he was far too honest. 

Closely related was Gentz's eminent gift of social con- 
versation. It was more necessary for him to speak than to 
write, and he loved to express himself fully to others or 
to chat with them even when there was no problem at 
issue. Whenever he was in the proper mood he could talk 
very seductively and fascinatingly, and the fact may per- 
haps be a matter of surprise that he found entertainment 
among men as attractive as among women. It would be 
incorrect to term him a ladies' man; but he certainly was 
a master in social intercourse with women, particularly 
with those of standing. When he made use of his beauti- 
ful eyes, when his gentle voice softly flattered the ear, 
when he spoke of his boundless devotion or in his spirited 
fashion discoursed of serious things — then he must indeed 
have been hard to resist. The circle of his feminine ac- 
quaintances was therefore large, reaching almost to the 
throne, and it is safe to say that without this gift of light 
as well as of substantial conversation Gentz would not 
have attained to the illustrious social position in Vienna, — 
a position which meant so much to him politically — that 
with its assistance he won so easily. 



511 ] CHARACTER 



25 



Speech is not in and of itself, however, of equal im- 
portance with thinking; mere words are cheap, but clear 
deep, and original thinking is by no means so Row 
was Gentz's intellect in this regard? It must " be 
granted that he was no intellectual pioneer; he was orig- 
inal, perhaps, in nothing save the combination of the quali 
ties which he embodied, and this he too, honest as ever, has 
himself granted. To Rahel, his particular confidant he 
wrote m 1803: "You are a ceaselessly producing nature I 

Z IrTTn 17 reCeptJVe ° ne; J ° U m a ^ reat ma *> I am 
the first of all women who ever lived. This I know ■ had I 

been physically a woman, I should have brought the earth 
to my feet. I have never discovered anything, never com- 
posed anything, never made anything. I am more electrical 
than metal and just for this reason a conductor of electric- 
ity without a second. My receptivity is quite boundless »« 
Gentz wa^ however, not at all on this account purely re- 
ceive. He read much and in this way accumulated ma- 
terial from all sides. This material he carefully arranged 

and moulded into a pleasing form, the latter point receiving 
much of hls att ti If many Qf Mg tre P t . geg a ^ * 

withstanding not easily readable, this is not due to any 
lack of clearness of logic, but to the abundance of material • 

Gentz If m f \f en dear bGCaUSe ^perficial, whereas 
Gentz * as, if anything, thorough. And not thorough alone 
but hkewise objective, even in the midst of the battle. He 
would have none of that extremely convenient principle 
hat there are two sides to every question; to him a ques 
tion might have many sides and ramifications, but there 
was only one truth and that truth was obligatory upon all 
lo assume that truth could be established bv a majority 
by the judgment of public opinion or moreover by the will 
of the common people was in his eyes both an absurdity 
and a crime Principles of this sort he considered empty 
Phrases; and of these he was the most irreconcilable foe 
A very valuable intellectual peculiarity which Gentz pos- 

3 Schlesier, I, 113. 



26 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [512 

sessed was, moreover, his undoubted brilliancy. The ani- 
mation of his mind, his many-sided interests, his wealth of 
ideas — secondary and not original, it is true — his ability 
to use these ideas quickly and fitly, the artistic quality of 
his conversation, and an undeniable humor — all these 
combine to give him a claim to be called brilliant. In this 
respect he was without question an exceptional figure. 

As regards the other sides of Gentz's character there 
is not a little that could be mentioned, for Gentz was any- 
thing but narrow and dull. He was possessed of much nat- 
ural good-nature, much independence of spirit, and much 
restlessness; besides, he was endowed with an elasticity 
of temperament which kept him youthful almost to the 
the last. He liked sensation when not too strong. He 
deviated not a hair's breadth from his principles; on the 
other hand, he was entirely lacking in military spirit and 
feared noisy crowds, unknown faces, age, and death. For 
nature, especially for his beloved mountains, the "silent, 
icy" peaks of the Alps as he calls them, he always felt a 
warm affection, not unlike that of a boy who comes home 
for a few days' vacation ; but above this unadulterated na- 
ture he still placed that artistically beautiful nature of 
the kind that one meets with in architecturally planned gar- 
dens. In many regards he was a romanticist in the sense 
of the two Schlegels, although lie expressed himself not in- 
frequently in a rather disparaging way concerning the 
younger of the brothers and concerning Tieck. He was 
a romanticist in his inner wealth of life, his warmth of 
feeling, his reverence for the feminine, his exalted levity, 
his sense of the poetical and his love for nature, in his 
occasional need of solitude, in his reverence for the past 
and in his catholic tendencies, or rather in the combination 
of all these qualities. If we were to name a single and 
comprehensive characteristic which above all he had in 
common with the Schlegels, it would be his antipathy to- 
ward whatever was commonplace and philistine. His ap- 
preciation of reason and understanding, his energy and 



513] CHARACTER 27 

cheerfulness, as well as his interest in politics were, it is 
true, quite unroniantic features of his make-up. 

Gentz could apparently not until late in life dispense 
with social intercourse. Along with his occupation with 
politics, it was for him the salt of life. The equipment for 
playing a role in social life he possessed with the excep- 
tion of one thing, noble birth ; and this was unfortunately 
a point to which at that time especial importance was at- 
tached. It was therefore necessary for him to make up 
for the deficiency, as far as this was possible, by falling 
back upon other personal distinctions which were available 
and useful to this end. What helped Gentz here most, be- 
yond doubt, was the thoroughly aristocratic character 
of his whole nature. Intercourse with people who stood 
outside the sacred circles of high life was under certain 
circumstances very attractive to him, his intimate relations 
with Adam Miiller and others testify to this; but his real 
atmosphere was, after all, the perfumed air of the drawing- 
room. His love of comfort, his absolute light-heartedness, 
his sense of the artistic, the gentleness of his manners, his 
egotism and his ambition forced him thither, or at any rate 
away from the common crowd ; he belonged to the elite and 
wanted to belong to them, intellectually, socially and polit- 
ically. We know how completely successful he was in this 
endeavor; that he was so, however, especially the man- 
ner in which he succeeded in gaining entree into the very 
exclusive circles of the high Austrian nobility and in estab- 
lishing there a place for himself, will always be a circum- 
stance for wonder to him who knows the laws and habits of 
this West-End of Europe. With time, it is true, when he 
had drunk long enough from this cup of bliss and that old 
age which he feared so much was gradually drawing on, 
his love for society life waned very considerably. 

In the final analysis, Gentz had, after reaching full 
manhood, three fundamental ideas : influence, pleasure, and 
justice; the first two governed his life in general, the third 
his political theories in particular. He wished to play a 
role in the world and felt that he had the power within 



28 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [514 

himself to do so; and this role was to be principally that 
of statesman. But he did not entertain such ambitions 
from the start. To Elizabeth Graun, one of his first loves 
but by no means his last, lie writes in 1785 in a perfectly 
bucolic, Rousseau-like manner : "Life with four or five 
excellent people but without compulsion, without restraint 
in the most unconfined, happy freedom of nature, limited 
by no considerations of ceremony, embittered by no fear 
of misconstruction, furthermore in the quiet bosom of sweet, 
sweet nature — wouldn't that be the only thing which could 
make such people as we are happy? But tell me, would 
we wish more, would we not gladly leave all the vain show 
of the world of fools, all the money to Jews, all the learning 
to the schools and look from our little happy circle into the 
big world ... as occupants of a good, quiet warm 
room looking out into the autumnal country, where the 
evening wind in a cold, cold rain drenches the fallen 
leaves?" 4 Already in 1802, however, he expresses him- 
self to Brinckmann, then in Berlin as envoy from Sweden 
and always one of his closest friends : "My hour has struck ; 
tlie course of my long, long youth is ended; I renounce the 
abundance of life's pleasures and consecrate nryself to the 
serious activity of my head, which is still young. I shall 
henceforth lead a cooler, more tasteless but, I strongly 
hope, more uniform and harmonious life; and upon the 
ruins of all my old inclinations and passions and pleasures 
there shall be erected nothing but ambition for true fame, 
and a certain pride, which heretofore has been but re- 
pressed for that which really lies hidden in the depths of 
my soul beneath a quite foreign exterior, shall be exalted." 5 
In 1820 he likewise endorses the word of Johannes von 
Miiller, the Swiss historian: "Surely a single good idea, 
contributed at some time in life at a peace negotiation or 
in some other important transaction is of greater influence 
than the arrangement of a whole archive." 6 Next to or 

4 Brief c v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 6/ f. 
'Ibid., II, ioo. 
•Schlesier, IV, 287. 



515] CHARACTER 29 

perhaps parallel with this ambition stood Gentz's love of 
pleasure, of pleasures high and low. He was a born mas- 
ter of the art of living, knowing how to get out of life all 
there was in it. "He who expects to enjoy always, never 
enjoys;" " the sum of all wisdom is: make use of the pres- 
ent!''; "let us live, live and not merely exist' 1 — so he writes 
as early as 1785 to Elizabeth Graun; 7 and he lived in ac- 
cordance with this doctrine then as well as later. The 
third of his fundamental ideals, that of justice, was, as we 
have already noted, significant directly only for his political 
theories; since, however, his theories in turn very strongly 
influenced his political activity, the actual extent of this 
ideal was in his case much greater. From it, above all, he 
derived the ever-glowing fire of passion and energy which 
characterizes his fight against the Revolution and Napol- 
eon; but he had it to thank too for many hours of deep 
sorrow. It was a help to him, but also a burden and a 
ballast wich seriously handicapped his actions, as high 
principles are so likely to do if closely adhered to. 

Gentz was a born politician, as he has been called, only 
in part. Ambition, interest in politics, the needed social 
talents and a knowledge of the diplomatic language of 
French he possessed ; other quite as important traits of the 
true statesman, however, he lacked. Above all he was not 
what the Germans term a Realpolitiker, at least not until 
1813. He saw everywhere only questions of right, but in 
politics power is the chief matter. Furthermore, he was 
not cool enough. The warmth and sensibility of his na- 
ture, in itself an attractive trait of his character, stood 
here in his way. He inclined to strong sympathies and 
antipathies and could not break off old intimacies or form 
new ones as quickly as the political constellation of the 
hour would require; likewise he easily lost his patience 
and felt ill at ease in the face of the unknown. Metternich 
was not so far wrong when he remarked that Gentz was 
always inclined "to view situations in the most lurid 

''Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 73. 



30 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [516 

colors and to leap from extreme hope to extreme despair." 8 
A man with nerves like these and a temperament like his 
was indeed not to be employed as an independent force in 
foreign policies. Lastly, Gentz lacked entirely the gift 
of dissimulation; he could of course keep his peace, but 
hypocrisy was entirely foreign to his nature. 9 

Gentz's lack of these particulars had, however, also its 
good aspects; it made of him a remarkable if not a great 
publicist, and it is a strange thing that he should naturally 
have been most suited to the very activity for which there 
was at least place in the political system of his maturity. 
For the masses he never wrote ; he had in view the educated 
classes and for this reason did not shun thoroughness. His 
style is always clear and apt, and often picturesque and 
dramatic, as for instance in many of his letters and espe- 
cially in his memoir to Archduke John. And yet, in 
spite of these qualities Gentz cannot be called the greatest 
German publicist of his time, for beyond question this 
place was held by Joseph Gorres. 

3. Gentz's Political Theories. 

The most important sources of Gentz's political activ- 
ity were undoubtedly his political theories, and, on that 
account they now require an especial treatment. This 
treatment, it is true, will be neither entertaining nor sim- 
ple, for an uncommonly unfavorable situation has to be 
faced in this case. Although he was possessed of a clear 
and systematic mind, yet Gentz was not a professional 
teacher of law and thus never arrived at any really con- 
nected presentation of his political ideas; in 1792, 1794- 
1795 and 1799-1800 he makes, it is true, certain attempts in 
this direction. On the other hand, Gentz was by no means 
a mere pamphleteer ; he always writes after a careful con- 
sideration and with no little knowledge of the subject, 

8 Metternich-Klinkowstr6m, Osterreichs Theilnahme an den Bcfreiungs- 
kriegen, 599, note. 

"Varnhagen von Ense, Calerie von Bildnissen aus Rahels Vmgang, 
und Brieftvechsel, II, 182. 



517] POLITICAL THEORIES 31 

trying above all to convince his readers by reasons. The 
presentation of the political thoughts of a man of his type 
must, therefore, necessarily be extensive as well as compli- 
cated. 

We have no reason to assume that Gentz interested 
himself in questions of public law even while a student 
in the Gymnasium. Presumably, he came first in contact 
with them at Konigsberg, where he probably attended 
Kant's course on the law of nature and certainly familiar- 
ized himself with the doctrines of the school of natural 
law. There he likewise became acquainted with Garve's 
edition of Cicero's De Officiis 10 and with Rousseau; how- 
ever, it can not be ascertained whether the latter's political 
writings at that time entered into his vision. We are only 
slightly informed as to the years immediately following 
Gentz's stay at Konigsberg; we know this that he read 
another work of Garve's, the treatise on the connection of 
morals and politics. 11 From 1790 on, we are somewhat 
better informed ; Gentz now takes up once more the study 
of Montesquieu and devours everything that he can get 
hold of as regards pamphlets and newspapers dealing with 
the Revolution. 12 

The rationalistic doctrine of natural law, Cicero, Gar- 
ve, Montesquieu and perhaps, also Rousseau then formed, 
so far as we know, the reading material from which the 
young Gentz drew his political ideas. In order to under- 
stand the latter it will, therefore, be neccessary first to 
study the former. 

At the times when Gentz studied at Konigsberg, the 
German law faculties were almost completely under the 
sway of the school of natural law; the positive law made 
itself felt only later. The natural law in its turn was 
essentially nothing but the application of the general ra- 
tionalistic tendencies to the sphere of political life and 
thought; its standpoint coincided with that of ordinary 

10 Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 140 f. 
"Ibid., I, 146. 
"Ibid., I, 182, 179 f. 



o'2 FEIEDRICH GENTZ [518 

rationalism, that is, with the recognition of the primacy 
of reason. From this general basis the natural law pro- 
ceeded, however, to the construction of a system of indi- 
vidual ideas, the most important of which were the follow- 
ing: the placing of the natural above the positive right; 
the emphasizing of the cultural aims and problems of the 
human race; the supposition of a state of nature; the der- 
ivation of organized society from a fictitious or historic 
social compact; the distinguishing between the subject 
of sovereignty and its administrator; the assertion of the 
right of removing incompetent or bad rulers; the identi- 
fication of state duties with the protection of law and the 
advancement of the general welfare; the proclaiming of 
inalienable rights of man; the basing of international law 
on reason, treaties and usage; the drawing of a parallel 
between the relations of citizens and states ; the supposition 
of a universal state comprising all nations ; finally the con- 
demning of war as a falling back into the state of nature or 
into barbarism, and a general tendency toward progress. 
The most important of these ideas was, perhaps, that of 
the world state, of a siocietas of the nations or of a civitas 
maxima. It is found with most of tine advocates of natural 
law and is conceived by them in analogy with the notion of 
the individual state : its executive is resting with the total 
of the separate nations, its laws are, above all, the precepts 
of reason and its supreme court of justice is formed by the 
public opinion of the world. It would, however, be difficult 
to say how far this universal state was considered really 
to exist and to what extent it was a mere fiction; to men 
like Wolf it represented no reality, but others believed in it 
so seriously that they even demaned the abolition of the 
existing states. 13 

The political ideas of Cicero are found especially in his 
work Dc Officii*, that is, in that with which the young 
Gentz familiarized himself. Since it probably, as will be 
seen later on, exercised a particularly strong influence up- 
on the latter, it may be best to quote the most characteristic 

13 Cf. p. 20 f. 



r 

$19] POLITICAL THEORIES 33 

passages of this work of Cicero's; they are the following. 14 
''Whatever is virtuous arises from some one of these four 
divisions, for it consists either in sagacity and the per- 
ception of truth ; or in the preservation of human society, 
by giving to every man his due, and by observing the faith 
of contracts; or in the greatness or firmness of au elevated 
and unsubdued mind ; or in observing order and regularity 
in all our words and in all our actions, in which consists 
moderation and temperance" (I, 5). "We ought to regard, 
to cultivate, and to promote the good will and the social 
welfare of all mankind" (1,41). "The most extensive sys- 
tem is that by which the mutual society of mankind, and as 
it were, the intercourse of life is preserved. Of this there 
are two parts : justice, in which virtue displays itself with 
the most distinguished lustre and from which men are 
termed good; and allied to this, beneficence, which may 
likewise be termed benevolence or liberality'' (I, 6). 
"That one virtue, justice, is the mistress and queen of all 
virtues" (III, 6). "There are two kinds of injustice; the 
first is of those who offer an injury, the second of those 
who have it in their power to avert an injury from those 
to whom it is offered, and yet do it not" (1,7). "The 
foundation of justice is faithfulness, which is perseverance 
and truth in all our declarations and in all our promises" 
(I, 7). "Nothing is more disgraceful than insincerity" 
(I, 42). "The main cause why most men are led to for- 
getfulness of justice is their falling into violent ambition 
after empire, honours, and glory" (I, 8). "There is a man 
for you who aspired to be king of the Romans and master 
of all nations, and accomplished it — if anyone says this 
desire is an honest one, he is a madman" (III, 21). "No 
vice is more foul . . . than avarice, especially in great 
men, and such administer the republic" (II, 22). "The 
knowledge and contemplation of nature is in a manner lame 
and unfinished, if it is followed by no activity ; now activity 
is most perspicuous when it is exerted in protecting the 

"From the translation by C. R. Edmonds, London, 1865. 



34 FRIED1UCH GENTZ [520 

rights of mankind" (I, 43). "It is, therefore, more ser- 
viceable to the public for a man to discourse copiously, 
provided it is to the purpose, than for a man to think ever 
so accurately without the power of expression" (I, 44). 
"Those acts which are done in a timid, humble, abject and 
broken spirit . . . are inexpedient because they are 
scandalous, foul and base" ( III, 32) . "The administration 
of a government, like a guardianship, ought to be directed 
to the good of those who confer, and not of those who re- 
ceive the trust" (I, 25). "Nor indeed is this forbidden by 
nature alone — that is by the law of nations — but is also 
in the same manner enacted by the municipal laws of 
countries . . . that it should not be lawful to injure 
another man for the sake of one's own advantage" (III, 5). 
"This is the peculiar concern of a state and city, that every 
person's custody of his own property be free and undis- 
turbed" (II, 22). "The desertion of the common interest 
is contrary to nature" (II, 6). "The interest of each indi- 
vidually and of all collectively should be the same" (III, 
6). "Equality of rights has ever been the object of de- 
sire; nor otherwise can there be any rights at all" (II, 12) . 
"Equality ... is entirely subverted, if each be not 
permitted to possess his own" (II, 22). "As to actions 
resulting from the customs of civil institutions of a people, 
no precepts can be laid down; for those very institutions 
are precepts in themselves" (I, 4). "Wars . . . are 
to be undertaken for this end that we may live in peace 
without being injured" (I, 11). "Our magistrates and 
generals sought to derive their highest glory from this 
single fact that they had upon the principles of equity 
and honor defended their provinces and allies" (II, 8). 

If we compare these ideas with the corresponding ones 
of the natural law, their similarity will become immedi- 
ately apparent: here as well as there, we find the belief 
in the cultural ideals of the human race and in the exist- 
ence of a bond embracing all nations, the differentiation 
between state and ruler, the emphasizing of the promotion 
of the general welfare, the drawing of a parallel between 



521] POLITICAL THEORIES 35 

state and international duties and the rejection of offen- 
sive wars. It is true, there exists no complete harmony 
between the two doctrines — Cicero demands equality, he 
respects established institutions and customs, he knows of 
no natural rights in the special sense of the word and 
favors, of course, a republican form of government, while 
the doctrine of natural law takes an almost opposite stand 
on all these points — yet, these differences are in themselves 
of no great importance and remained almost unknown to 
the eighteenth century. In fact, so little was the period 
conscious of them that many rationalists would claim the 
Roman orator and statesman as one of their own; suffice 
it to mention here the names of Hume, Voltaire, Mirabeau, 
Robespierre, and Garve. 

The translator and editor of Cicero, Garve, must to 
a certain degree, be considered a rationalist ; he could, how- 
ever, be called an eclectic philosopher almost as well. He 
rejects dogmatism and declares that not the theory alone, 
but the theory coupled with a careful consideration of 
actual conditions should determine the form of govern- 
ment and the framing of laws. Whether politics may 
successfully be connected with morals, he does not dare to 
decide being of the opinion that a satisfactory answer to 
that could not be given. The smaller states, he thinks, 
must yield to the vital interests of the larger ones; at the 
same time, however, he asserts that the rulers should 
consider it their duty to advance the welfare of all human- 
ity. The most important duty of the government is, accord- 
ding to him, the protection of the law; he is not averse to 
moderate progress and a certain degree of liberty, but ob- 
jects to a complete abrogation of the privileges of the no- 
bility. He looks with admiration upon England and in the 
beginning sympathetically greets the Revolution. 

The fundamental principle of Rousseau was the idea 
of the sovereignty of the people, which he holds, however, 
in a quite unique way: he demands that this sovereignty 
be exercised directly and without the division of the pow- 
ers. Montesquieu, on the other hand, advocated the latter 



30 FRIBDRICH GENTZ [522 

and saw in the British constitution the model for every 
other constitution. 

We have little direct information as to what political 
theories the young Gentz held. From a letter to Garve of 
October, 1784, 15 we may infer that he had, at that time, 
become acquainted with the translation of the Officii*; 
"an excellent book", he writes, "which exercised a very im- 
portant influence upon my moral principles, 1113'' way of 
thinking and my character". Whether this influence 
emanated from Cicero himself or rather from the notes and 
treatises of Garve's edition cannot be said definitely ; it is, 
however, probable that it proceeded from the former, for 
some years later Gentz begins to raise objections to Garve 
and to raise them from a rationalistic and Ciceronian 
standpoint. At the beginning of October, 1789, he writes 
to Garve that the principles of morals and of philosophy 
are most valuable when practically applied, an idea that 
(lie year before had been declared by the latter to be open to 
criticism. 10 At the end of October, 1789, Gentz makes 
further attacks on Garve and they contain the first direct 
utterances which we have from him on questions of public 
law. 17 It is, he asserts, a matter of doubt whether there 
was ever a state of nature, for the existence natural to 
mankind is one regulated by contracts. Through contracts 
rights are created, and where there are rights there are 
also duties. The latter may be divided into two kinds, 
those of compulsion and those of moral obligation; both of 
these are the precepts of reason, but only the fulfillment of 
the former can be enforced. The capacity for fulfilling the 
duties of compulsion is justice, that for fulfilling the duties 
of moral obligation beneficence or benevolence. Gentz does 
not recognize any rights based solely on superior power, 
for this would be antagonistic to reason and reason is to 
him the highest judge. Likewise he will not allow the ruler 
to heat the state as his property; the ruler, he declares, is 

"Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, 1, 140 f. 
"Ibid., I, 144. 
"Ibid., I. 148 ff. 



523] POLITICAL THEORIES 



37 



only "the first servant" of the state and subject to the ver- 
dict of the people. The states themselves, however, he be- 
lieves to be moral personages; they stand toward one an- 
other in relations identical to those between private citizens 
and are, therefore, bound by mutual obligations. Further re- 
marks date back to the year 1790. In one of them Gentz 
speaks with considerable emphasis of the rights of the peo- 
ple without, however, pointing out which particular rights 
he is thinking of. 18 Others are found in the treatise Uber 
den Ursprung der obersten Prinzipien des Rcchts. 10 Reason 
and liberty, so Gentz now assumes, form the true nature of 
mankind ; reason, again, is the faculty of having ideas and 
represents the highest and original source of rights. The 
ideas of reason pertaining to law are inalienable and, 
therefore, called the "original rights of mankind" ; of such 
ideas there are three: the common individual right over 
one's self, the right of property, and the right of main- 
taining contracts. 

In short, Gentz's political system would then, accord- 
ing to this, until 1790 be the following : the chief elements 
of the human nature are reason and liberty ; reason is pri- 
marily the faculty of ideas and as such the source of positive 
law; the precepts of reason are compulsory to all, even 
when dealing with foreign nations, and the most import- 
ant of them are those of justice and benevolence; finally, 
the ruler is nothing but the mandatory of the popular will 
and accountable to its forum. 

The years 1791 and 1792 were of special importance 
for Gentz's inner development. Unfortunately the course 
of this development is rather unknown, for Gentz's corre- 
spondence with Garve— the best source of information 
about his earlier political theories — is missing beyond 
April, 1791; we know, however, that during this period 
Gentz did considerable reading, likewise that he watched 
the events in France with great interest and was gradu- 
ally losing his sympathies with the cause of the Revolu- 

ls Ibid., I. 158. 

"Forschungen zur brand- und preuss. Geschichte, XIX, 18 f. 



38 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [524 

tion. 20 In the beginning of 1793 Gentz appeared with the 
first of his many anti-revolutionary writings, the trans- 
lations of Burke's Reflections, to which he added notes, 
and five political treatises from his own pen. 21 

Burke has certain points in common with rationalism ; 
fundamentally, however, he is little of a rationalist. He 
practically knows no social compact and explains the orig- 
in of the state from the desire to get protection for existing 
contracts and agreements. The first obligation of the state 
he sees in this protection of rights, the second in "benevo- 
lence" or in the advancement of the general welfare. There 
is, according to him, no inborn right of equality; he would 
rather consider the state in the light of an association in 
which every member partakes of the profits in proportion 
to his investment. He considers freedom, in general, as a 
matter of small importance; the absolute freedom of the 
state of nature is inconceivable to him in organized so- 
ciety, but at the same time he advocates as little restric- 
tion of liberty as possible. Any right of participating in 
government he denies, reserving the conduct of public 
affairs to wealth, noble birth and talent; likewise he re- 
pudiates the tendency towards constructing constitutions 
at will; for these, in his opinion, must grow and cannot be 
fabricated. He strongly attacks the principle that every- 
body is naturally qualified to govern, maintaining that 
government is an art or, at best a trade which must be 
learnt like every other. Were we to ask him in what his 
ideal of a well-governed state consisted, he would answer: 
in the conception of a state in which order, prosperity, 
propriety, the protection of law and property, confidence 
in the government, and respect for the established order of 
things form the fundamentals of the community. 

Gentz began to read Burke in April, 1791. At first he 
liked only the latter's style, 22 but in the introduction to his 
translation of Burke's work on the French Revolution he 

"Cf. p. 57 f- 
^Weick, III. 
^Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 203 f. 



525] POLITICAL THEORIES 39 

declares himself to be in harmony also with the princi- 
ples of the author. 23 His political theories at about the be- 
ginning of 1793 are then, according to him, those of Burke, 
After 1792, these theories develop but little; they may 
undergo slight changes, as for instance in 1814 and 
again in 1819, but on the whole, they are stationary. They 
form a unit; they must, therefore, be treated as such, and 
the following pages will try to present them in this form. 

The first problem which confronts us here is the very 
difficult question whether Gentz must be classed with the 
rationalistic or with the positive-historic school of law. 
He has been claimed by both sides, and in reality he belongs 
to both schools : in his fight against the Revolution he pro- 
ceeds more from positive-historical points of view, while 
he bases his opposition to Napoleon chiefly on a rational- 
istic line of reasoning. 

Those who see in him more the adherent of the law 
of nature refer, of course, to such passages in his works 
as those in which the primacy of reason is explained. There 
are, it is true, many utterances of this kind in Gentz ; how- 
ever, if we analyse them closely, they do not always actu- 
ally contain what, at the first glance, they seem to mean. 
Besides, there could be mentioned an equally large num- 
ber of passages expressing a positivistic point of view. If 
we wish to arrive at a clear understanding of Gentz's atti- 
tude in this regard, we have, therefore, to proceed with the 
greatest caution and accuracy. 

In the treatises of the year 1793, Gentz speaks of the 
"deduction of the pure notions of law", of the "precepts 
of the law of nature", of "original rights", of the "specific 
rights of mankind" and of "original natural rights"; 24 
likewise, well-known teachers of the law of nature, such 
as Grotius and Pufendorf, are mentioned and referred to 
as authorities. 25 Furthermore, we hear in 1795 that the 

23 Weick, I, 20 f. 

"Ibid., II, 76 f., 39, 87, 89 ff. 

"Ibid., II, 77- 



40 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [526 

idea of the community of mankind is "a fiction of reason 
striving for perfection" and the notion of the human 
perfectibility, "an idea founded on reason as firmly as the 
idea of a supreme being, or of an unending existence of the 
substances". 20 In 1800 we find the remark that eternal 
peace is demanded by reason, and that order and lawful- 
ness are the symptoms of reason. 27 In 1793 Gentz declares 
that the advocates of the old order of things have to turn 
to reason ; similiarly he explains in 1800 and again in 1809, 
that it is advisable to order constitutions grown up his- 
torically according to the demands of logic and reason. 28 
Even in 1817, he writes to Adam Miiller : "Concerning all 
which can be recognized by reason there must be an appeal 
to reason, that is, to individual reasoning. . . . Ex- 
plain it as you like, my first impulse will always be that of 
an appeal to my reason." 29 

In all these passages, Gentz clearly takes the stand 
of a rationalist. He is, however, not less emphatic in up- 
holding the cause of the positive-historic law. In 1799 he 
calls the question regarding the lawfulness of an action 
the first and most important of all; 30 lawful, on the other 
hand, he declares in 1800 to be equivalent to whatever 
the sovereign commands. 31 At the same time he demands 
that no laws should be created which are likely to infringe 
upon existing rights; 32 likewise, he sees the main purpose 
of the social compact in the protection of the agreements 
and contracts entered into during the state of nature and 
in organized society. 33 He recognizes, in a general way, 
natural rights until about 1800, and as such he considers 
the right of liberty, property, self-defense, and of adherence 

"Ibid., V, 2ii. 

27 H. J., 1800, III, 713, 718, 7"i- 

^Ibid., I, 112 f. Aus dem Nachlasse, I, 298. 

^Briefw. zw. Fr. Gentz u. A. H. Miiller, 238 f. 

30 H. J., 1799, II, 309 ff. 

"Ibid., 1800. I, 18. 

32 Ibid., I, 7, 30, 1799; II, 142. 

33 Cf. p. 43- 



527] POLITICAL THEORIES 41 

to contracts, while he rejects a natural right of equality 
and of personal safety; 34 yet he maintains as early as 
1793 that states cannot be constructed on the basis of 
human rights and that these general rights are not inalien- 
able. Very emphatically he asserts in the treatise JJber die 
Declaration der Rechte : "That the human being in entering 
into company with equals gives up part of its original 
rights only in order to enjoy the remainder in safety and 
to have the total of its manifold aims advanced, — upon 
that everybody agrees". 35 At all events, the natural and the 
civil rights are for him fundamentally different, 30 and in 
1800 he declares, therefore, that there are no rights of 
man any more as soon as there are state rights; 37 in 1809 
he even goes a step farther calling all talk about inborn 
rights mere nonsense. 38 

The chaos, then, seems to be complete. If we wish to 
clear it, we will have, first of all, to remember the particu- 
lar notion of reason existing and prevailing at the time 
when Gentz entered the years of his maturity. At present, 
reason, in general, simply means the understanding or the 
faculty of logical thinking. The rationalism of the 
eighteenth century, however, understood by reason not 
only the latter, but also, and preeminently so, an assumed 
faculty of having ideas. Until Kant, the linguistic usage 
did hardly distinguish between the words "reason" and 
"understanding", using both of them interchangeably. In 
a certain sense, this practice was continued even later on; 
in general, however, Kant succeeded in introducing his 
differentiation between the two terms, and after him 
"reason" meant then more or less the faculty of ideas. Gentz 
uses the word "reason" in the old sense as well as in the 
new, and in this lies one of the chief causes of the seeming 

34 Weick, II, 89 f., 86. H. J., 1800, I, 6 f. 
^Weick, II, 63. 

"Ibid., II, 89 ff. H. J., 1800, I, 75 f- 
37 H. J., 1800, I, 61. 
**Aus dcm Nachlasse, I, 294. 



42 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [528 

confusion referred to above. For instance, when he declares 
that the man of conservative tendencies has, in defending 
his standpoint, to turn to reason, when he recommends the 
rational construction of constitutions or tells Adam 
Miiller that an appeal to reason will always be his last and 
decisive act, he has undoubtedly in mind nothing but the 
understanding. A further cause of this confusion is 
Gentz's attitude in passages speaking of reason as of the 
faculty of forming ideas; in those he unquestionably ap- 
pears, to a certain degree, as a rationalist. Yet, his ration- 
alism is never without a tinge and is coupled with other ten- 
dencies. The ideas or commandments of reason are for 
Gentz, as we shall see later on, 39 since 1793 in general mere 
ideals ranking as such after the positive law; at times, 
however, they represent to him also strictly binding or- 
ders and then they are in rank co-ordinate with any posi- 
tive law. Within the sphere of state law he places the 
positive-historic law invariably first, and there the pre- 
cepts of reason have for him no other meaning than that 
of ideals. In the sphere of international law he generally 
considers the ideas of reason in the same light; now and 
then, however he places, in this case, the rational law at 
the side or even before the law established by treaties or by 
usage. His ultimate aim seems to be the transforming of 
all rational into positive law. 

Among the precepts — or ideals — of reason that of the 
progress toward the perfection of the human race was for 
Gentz during a number of years the most important. It 
is found especially in his treatises of 1793-1795; after 1800 
we hear lit tie more of it. 40 The individuals, the state and 
the totality of the states, so Gentz demonstrates often and 
witli particular emphasis, combine to advance this ideal: 
the individuals by devoting themselves to their calling, the 
stale by protecting the law and promoting productive labor, 
and the totality of the states by cultivating the bonds of 

89 Cf. p. 49- 
40 Weick, II, 22 f. 



529] POLITICAL THEORIES 43 

intercourse and mutual good will existing between them. 41 
Yet, in spite of his enthusiasm for human progress Gentz 
was never blind to the disadvantages and dangers usually 
connected with such growth, 42 and this feeling grew upon 
him more and more, until it finally almost broke up his en- 
thusiasm for the cause of human culture. As early as 1805, 
he calls himself an opponent rather than a friend of pro- 
gress; and this he continued to be until his death, although 
he always demanded the cultivation of the spirit of fellow- 
ship and mutual consideration. 43 

Gentz even in 1789 doubts whether there ever was a 
state of nature; he repeats his doubt in 1793. 44 He seems 
to believe, however, in the existence of a social compact, 
at least up to 1800, 45 and we may say that his conception 
of this compact lies about half-way between the strictly 
rationalistic and the historic point of view. The mainten- 
ance of the unlimited freedom of the state of nature, Gentz 
asserts, or the introduction of equality cannot have been 
the aim of the social compact; 46 the right of self-defense 
was even abolished by it. 47 But what did this compact then 
really aim at? It meant, answers Gentz, the renouncing 
of a part of the natural rights in order to enjoy the rest 
more fully and satisfactorily, 48 the protection of the indi- 
vidual, positive rights acquired by contracts before or 
during the alleged social compact, 49 the advancement of 
the manifold problems of humanity, 30 the establishing of a 
supreme legislature and executive authority, 51 and the 

a Ibid., V, 193, note; II, 24. H. J., 1799, III, 447, 477. 

"Wrick, V, 190 ff. H. J., 1800, III, 730 f., 747- 

43 Schlesier, IV, 176 f. 

"Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 148 f. Weick, II, 64. 

4S H. J., 1800, I, 4; HI, 768, 772 f. 

46 Cf. p. 46 f. 

"Weick, II, 90 f. 

w Ibid., II, 63. 

"Ibid., II, 88. H. J., 1800, I, 5. 

50 Weick, II, 9. 63. 

"H. J., 1799, III, 280 ff., 302. 



44 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [530 

creation of a constitution and, by that, of a nation. 52 Gentz 
does not acknowledge any right of the individual to declare 
the social agreement null and void; he reserves it to the 
totality of the contracting parties acting as a united poli- 
tical body. 53 The mandate given to the supreme authority 
forms, according to him, a part of the social compact it- 
self and lasts, on account of that, as long as the latter; 5 * 
consequently, it cannot be recalled or abolished separately. 

A wholly different theoretical basis for the authority 
of the state is given by Gentz in 1809, and it is probable 
that this new theory from then on and even earlier formed a 
part of his political system in general. It is formulated by 
him as follows : "To consider the monarch as the proprietor 
of the state (in the sense in which some private citizen may 
be called the owner of his estate) is an indefensible and un- 
dignified idea. It is true, the state is intrusted to the mon- 
arch ; but only in the interest of the people shall he admin- 
ister it; and the transference takes place not by virtue of 
a common, miserable contract, which can be terminated at 
will by any of the parties; to treat the state like a leasehold 
estate . . . is a blunder of such inexcusable magnitude 
that compared with it the idea of some of the older pol- 
iticians assuming a divine right, a power handed over to the 
monarch, as it were, by God himself appears not only to be 
endurable but even attractive. The state is neither the pro- 
perty of someone, nor an object of the whims of the people ; 
it is an everlasting community to bind together by inde- 
structible ties the present, the past and the future; and in 
this sense it is of God". 55 

The duty of the state is for Gentz, in general, identi- 
cal with the purpose of the social compact: it consists, in 
the maintenance of order and peace, in the assurance of a 
certain amount of liberty, in the protection of law and in 

■7Wd., Ill, 282; I, 488 f. 
M Weick, II, 46, H. J., 1799, III, 288 f. 
M H. J. 1799, III, 282 f. 
ss Aus dem Nachlasse, I, 288. 



531] POLITICAL THEORIES 45 

the advancement of the general welfare. 50 The introduc- 
tion of equality is excluded from it. 57 Of these duties the 
most important are the two last named, or, as Gentz says, 
the duties of "natural justice'' and of "moral perfection". 58 
They, again, rank acording to their worth in such manner 
that the protection of law stands in the first place, the pro- 
motion of the general welfare, however, in the second place, 
and in establishing this scale Gentz deviates from ration- 
alism more than anywhere else. "Law", he says, "is the 
fundamental basis of social existence and the supreme rule 
of the state. The public weal is a great ideal, but compared 
with law, it is subordinate". 59 The rights which he de- 
sires to be preserved by government are — and it is im- 
portant to keep this in view — less the general, natural 
rights retained in organized society, than the individual 
rights based on special contracts; 60 of these, again, the 
right of property is the most important. 61 Gentz assumes 
that their fulfillment is of general interest and asserts more 
than once that the common welfare and the welfare of the 
individual are identical. 62 Of course, he does not fail to 
admit that a state governed according to these principles 
may appear harsh; but that cannot be changed. On the 
other hand, he finds that the strict enforcement of the laws 
makes their observance considerably easier; "to do what 
is right", he declares, "may, under such circumstances, 
often become hard and injurious, . . . but to know 
what duty requires will, at least, be no riddle." 63 

As to the form of government, Gentz shows a good 
deal of indifference towards all formulas, believing that 
none of them will give full guarantee of just laws and of a 

5e Weick, I, 55 ff., 90; V, 3 f. H. J., 1799, III, 301 f., 312; 1800, I, 
29 ff., 116 f. 

"Weick, II, 86 f. H. J. 1800, I, 5 ff. 

^Weick, II, 46. 

59 //. /., 1800, I, 30. 

60 Weick. II, 63 f., 88, 98, H. J., 1799, III, 301 ff., 310 ff.; 1800, I, 
4 ff., 30 ff. 

"Weick, II, 199, 90. 

™Ibid., V, 3, 193. 

e3 Ibid.. II, 56. 



46 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [532 

rigorous enforcement of existing regulations. 64 He lays, 
therefore, more stress on sagacity and experience 63 and is 
insistent only on that nothing but the law shall be author- 
itative in the state. 66 In reality, it is true, Gentz is less 
indifferent towards the form of government than he often 
pretends to be. At the time of the beginning of the French 
Revolution and at any rate until 1794, he considers the 
then existing British constitution as the best imaginable 
and would like to see other constitutions being shaped after 
it. 67 In 1799 we find him in irresolute oscillations: inci- 
dentally he still points to the British constitution as a 
model ; 68 but at the same time he remarks that the purely 
monarchical form of government is as good as any other. 69 
After 1800 he comes out more and more openly for the 
system of enlightened absolutism; from then on he is, at 
any rate, the untiring foe of democracy. 

If the ideas of liberty, equality and sovereignty of the 
people may be called the fundamental principles of democ- 
racy, what was, then, Gentz's attitude towards them? 

Liberty as such is to him no political ideal in the pro- 
per sense of the word. 70 In the state of nature, he declares, 
everybody was free, even absolutely free; in organized so- 
ciety, however, only restricted liberty is possible. There, 
the one form of liberty which is indispensable is the absence 
of arbitrariness or despotism and the rule of the law. A 
greater amount of liberty, Gentz thinks, would be injurious 
to the true interests of the state ; for no government, so he 
asserts repeatedly and emphatically, can be efficient and 
beneficial, except it be strong and centralized. 71 

"Ibid., I, ii2. Translation of Mallet du Pan, conclusion. H. J. 1799, I. 
490 ff., Ill, 283, 286. 

C5 Weick, I, 112, note; II, 9, 40, 88. H. J., 1799, HI, 286 f. 

m H. J., 1799, I, 489; HI, 284. 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, 22, note, 33, note. 

M H. /., 1799, III, 448, note. 

"Ibid., I, 498. 

™Weick, II, 86 ff., 120; V, 197, note. H. J., 1800, I, 77 ff- 

"Weick II, 12. H. J., 1799, I, 29m.; II, 55, 457; 1800, I. 121 ff.. 165 
1, 336; II, 457. Weick, II, 56. H. J., 1800 I, 196, 34i I- 



533] POLITICAL THEORIES 47 

Equality 72 is rejected by Gentz in the most absolute 
way, if equality of rights is meant; it is, on the other hand, 
accepted, if it means equal protection of acquired rights. 
The first he calls the "objective", and the second the "sub- 
jective" equality. 

The principle of the sovereignty of the people is of 
all democratic doctrines the most hateful to Gentz, because 
it is the most important and far-reaching. He denies any 
right of participation in the conduct of public affairs, any 
alleged natural ability to govern, any possibility of find- 
ing out what the popular will demands and consists of, 
any right of the citizens to criticize the laws of the state 
from the basis of general principles, in short, everything 
that has been said about and in favor of this hated doc- 
trine. 73 To him government is an art requiring talent and 
training as much as any other art, 74 and, on account of 
that, he would reserve the right of cultivating this art to 
the sovereign of the state, to his officials, to noble rank, to 
wealth, in a certain sense also to talent. 75 Summing up 
his objections he remarks in 1809 : "The sovereignty of the 
people is the wildest, most wicked, most dangerous of all 
chimeras". 76 

Gentz does not, as might be expected, assume that 
there is anything like complete justice to be found admin- 
istered even in the best of the existing states; 77 but he 
denies, nevertheless, any right of withdrawing from the 
social contract, so long as not all the participants are ready 
to do so. A right of revolution is neither rejected nor 
acknowledged by him; 78 as a matter of fact, however, he 
dislikes revolutions most heartily. He abhors the idea of 

"Weick, II, 85 ff., 107 ff. ; V. 199- H. J., 1800, I, 5 ff.. 83. 

' S H. /., 1799, III, 292 ff. Weick, I, 112 note. Translation of Mallet 
du Pan, 20 f., note, 101, note, 89 note. H. /., 1800, I, 76. 

74 Weick, II, 9, 12 f . ; V, 4, 193, note. 

™Ibid., I, 99, note, 23 ff., 44 ff.; II, 136 ff., 13 ff. ; IV, 75 ff. H. J., 1800, 
I, 26. Mem. ct ktt. iucd., 87. 

'"Aiis dem Nachlasse, I, 288. 

n H. J.. 1800, III, 777. 

78 Weick, II, 35 ff. 



48 FRrEDRICH GENTZ [534 

removing a ruler and bases his attitude in this regard on 
the theory that the ruler's mandate lasts as long as the so- 
cial contract itself, that is, as he expects, forever. He 
preaches obedience and confidence to those who are gov- 
erned, and a paternal consideration of the common weal to 
those who govern; or, to use his own words, he demands 
"on the part of the people respect and confidence, on 
the part of the authorities generosity and firmness, 
strength and benevolence, frankness and paternal care". 79 
Progress there must be, of course; but this progress should 
be slow and never too incisive. In 1799 he still adheres 
to the programme of "conserving by improving" ; 80 by the 
end of 1805 he declares, however, that although wishing 
for a balance between the forces of conservation and pro- 
gress he was, at the present time, working exclusively in 
the interests of the first. 81 

Gentz uses not unfrequently — as he does especially in 
1804 and 1805 — expressions like "eternal laws", "eternal 
principles", "divine and human rights", "most sacred prin- 
ciples", or the like, and exhorts the princes as well as the 
people to stand up for the defense of such rights and prin- 
ciples. 82 What he understands by them will become evident 
when we consider that he apparently uses the words "foun- 
dations of the social order" and "principles of public order 
and morality" as synoyms of the expressions named above ; 
according to this, he would, then, use the latter in order to 
designate the ideas of his political system in general. 

If we turn to Gentz's views on international law and 
international politics, we hit, first of all, upon the idea of 
a world state. We know that Gentz favors close commer- 
cial and cultural relations between the civilized nations; 83 
but he speaks also of a "general state", a "confederation of 
states", a "grande association que tons les penples civilises 

™H. J., 1799, I, 104. 

"Ibid., II, 143. 

"Schlesier, IV, 176 f. 

* 2 Mem. et lett. hied., 14 f., 31, 38, 81, 86. 

"Cf. p. 42 f. 



535] POLITICAL THEORIES 49 

forment entre cn-r" or a "communio eminewbissima" of the 
nations, 84 and the question arises, therefore, what he really 
means by using such terms. In other words: was the 
world state for Gentz a fact, a legal fiction, or a mere ideal 
of reason? The answer to this question is by no means easy. 
In general Gentz alternates these three conceptions; in 
particular, however, he probably favours most the idea 
of the universal state as a mere goal to be attained by the 
gradual extension of international law based upon treaties. 
How much he alternated in this regard may be seen 
from the fact that he considers the establishment of a fed- 
eration of the states— first of all of those of Europe— to be 
a mere ideal in 1799 and in 1800, that he treats it as an 
actual fact in 1805, rejects it entirely in 1809, and seems to 
take it to be a fact once more in 1813. 

As regards the individual rights and duties of the 
states in dealing with one another Gentz mentions, above 
all, the right of independence, of safety, and of honour, 
together with the duty of international justice. 85 The lat- 
ter consists for him, however, not only in doing no wrong, 
but also— and this is important— in helping others to get 
what is due to them ; 86 most emphatically he declares it to 
be the duty of each and every state to render assistance to 
those who are forced to defend their rights. 

Gentz knows of three means through which he expects 
the maintenance of an international state of conditions in 
which the law is reigning supreme ; they are : international 
congresses, the preservation of the balance of power among 
the European nations, and, as the ultima ratio, war. 

In itself Gentz would have liked nothing more than 
to see every European complication settled peacefully and 
by means of congresses; but for that the time was too 

^Weick, II, 192, 195; IV, 69; V. 6, 8, 195. H. J-, 1799, I, 405- Mem. 
et lett, ined., 86. Metternich-Klinkowstrom, Osterreichs Theilnahme an 
den Befreiungskriegen, 251. 

85 Fournier, Gents und Cobensl, 278, 282, 284. Weick, IV, 66 ff., note; 
V, 8. Aus dem Nachlasse, I, 301. 

86 Fournier, Gentz und Cobencl. 287. Mem. et lett. ined., 86. 



50 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [530 

stormy, and thus lie refers, before 1815, to this mode of 
settlement extremely seldom. 87 

The maintenance of the balance of power was for him 
an idea to which he clung all his life because he believed 
that he had found in it a panacea for all international 
complications; 88 he defines it as the grouping of the small- 
er powers in such way as to neutralize the forces of a para- 
mount state and sees in it the real aim of the art of diplo- 
macy. Should it prove to be impossible to create or to 
utilize properly this balance of power toward the protec- 
tion of international rights, then — but only then — diplo- 
macy must give way to force. The ultima ratio of all re- 
lations between the different states is, therefore, for Gentz 
too: war; 89 he considers it as being justifiable not only if 
waged for the defence of a country, but also if undertaken 
in order to suppress dangerous movements outside one's 
own state, and proclaims a formal law of intervention. 90 

So much for the political theories of Gentz. There re- 
mains, however, one question to be answered, which, until 
now, has received almost no attention. If the political 
theories of Gentz, as has been said above, formed the 
basis of his fight against the Revolution and Napoleon, 
then they naturally must have been older than this fight; 
the problem which confronts us now would, therefore, be 
this: were Gentz's theories really older than his struggle, 
or did they not rather originate during the conflict? 

It must be admitted that this question allows of no 
solution which would be entirely proof against objections. 
Approximate solutions of it are, however, quite possible, 
and they will, ultimately, have to rest on our knowledge 
of Gentz's relations to Cicero. 

A priority of the political theories held by Gentz to his 
struggle against the Revolution can not be shown from 

K Mcm. et left, incd., 63. 
nVeick, II, 195. H. /., 1800, III. 757 ff. 

89 Weick, I, 68; II, 152 ff. ; V, 7. H. /., 1800, III, 775 f., 782 ff. 
""Weick, II, 194 ff. Metternich-Klinkowstrom, Ostcrrcichs Theilnahme 
an den Befreiungskriegen, 251 ff. 



537] POLITICAL THEORIES 51 

any of his earliest utterances, for there is not a sufficient 
number of them. Neither has the fact that Gentz knew 
and admired Montesquieu, Rousseau, Garve and Burke 
any bearing on the question; to admire a political system 
does not necessarily mean to accept it, and even by grant- 
ing this, we would only admit that Gentz, at that time, 
had accepted the political ideas of these men and could not 
have had, just for this reason, his own ideas of 1793 and 
the following years which were rather different. The 
same may be said concerning his study of natural law at 
Konigsberg and at Berlin. 

The attempt to establish this priority would, then, 
have to be abandoned, had we not at our disposal one bit 
of evidence which appears to be more or less convincing: 
Gentz's knowledge and admiration of Cicero of which he 
himself informs us. We know that he had read the latter's 
work De officiis even before 1789 and that he speaks of 
the great influence which it had had upon his mind and his 
character; 91 in 1790, he even incidentally mentions that the 
book — probably in the Garve edition — forms part of his 
meager library. 92 Furthermore, in 1793 and in 1794, lie 
refers to or quotes the Roman as an authority. 93 We have, 
therefore, sufficient indications to permit the hypothesis 
that Gentz, before 1789, had been essentially influenced 
and guided by Cicero, and only incidentally by other poli- 
tical thinkers. But it is just these ideas of Cicero's, as 
the above citations show, 94 which are fundamentally iden- 
tical with those held by Gentz before and after the year 
1789. Comparing the two we may, then, conclude that 
the political system of the latter did antedate his political 
struggle, in so far as this is possible in complicated his- 
torical questious. 

And on this hypothesis Gentz's attitude after 1790 
will cease to be a riddle which it must otherwise always 

91 Cf. p. 36. 

i2 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 164. 

^Weick, I, 258 f., note. Translation of Mallet du Pan, 21, note. 

94 Cf. p. 33 f- 



52 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [538 

be in our eyes. As will be seen later, Gentz was, in the be- 
ginning, a friend of the Revolution who was enthusiastic 
about the sacred principles of liberty and equality. Such 
enthusiasm he could not have developed on the basis of the 
teachings of natural law, for this stood for the omnipo- 
tence of the government and the preservation of the aris- 
tocracy; but such a course would be thoroughly permis- 
sible from the Ciceronian viewpoint. If Gentz later turned 
against equality, it would not necessarily indicate a depar- 
ture from this standpoint ; he may, on more careful consid- 
eration, have noticed that Cicero refers, after all, less to 
equality of rights than to equal protection of rights what- 
ever these might be. In addition to this, Cicero was, of 
course, the sworn enemy of all excesses such as the Revo- 
lution brought with it. It is true that he does not fre- 
quently speak of forms of government, whereas Gentz, be- 
tween 1789 and 1795, considered constitutional govern- 
ment the best; but it is just the relative silence on these 
points which made it possible for Gentz to yield to other 
influences without being disloyal to his fundamental prin- 
ciples as well as to the inspirer of the same. 

It can, of course, not be denied that the Ciceronian 
influence on Gentz often coincided with that of natural law; 
likewise it must be admitted that Gentz's original ideas 
were, to a certain extent, modified by his reading of Burke 
and Mallet du Pan, and by the course of the French 
Revolution itself. 



II. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REVOLUTION 

1. Before the Struggle: 1789-1792. 

On the right bank of the Rhine there existed already 
in the years 1787 and 1788 here and there a fear that 
Europe was on the eve of disturbances; but when the 
Revolution really broke out in France, even those who had 
felt such premonitions were surprised. The sensation 
which the rapid succession of events since 1789 aroused 
was extraordinary and persisted often for a considerable 
time after the opening scenes of the great drama. 1 Even 
in 1793, Archenholz writes in his Minerva: "The French 
Revolution crowds out everything else by reason of its in- 
tense interest; the best poetry remains unread." 2 In 1794, 
Gentz remarks likewise: "The French Revolution is one 
of those occurences which belong to all mankind; it is an 
occurence of such magnitude that it is scarcely permissible 
in its presence to be occupied with any lesser interest." 3 

Tor a better understanding of the following, it is well at this point 
to recall the chief events of the French Revolution. They are as fol- 
lows: May 5th, 1789, assembling of the Etats-Generaux at Versailles; 
June 17th, establishment of the third estate as the National Assembly; 
July 14th, storming of the Bastille; August 27th, declaration of the rights 
of man ; October 5th to 6th, procession of the mob to Versailles, removal 
of the royal family and of the National Assembly to Paris; June 20th, 
1791, flight of the king to Varennes and his return to Paris; October, 
1791 to September, 1792, Legislative Assembly; April 20th, 1792, declara- 
tion of war against Austria, and February 1st, 1792, against Holland, 
England and Spain; May, 1792, actual beginning of the revolutionary 
wars ; August 10th, storming of the Tuileries ; August 13th, suspension and 
imprisonment of the king, Jacobins in power; September 2nd to 7th, 
massacre of royalists and constitutionalistic prisoners at Paris and in 
other large cities; September, 1792, to October, 1795, National Conven- 
tion; September 21st, 1792, abolition of the monarchy; January 21st, 1792, 
execution of the king; March, 1793, to July, 1794, Reign of Terror; Octo- 
ber, 1795, to November, 1799, government of the Directory; October 9th 
(18th Brumaire), 1799, Coup d'Etat by Napoleon Bonaparte. 

2 August Number, 199. 

translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xvi. 

53 



54 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [540 

The enthusiasm for the Revolution in Germany was 
at first wide-spread; it was, however, not equally intense 
everywhere, and even where it did prevail, it was subject 
to considerable variations. 4 The West and the South seem 
to have been most affected, that is to say, the territory 
which lay nearest to France and which is even today, the 
stronghold of German democracy. By the end of 1789 and 
the spring of 1790 in this part of Germany — especially in 
the Palatinate, in Hesse and in the ecclesiastical territor- 
ies on the left bank of the Rhine, in the Black Forest and 
in many of the imperial cities — even numerous petty re- 
volts broke out, which were, however, subdued without 
much effort, either by compromise or by force. Toward 
the spring of 1791, the first enthusiasm had subsided, and 
then unheard of events followed one another with dreadful 
rapidity. The result of this was that the number of those 
sympathizing with the Revolution quickly decreased 
during 1792-1795. Already the 20th of June, 1791, had 
caused many to waver; but the 13th of August, the 2nd to 
7th and the 21st of September, 1792, the 21st of January, 
1793, and finally the whole Reign of Terror made an ex- 
tremely unfavorable impression. After the fall of Robes- 
pierre, the sympathy for the Revolution once more in- 
creased and was further strengthened by the victories of 
Bonaparte in Italy. 

The intellectual classes of Germany seem to have been 
more persistently committed to the couse of the Revolution 
than any other class; they saw in it a movement which 
was essential to the progress of humanity and were in- 
clined to ignore its excesses or to excuse them on the 
ground of circumstances. Gentz complains of this as late 
as 1794, in the midst of the Reign of Terror. 5 The nobility 
was, in the main, opposed to the Revolution, which as re- 
gards the country districts of Prussia, had great signifi- 
cance. The clergy and the government became, of course, 
very soon decidedly hostile to all revolutionary tendencies. 

4 Cf. for the following: Wenck, Deutschland vor hundert Jahren. 
'Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., v. 



541] GERMANY AND THE REVOLUTION 55 

The attitude of the peasants varied considerably. In the 
North they remained in general quiet, owing to their na- 
tural conservatism, to the influence of the local powers, 
the landed nobility and the clergy, to their old Prussian 
instinct for discipline and their geographical remoteness 
from France. In the West and South, however, there was 
at first considerable restlessness, as has been previously 
remarked, especially on account of statute labor and the 
damage done by game. The peasantry of Swabia remained 
devoted to the cause of the Eevolution down to 1796, and 
not until the French themselves appeared in the country, 
did this feeling change. 6 The invasion of the French 
armies into German territories cooled the enthusiasm for 
the Revolution also in other districts; the plundering of 
the imperial city of Frankfort a. M. by Custine made, for 
example, a deep impression on almost all Germany, par- 
ticularly of course, on its rich commercial centers. As an 
illustration of the opinions then prevailing in Germany, 
we may cite two contemporary judgments, one from the 
South and one from the North. In 1798 the Swabian Z. 
L. Huber writes, that there existed in his country, as else- 
where in Germany, three parties: those who were hostile 
to the Revolution, those who sympathized with it, and 
finally a middle party. The enemies, he explained, would 
like to see the Revolution with all its principles and effects 
nowhere else than in limbo, and in this party he includes 
first of all the rulers, the governments, and the nobles; 
the sympathizers, on the other hand, delighted in the Rev- 
olution and many of its methods, while the middle party 
agreed with the principles of the Revolution, but regretted 
its ways. 7 According to the Hanoverian E. Brandes, 
there prevailed among the nobles and among many of the 
officials not only disgust with, but even a considerable fear 
of, the Revolution; on the other hand, the movement met 
with sympathy from a minority of the officials and from 

'Lang, Von und aus Schwaben, III, 88. 
'Ibid., Ill, 67. 



56 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [542 

most of the political theorists. 8 As to the particular con- 
ditions of Prussia, a modern historian assumes that there 
the nobility and army were more or less against the Revo- 
lution and the middle classes more or less for it, while 
some of the high officials and not a few of the lower ones 
felt at least convinced that reforms were necessary. 9 

The centres of this struggle between the conflicting 
views for and against the Revolution were Hamburg, Ber- 
lin and Gottingen in the North, Tubingen in the South, 
and Jena in middle Germany. At Gottingen, Brandes, 
Schlozer, and Girtanner had been writing against the 
Revolution since 1791, while at Tubingen the tireless Pos- 
selt was working for it since about 1795. In 1793, there 
arose a new opponent to the Revolution : the young Fred- 
erick Gentz. 

If we wish to understand Gentz's position towards 
the Revolution from the beginning, we must attempt to 
put ourselves into his state of mind. He was, as has been 
shown above, strongly interested in the progress of human 
culture, in justice, freedom, and equality — in the last, 
it is true, in a rather vague sense — and believed, at any 
rate later on, that the conditions of pre-revolutionary 
France were really bad and needed reforming. 10 He 
heard the mutterings of the French people, but also saw, 
or thought he saw, that the king and the government were 
not only ready for such reforms but had even taken steps 
toward their realization. 11 Of the character of the French 
nation itself he had, furthermore, a rather high opinion to 
which he gives expression even in the midst of the struggle. 
What else, then, could he expect, but that the work of re- 
form would now be completed? It might be completed 
even though with disturbances, yet without the shedding of 
blood or the overthrow of law ; and it is not improbable that 
Gentz expected it to be accomplished along the lines recom- 

8 Wenck, Dciitschland vor hundert Jahren, II, 4. 

'Wittichen, Forschungen zur brand, mid prcuss. Geschichte, XIX, 6 fiL 

10 Cf. p. 67. 

"Cf. p. 67 f. 



543 J EARLY SYMPATHIES WITH THE REVOLUTION 57 

mended by Cicero in the passage which he cited in 1793. 12 
That he really did entertain these hopes can, of course, not 
be proved absolutely. 13 It is true, had Gentz possessed 
more experience, he could have seen even then that it is 
wholly impossible to forecast the future in any way so long 
as events depend upon the multitude and upon its psy- 
chology. 

In view of this we must, therefore, find it but natural 
that Gentz at first should have welcomed the Revolution. 
As Henrietta Herz relates, 14 he was enthusiastic about the 
cause of freedom even in 1787, and we can follow the 
course of his sympathy in his letters to Garve down to 
April 19, 1791. 15 He states that he himself would consider 
the failure of this movement as one of the greatest 
misfortunes that ever befell the human race; he defines 
the Revolution as the "first practical triumph of philosophy 
the first example of a form of government which is founded 
on principles and upon a consistent, logical system." He 
terms it "an attempt to better humanity on a large scale," 
or "the greatest work which history can show," and sin- 
cerely mourns the death of Mirabeau. But his utterances 
are soon tinged with a pessimistic undertone, and in April, 
1791, he begins to fear that the Revolution may eventually 
fail. 10 

We have no direct information about Gentz's attitude 
toward the Revolution during the period between the 
middle of April, 1791, and the end of 1792, as his letters 
to Garve from this time are not preserved and other mater- 
ial is not available. We know, however, this much that he 
followed the events in France with a very watchful eye. 
As early as 1790 he is reading Mallet du Pan's Mercure de 
France, Mirabeau's Courier de Provence and the reports 

12 Weick, I, 258 f., note. 
™Ibid., II, 45, note. 
"Guglia, Fricdrich von Gentz, 98. 

"There are only a few of them : Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 178 ff., 
233 ff. 

10 'Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 205. 



58 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [544 

of the sessions of the National Assembly. 17 He praises 
the Mercure with reference to its style, but can not yet 
agree with its tendencies; three years later, however, he 
calls the paper the best French publication since the death 
of Voltaire. 18 The reports received his high praise as first 
class sources for the study of the Revolution. 19 He mentions 
also other works and newspapers : Burke's Reflections, the 
Moniteur and the Journal de Paris, then in a general way, 
Brandes and Girtanner; of the last two lie has no favor- 
able impression, and in Burke he is at the time being 
pleased only with the form of presentation. 20 His review 
of the French political literature from August 1788 to 
June 1789 in the Historisches Journal of 1799 shows, how- 
ever, that in his study of the Revolution he must have con- 
sulted many other publications besides those mentioned 
above; in 1796 he asks the library at Weimar for the priv- 
ilege of using its literature on the Revolution, and in 1798 
the number of newspapers which he is reading and excerpt- 
ing regularly has grown to many German, five French, and 
three English ones. 21 The events in France had apparently 
got a permanent hold upon his mind, as he himself acknowl- 
edges in 1790 and again in 1798. 22 

The sympathetic attitude of Gentz toward the Revolu- 
tion did, however, not last very long, for as early as the 
beginning of 1793, he appeared as its foe, with the trans- 
lation of Burke's Reflections, and five political treatises 
from his own pen. 23 The pro-revolutionary utterances 
which have been preserved of him extend, as we know, not 
beyond the middle of April, 1791 ; and since we may assume, 
on the other hand, that he began his work on Burke and 

"Ibid., I, 178 ff. 

u Ibid., 11, 40. 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xxvii. 

20 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 203 ff. 

~ l H. J., 1799, II, 176 ff. Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 206 f., 220 f., 
223, note, 224. 

"'Bricfc V. u. a. Fr. v. Gcntz. I, 180, 207. 

^The two volumes of this work actually appeared at the close of 1792, 
but bore the date 1793. 



1 CHANGE OF ATTITUDE 59 

the five essays, at latest in the fall of 1792 the change in 
his attitude toward the Revolution must have afca fni e 
m the period determined by these two limits Ewtlv 

portant The" " T ^ " »* "»* t0 *»*™ * * - 

enee We f, fl v f mg ° f BUPke d ° UbtIm bad some influ- 
ence We have, however, no means of deterininino- ti,„ 

exact extent of this influence as Burke's theor™ in Lnv 

rs^ tLeir t ted tendency i ™ « 

conservatism, m their emphasis on justice in general and 
property rights in particular, in their conception o'ual 

fsdom th Z^ iSerenCe t0 aU the ° rieS -A e-ltation „r 
« sdoni and experience-correspond exactly with those 
which Gent, could already have become acquainted tZ 
in Cicero or Garve. It is, however, probable that Gmtz 

ot the events themselves m France, and in his determini 

ad boT, tUe "• ,f S °i tLe flghterS ' The ^-e m gh Te 
said about a possible mfluence of Mallet du Pan Of much 

greater importance in this regard was the coarse o^tne 
* I* 10 " ' £* *»*- -»n saw more and more 

iS o 1 is McaTTnrI 110 ' ° nlT " D ° ^ 
, tim " " a meals > but even an increasing deterior- 

v lue of 1 be" r ,St,Dg r nditi0 -; he began todonbt Te 
value of hberty and of equality in the sense of their 
revolutionary interpretation, and the antipatln w lie! 
thus had gradually been gathering came fiuaSy with rela 

n Z TTZ* d t7? When tMS ^ ---Ted 
„„„.' be ' said definitely. All indications, however 
point to the events of the 10th to 13th of August 1792 « 
those whmh brought about the climax; the bloodv 
scenes o the 2n(] m Qf geptembe J^ b °;* 

of that "ever horrible year", 1792, onlv made Gentz's "tti 
to.de a permanent one- "The last and most terrible perLd 
of the French Revolution", he says in 1794, ' "?' 

gan w.th the horrors of the 10th of August " This onininn 
was quxte correct in so far as those'days did ^arTtne 

07, 2:t U not: h '* TranS ' a,i0n ° f Ma " el d " Pa "' * »* «. no-, 



CO FRIEDRICH GENTZ [546 

beginning of what Gentz calls "the systematic overthrow 
of all social conditions". 25 It was also more or less the 
opinion of the many German observers of the events beyond. 
the Rhine who after having sympathized with the Revolu- 
tion finally turned against it. There were, according to 
Gentz's own testimony, in German}^ people professing 
democracy up to the 5th of October, 1789, to the opening 
of the Legislative Assembly, to the 10th of August, 1792, to 
the execution of the King and so on ; 2G for the majority of 
the German democrats, however, this 10th of August 
marked the turning point in their attitude toward the 
Revolution. 27 . 

2. 1793—1801. 

Gentz was now an enemy of the Revolution and re- 
mained so during the next ten years of his life. As his 
nature would not permit him to be idle under such cir- 
cumstances, he girded his loins and went forth to battle. 

How far he fought the Revolution through the medium 
of the spoken word is hard to say; our sources are for the 
most part silent about this. Opportunity for such activity 
certainly was not wanting to him. During the whole period 
of this struggle, he was living at Berlin as an official of the 
Prussian civil service; his position was by no means an 
important one, but he possessed from the beginning con- 
nections and these together with his own resourcefulness 
won him in time a place in the higher social life of Berlin. 
Up to 1797, we find in his letters especial references to an 
intercourse with families of the middle class such as the 
Ancillon, Spalding, Engel, Gilly, Hainchelin, Merian, 
Herz and others; names of the nobility are, however, also 
mentioned, as for instance that of W. von Humboldt. Lit- 
tle by little Gentz's social environment becomes higher, and 
between 1800 aud 1802, he moves in the upper circles of 
society; he is now acquainted with Prince Louis Ferdi- 

^Translation of Mallet du Pan, 75, note. 

K Ibid., pref., xxi. 

"Lang, Von und aus Schwaben, III, 69. 



547] EARLY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 61 

mand of Prussia, with the duke of Braunschweig-Ols, the 
ambassadors of various foreign powers, such as Lord 
Carisford of England, Prince Reuss and Count Stadion 
of Austria, Count Panin of Russia and Brinckmann of 
Sweden, with Lucchesini, the later Prussian representative 
at Paris, and with Haugwitz. 28 This undeniable suc- 
cess he owed to a combination of fortunate circumstances. 
His father was, after 1779, director general of the royal 
mint, and one of his uncles, an Ancillon, counsellor of the 
consistory in Berlin. Moreover, he had patrons and friends 
who boomed him socially, such as Captain von Schack, 
Brinckmann, the Swedish envoy, and the Marquise of 
Lucchesini. 29 Finally, we must here take into account 
his own social talents, his growing reputation and his 
lavish expenditure of the money extracted from the coffers 
of the British foreign Office and the treasuries of helpful 
people in general. But, whatever Gentz, in these circles, 
may have done against the Revolution, the centre of his 
anti-revolutionary activities lay certainly elsewhere : in his 
anti-revolutionary publications. The first of these, as noted 
above, were his translation of Burke's Reflections and the 
five essays JJbel politische Freiheit; liber die Moralitdt in 
den Staats revolutionen; ijber die Deklaration der Reclite; 
Versueh einer Widerlegung der Apologie des Ecrra Mdk- 
intosh; and Uber die Nationalerziohung in Frankreich. In 
1794 his translation of Mallet du Pan's work on the 
French Revolution appeared; likewise, in 1795, that 
of a part of Mounier's . "The Causes which have 
hindered France from attaining Freedom," and in 1797 a 
translation and continuation of d'lvernois' "History of 
the Financial Administration of the French Republic dur- 
ing the year 1796.'' Independent works were: Uber die 
Qrundprincipien der jetzigen franzosichen Verfassung, 
nach Robespierre's und St. Just's Darstellung derselben 

^Schlesier, V, 24 ff. 

"According to Gentz himself, it was she who introduced him into 
upper Berlin society (Festschrift sit Gustav Schmollers 70. Geburtstag, 
249) ; but perhaps he here simply desires to flatter. 



62 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [548 

from 1794, Uber den Ur sprung unci Charakter des Krieges 
gegen die fran&osische Revolution, and Von dem politi- 
schen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der fransosischen 
Revolution, the last two both from 1801. Finally, there 
are to be mentioned two periodicals which were mostly 
written by Gentz himself, the Neue teutsche Monats- 
schrift and the Historisches Journal. The Historisclies 
Journal, the more important one, was purely political and 
financial in content and appeared from 1799 to 1800. The 
work on the history of the French Revolution, upon which 
Gentz worked during the nineties, has never been printed ; 
it exists, however, as a manuscript ready for print, and 
consists of five volumes. 30 Of all publications, the series 
of articles in the Historisches Journal of 1799, bearing the 
titles Tiber den Gang der offentlichen Meinung in Europa 
in Riicksicht auf die franzosischc Revolution, and Be- 
trachtungen uber die Entstchung der franzosischen Rev- 
olution, give the clearest insight into Gentz's views about 
the causes and the first period of the Revolution. 

In these nineties falls also the beginning of Gentz's 
connections with foreign governments and personages, 
which from then on played an ever increasing role in his 
life. We know already that he gradually became acquainted 
with various foreign representatives accredited to the court 
of Berlin. His relations with Austria began through his 
sending the translation of Burke to Emperor Francis; 
later he received the permission to sell copies of his His- 
torisches Journal in the Austrian duchies. 31 He must also 
have come into touch with leading men in Russia, for in 
May 1800 his diaries speak of his receiving a present from 
the Czar. 32 

The first establishment of relations with England fol- 
lowed in 1795; Gentz published in his Neue Teutsche 
Monatsschrift a translation of a portion of d'lvernois' 
study on republican finance which aroused Pitt's interest 

30 Brie fe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 245, 246, note 1. 
31 Guglia, Friedrich von Gentz, 137. 
^Tagebucher I, 1. 



549] EARLY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 63 

and caused hini to urge the author to continue his work. 33 
1799 Gentz presented to the English secretary of state, 
Lord Grenville, an article which had appeared in the His- 
torisches Journal and dealt with Pitt's financial policy; 
he added the request that the article be laid before the 
King. Grenville replied with a letter and a check. 34 No- 
vember, 1800, Gentz sent two memorials to London. In 
the first he pictures the condition of popular opinion on 
the Continent toward England; in the second he offers his 
services to the English government as journalistic repre- 
sentative, and this offer seems to have been accepted. 35 In 
October 1802, Gentz went himself to England, where he 
remained some three months. His personal success was 
great; 30 but this was only natural, for he was peculiarly 
fitted for the life of the then existing English society : he 
had the instincts of the grand-seigneur, was a brilliant 
conversationalist, and could endure any amount of the 
gay life. He himself was in a perfect rapture, for he felt, 
for the first time, the delicious inspiration of satisfied am- 
bition; for a brief moment he mingled with the mighty 
as an equal. At the same time he reached an agreement 
with the British government; it has never become known 
what instructions he received, but in general he was ex- 
pected to act as an English agent on the continent. 37 If 
this step later brought him under suspicion, it must be 
said that he by no means intended bartering his convic- 
tions; this he never did, not even under the most trying 
pressure. English policy was, after all, in its main fea- 
tures, only the one advocated by himself, for it aimed at 
France, and he really believed that in serving England 
he was serving Europe. That he accepted remuneration 
for his services was not only quite proper but even neces- 
sary; for without sufficient funds he could never hope to 

^Schmidt-Weissenfels, Friedrich Gentz, I. 84. 
3i Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 466. 
"Ibid., CX, 467. 
3e Schlesier, V, 28. 
S7 Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 468. 



64 F1UEDRICH GENTZ [550 

gain entrance into those circles by which the course of 
foreign policies was shaped. 

A number of causes contributed to make of Gentz thus, 
by degrees, a rather many-sided personality. Gentz had, as 
we know, an inborn and increasing interest in politics, 
and that he could, as a Prussian subaltern, not practically 
indulge; he seized, therefore, the only way which offered 
an outlet for his feelings: the pen. Furthermore, he was 
ambitious and of very luxurious inclinations; how was he 
to satify these tendencies in the service of the Prussian 
state where, as he explains to Adam M Ciller, he could only 
hope to reach the position of privy counsellor of finances, 
carrying a salary of two thousand thaler? 38 And was writ- 
ing not a positive pleasure to him which he could never long 
forego? If he industriously wove at the net in which his 
fortune was to become entangled, he did in this certainly 
not think of himself alone, nor even principally : all 
the various lines of his activity were, after all, 
converging toward the one aim of opposing the Revo- 
lution, and this opposition he regarded as a sacred duty 
which had to be fulfilled whatever one's own inclinations 
might be. 39 Not that he expected certain results of his 
efforts, for these, he thought, were, in the flood of pro- 
revolutionary writings, somewhat doubtful and uncer- 
tain. 40 But he wished to do his part to further the good 
cause; it might, perhaps, be of some use and bear unex- 
pected fruit. 

In how far Gentz here allowed himself to be influ- 
enced by Burke it is hard to say, but the latter 's example 
can hardly have been entirely without effect. Gentz him- 
self seems to point to the existence of such an influence, 
for in the introduction to his translation of Burke we find 
the passage: "In most of the important proceedings of 
his time, Burke was an opponent of the ministry, because 
the influence of the court extended beyond the proper point 

3S Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 369. 

39 Weick, I, 2, 14, 18. Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xiv ff. xix. 

"Weick, I, 7-14. 



551] EARLY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 65 

of equilibrium, because it threatened to annihilate or to 
weaken the power of the representatives of the people. 
Burke took up the cause of the Americans with a warmth 
which he may well thank for much of his great name; be- 
cause they were, although they were Britons, denied the 
British constitution, because he found according to the 
maxims of true British polity that their demands were 
just; because he divined the strength of their opposition 
and the probable outcome of the unfortunate war which 
was forced upon them, with more accuracy than a blinded 
ministry did." 41 That which Gentz praises in Burke .applied 
equally well to himself: one has only to recall his stern 
standpoint of justice, his initial sympathy with constitu- 
tions, and his later opposition to Cobenzl, against whom he 
also hurls the word "blinded;" he fights, it is true, not 
against but for the preponderance of court influence. It 
is, therefore, quite possible that Gentz took up the fight 
against the Revolution — which from his point of view was 
preeminently a struggle for the right — inspired, among 
others, by Burke, especially since he had learned from the 
hitter's career, what a name could be won by championing 
the right. 

Not much more certain is the influence which Mallet 
<lu Pan may have had on Gentz. Gentz and Mallet stood, 
since 1793, closely enough together in their political views. 
Both rejected the principle of popular sovereignty and 
fought for a stronger government; on the other hand, they 
were indifferent as to the particular form of the latter. 
Both corresponded with ministers and kings, both pub- 
lished periodicals and had close relations with England. 
These parallels could even be followed into the personal 
characters of the two men, for each was possessed of a 
marked preference for order and moderation in every 
thing, of a strong feeling of independence and a pronounced 
antipathy against all that was loud and violent. If one 
adds to this that Gentz repeatedly mentions Mallet in his 

"Ibid., T, 22. 



66 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [552 

letters, 42 that he translated or reviewed certain of his 
works, 43 that his Historisches Journal, according to his 
own testimony, was suggested and inspired by Mallet's 
Mercure Brittannique , 44 finally that in 1799 he correspond- 
ed with the then exiled pulicist, 45 the existence of an in- 
fluence upon Gentz may seem to be rather probable. The 
exact extent of this influence, it is true, cannot be deter- 
mined with certainty; only in the following point do we 
find ourselves, perhaps, upon firm ground. Mallet was 
from about 1793 on, for a number of years, the confidential 
adviser of various governments at war with the Revolution 
and sent, up to 1798, political reports to the courts of 
Vienna and Berlin; in 1800 he died. In this same year 
1800, Gentz definitely offered the English government his 
services as publicist, and reported about the political situ- 
ation on the Continent. It is, therefore, not altogether 
improbable that the latter cherished the hope that the man- 
tle of the dead Mallet might fall upon him. 

How, we may ask, does Gentz picture the Revolution 
to himself and what has he against it? 

If we begin with the origin of the Revolution, we en- 
counter first his distinction between its remote and its im- 
mediate causes; the former, Gentz terms the "conditions 
of possibility," the latter, "the conditions of reality." 46 
The distinction is historically well-founded, and forms the 
basis of Gentz's general attitude toward the Revolution. 
He is convinced that France stood in absolute need of re- 
forms, but that on the other hand, the Revolution, as it 
actually took place, could and should have been avoided. 47 
The proper way to solve the difficulties as it then seemed 
to him was, as he once expresses it afterwards, by means 
of a "gentle revolution." 48 

4 'Briefe v. n. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 179 f., 255. 

t3 H. J., 1799 and 1800. 

"Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 327. 

"Ibid., 326 ff. 

"H. J., 1799. I, 38, 196. 

"Ibid., I, 198 ff., 229 ff. 

48 Translation of Mallet du Pan, 33, note. 



553] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 67 

Gentz describes the conditions of pre-revolutionary 
France with the instinct of the objective historian who is 
concerned above all with the establishment of the truth. 
On civilized Europe as a whole, he passes the judgment 
that before the Revolution it had reached an astonishing 
degree of perfection and was justified in still hoping for 
far more. 49 As its centre he considers France, 50 which, 
therefore, necessarily had its share in this high attainment 
of European civilization. That everything there was not 
what it should have been, he does not fail to recognize. He 
points out especially the bad system of taxation of the 
country ; aside from this he mentions the subordination of 
agriculture to the interests of industry and the already 
decidedly appreciable overpupulation, as it seemed to him. 51 
To the lettres de cachet he attaches, however, but small 
importance. 52 His judgment of Louis XVI is all in all a 
favorable one; lie cannot, however, forbear to blame the 
weakness of the king, who did not rise to meet the situa- 
tion. 53 He points out with special emphasis that monarch 
and government were sincerely ready for vital reforms; 
Turgot, he explains, proposed reforms "such as had never 
been conceived upon a throne." 54 

When, in spite of all, the Revolution came, the blame 
lay, according to Gentz, on what he terms the "conditions 
of its reality." He assumes that grave mistakes were made 
on all sides, by the king, by the government, by the repre- 
sentatives of the people, and finally by the people them- 
selves. The greatest blame he lays, to be sure, to the score 
of the people and their representatives. The government 
fell short in that it neglected to suppress the general spirit 
of discontent, and to direct it by wise counsels into proper 
channels, 55 but above all, in that it showed lack 

49 H. /., i 799 , I. 18. 

'"Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xvii. 

51 H. /., 1799, I, 208 ff. 

52 Ibid., I, 215 i- 

"Ibid., I, 272 ff. 

**Ibid., I, 229, 235 ff., 293, 304 f. 

K Ibid,, I, 31 ff. 



68 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [554 

of foresight and weakness. 56 When the government, as was 
the ease, encountered perpetual opposition, it was its prop- 
er duty to break this opposition; but this it never 
attempted, much less accomplished. 57 The calling in of the 
estates of the realm was a good idea, for it was necessary, 
financially and otherwise; unfortunately, however, the 
government failed to regulate in advance the form of the 
deliberations, and thus made possible the chaos which al- 
most immediately arose. 58 If we turn to the other side, 
we find Gentz pointing particularly to the influence of the 
revolutionary literature, to the attitude of the National 
Assembly, and the activity of the revolutionary leaders. 59 
He is inclined to attribute to the leaders a large part of 
the blame. But the people too he finds blameworthy. 
"When the Revolution of 1789 approached,'- he writes in 
1799, "the amiability of this nation [the French] had to 
a large degree disappeared .... A deeply rooted discon- 
tent, a restless longing for destructive novelty had taken 
the place of the old peaceful good nature .... The frame 
of mind of the entire nation had grown more hostile, 
gloomy, brooding, and tragic. The Revolution bore in 
its approach, in its outbreak, and in its whole course, the 
stamp of this mood, [a mood] "which superficial observers 
considered a result of that tremendous event, but which 
held priority over that event and was rather one of its 
causes." 60 It is true, Gentz does not overlook the fact 
that one of the causes of the Revolution lay, in a certain 
sense, within the revolt itself, insofar as every one of its 
events advanced its development just one step farther. 

The object of Gentz's special antipathy were the revo- 
lutionary leaders, for they, of course, were the rebels par 
excel] <■)><■<>. Sieves was to him the chief figure of the early 
Revolution; 61 Marat, on the other hand, probably the most 

M Ibid., I, 298, 321 ; II, 30, 55 ff., 245. 

"Ibid., T, 301. 

"Ibid., TI, 15 ff., 25 ff., 56 ff. 

5 *Ibid., II, 138 ff., 172 ff. Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xxiv. 

™H. /., 1799, IT, 160 ff. 

"Ibid., II, 297, 306 ff. Translation of Mallet du Pan, 66 ff. note. 



555] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 69 

horrible product of the whole revolutionary era. 62 Gentz's 
judgment of Rousseau was not always exactly the same. We 
know that he was, at one time, deeply interested in this 
personality and had found refreshment in the depths of its 
sentiment; it was in those early years when his emotional 
heart was still able to give itself up unreservedly to friend- 
ship and to the quiet enjoyment of nature. This reverence 
for Rousseau lingered down to 1792 ; Rousseau, Gentz still 
thinks, portrays the simplicity, the purity and the bliss 
of the true man of nature, and in that consists the real 
tendency of all his ideas. 03 Quite different from this, how- 
ever, is his judgment in 1794. Now he regards Rousseau 
from a purely political viewpoint, and thus the man whom 
he had previously so highly respected has now become an 
object of antipathy, almost of the most bitter hatred. But 
how could it have been otherwise? Rousseau's name was in 
the mouths of all enemies of the old, system, he was the 
father of the doctrine of the unconditional popular sov- 
ereignty and was himself a man of the people, of large 
ideas and an excess of feeling, but, in a general sense, 
vulgar as well. Small wonder, then, that Gentz now 
hated this man and hurled at him the charge that out of 
his school all the French revolutionists from Sieves to 
Marat had issued, and that to his fingers the innocently 
shed blood of the victims of the Revolution was sticking. 64 
The distinction between momentary and permanent 
causes of the Revolution made it hard for Gentz to find 
a definite beginning for that period. He considered the 
great turning point of events to be the second half of the 
year 1792; what happened in those bloody autumn days 
made him forever a foe of the new era. But where was the 
beginning? It was hard to name an entirely certain point 
in time, consequently Gentz lays the emphasis now on one 
and now on another of the eventful days of the summer of 
1789: on the 17th of June, the 14th of July, the time from 

S2 Translation of Mallet du Pan, 92, note. 

"Weick, I, 138 ff., note. 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, 20 ff., note. 



70 FRIEDBICH GENTZ [556 

July to October, and on the 5th-6th of October. In 1793 
he declares that the originator of the system of double rep- 
resentation for the third estate was the real cause of the 
Revolution, and names in this connection Necker; 05 since 
Necker proposed this idea to the royal council on the 
17th of December, 1788, the real beginning of the Revolu- 
tion would then be this day. Somewhat different is the 
dating which Gentz presents in the same year in reviewing 
the statement of the Scotch writer Makintosh. Here he 
mentions especially the 5th of May, the 17th of June — 
according to him it had been the 15th of June — and the 
14th of July, and assumes that the Revolution was per- 
fected through the sanction, by the National Assembly, 
of the storming of the Bastille. 00 In 1794 he sees the source 
of all the excesses of the Revolution in the activity of the 
National Assembly from July 1789 to the meeting of the 
Convention. 67 In 1799 he returns, in a certain sense, to 
the 17th of June — no longer the 15th — and declares that 
this day marked "one of the greatest and most fearful 
epochs in the history of mankind." 08 

Gentz never really attempted to fix the date of the end 
of the Revolution. In 1794 he still believed it to be com- 
ing ; 09 but soon he drops such speculations. In 1798 he even 
fears that the Revolution may extend into eastern 
Europe. 70 With the Coup d'Mat lie again indulges in hope, 
only soon after to let it fall again: 71 he could, after all, not 
eternally close his eyes to the fact that Bonaparte was not 
only the conqueror of the Revolution, but also the heir. 

As to the significance of the Revolution as an historical 
event of the first magnitude, Gentz was never for a moment 
in doubt. As evidence of this we may cite a word to be 

e5 Weick, I, 84, note. 

"Ibid., II, 116-128. 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xxiv ff. 

"H. J., 1799, II, 308. 

""Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xxxiii f. 

™ Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 210. 

"Cf. p. 86 f. 



557] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 71 

found in the introduction to his translation of Mallet du 
Pan, which throws, at the same time, a highly character- 
istic light upon his entire attitude toward this event. 72 
He writes there: "The French Revolution is one of the 
facts which belong to the whole human race. It is an event 
of such magnitude that it is hardly permissible to be occu- 
pied with any petty interest in its fearful presence, of such 
magnitude that posterity will be curious to know how 
people of all countries who lived at the close of the 18th 
century thought, felt, reasoned and acted about it. Even 
if it had exercised no direct influence upon other nations, 
it would still deserve the entire, lasting and eager attention 
of the world because it hit the most notable of all civilized 
countries, the true centre of Europe, from which proceeded 
the entire external culture, and most of the inner culture, 
of our hemisphere, because it promised a constitution — 
the most desirable thing which thinking beings can wish 
for — for a society of 25 millions of the most active, cul- 
tured, enlightened, talented, clever and good-natured peo- 
ple, and because, although from its inception to the present 
time it has been nothing but one great departure from its 
glorious aim, it had at least to furnish the largest mass of 
experiences out of which the theory of statesmanship has 
ever been developed, corrected, and confirmed." 73 

Gentz emphasizes at times how infinitely complicated 
the developments of the events in France had been. But 
the chaos there does not seem to him to be completely hope- 
less; he distinguishes between the essential and the neces- 
sary phenomena, and sifts from the mass of material that 
which he terms "the leading principles" of the Revolu- 
tion. 74 Against these he directs his chief attacks. 

What, then, are the fundamental principles of the 
Revolution, as seen by Gentz? 

In 1793 he gives not yet any really comprehensive 
statement of his views ; the list of his gravamina against the 

"Of 1794- 



"Of 1794. 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xvi ff. 

u Ibid., pref. xxiii f. H. J., 1799, II, 335 ff- 



72 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [ 558 

Revolution is, however, long enough. He emphasizes the 
great danger with which Europe is being threatened from 
the West. 75 Furthermore, he accuses the Revolution of 
fanatical intolerance, of disregard for property, of vanity 
and hypocrisy, love of destruction, general lawlessness, 
irreligion and a deeply rooted hatred of everything lofty, 
even of the aristocracy of spirit. 70 The object of his special 
antipathy is, of course, the principle of the sovereignty of 
the people. In his treatises of 1793, there is scarcely a 
page on which the words "liberty" and "equality" are 
not made the object of bitter criticism. Gentz thinks that 
he is laying his finger at the very root of all the evil, when 
he says: "There can be no absolutely incurably sick per- 
son, save he who takes pleasure in his pains. This is, how- 
ever, the real condition of the French people. Every suffer- 
ing is sweet to them, if they only can dream of their self- 
government. Their happiness is the happiness of a mad- 
man who does not feel the whip of his jailor because he 
considers himself the King of Kings. If one goes to the 
bottom of this political dreaming, then the garment of a 
few high-sounding phrases disappears; and what remains 
is — the fanaticism of vanity." 77 

On the declaration of human rights, Gentz expresses 
himself in 1793, and then again in 1800, both times in the 
same tone. 7S His judgment is exceptionally unfavorable. 
The very idea of such a declaration displeases him exceed- 
ingly; for the enumeration and classification of the simple 
human rights, he thinks not only hardly possible, but, if 
actually attempted, dangerous. He considers it an abso- 
lute error to term these fundamental rights, the "rights of 
men and citizens." A combination of this kind is, according 
to him, nothing but an absurdity. Of the separate articles 
of the declaration, scarcely a single one is left unattacked, 
and special emphasis is laid upon the fact that the so- 

75 Weick, I, 20. 

"Ibid., I, 15 ff., 186 ff., note, 257 f., note, 312, note, 281, note; II, 34. 

77 Ibid., I, 257 f., note. 

n Ibid. } II, 61 ff.. H. /., 1800. I, 58, ff. 



559] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 73 

called "natural rights" are, in this case, only the result of 
a great number of compromises. Gentz does not fail to 
admit that the declaration, as a whole, had been of great 
historical importance, but it can be imagined of what kind 
he conceived this importance to be; as a matter of fact, he 
unhesitatingly attributes to this declaration a great part 
of the general anarchy which followed it. 

Extremely severe is the judgment passed upon the 
Revolution by Gentz in 1794. The list of sins which he 
attributes to it in the introduction and the notes to his 
translation of Mallet du Pan has now become a formidable 
one, and one cannot help being struck with Gentz's intense 
hatred of the revolutionary leaders. He refers to the daily 
executions, to the murder of the royal family, the atheistic 
temples, the cult of Marat, the revolutionary tendency 
to worldiness, the destruction of the Vendee and the city of 
Lyons, to the superficial speculations and the self-compla- 
cency of the tribunes of the people, to the increasing plun- 
dering of the rich, the disregard of all morality and the 
tearing down of everything lofty, adding not without a 
certain bitter satisfaction that there it could at last be 
seen to what the "madness and perversity of an unre- 
strained people" would lead. 79 References to the cruelty 
and phrase-mongering, to the vanity, the lawlessness and 
general vulgarity of the revolutionary movement and its 
leaders are in fact to be found almost everywhere. 80 Inci- 
dentally, Gentz now and then sums up these characteristics 
of the Revolution in a single word, and speaks of "mob- 
tyranny," or of "the systematic reversal of all social con- 
ditions." 81 

In his Historisches Journal of 1799, Gentz exhibits, to 
a certain degree, the assurance of one who has had the 
satisfaction of seeing his warnings justified by the course 
of events. Here, too, he speaks of the injustice and tyranny 

"Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., vi f., x. 
m Ibid., 25 f., note, 56, note, 94 ff., note, 150 f., note. 
"Ibid., pref., xii, 74 f., note. 



74 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [500 

of the Revolution, of its harshness against the upper 
classes of the earlier era, of its hostility towards the prop- 
erty-holders and, above all, of its fundamental prin- 
ciple of the sovereignty of the people. 82 As to the 
revolutionary literature, he criticizes its entire lack of con- 
sideration of individual rights, its tendency to go to ex- 
tremes and the desire for novelty, its discrediting of the 
value of moderation and experience, its lack of historical 
sense and, as is to be expected, again, its doctrine of popu- 
lar sovereignty. 83 He repeats the idea expressed already 
in the manifesto of the allies of the year 1792, and later 
on by Mallet, that the Revolution was equivalent to a re- 
lapse toward barbarism. 84 With especial satisfaction, how- 
ever, he mentions the report of the commissioner Francois 
of June 21, 1798, in which the Directory is charged with 
having suppressed all and every form of freedom in France, 
the political, civil and personal liberty, the freedom of 
thought and the safety of property. 85 Likewise, he refers 
to the report of commissioner Trouve of August 30, 1798, 
for in this he finds a description of the conditions in the 
Cisalpine Republic, such as from his standpoint he could 
not wish any better. According to Trouve, there existed in 
this state "a government without means and strength, 
equally powerless to accomplish the good and to prevent 
the evil, an ignorant, wholly pernicious administration, a 
military equipment which despite its immense costliness 
is of no value at all, a complete disorganization of finances, 
no republican institutions, no public education, no con- 
nection existing between civil laws, on all hands disobedi- 
ence, indifference, unpunished waste of public money, in a 
word, the most complete and most horrible anarchy." 86 
These then were the alleged blessings of the Revolution ! 
To the relations of the Revolution to other powers, 



//. /., 1799, I, 57 ff-. 343, note, IT, 145 ff-, 464 f. 
'Ibid., IT. 138 ff. 



"Ibid., I, 29 f., note 
"Ibid., II, 431 ff. 
"Ibid., I, 338 ff. 



5G1] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 75 

Gentz did not give, for a long time, any mentionable atten- 
tion, other than to fear an invasion of Europe by revolu- 
tionary principles. The war which had been dragging on 
since 1792, he still regards even in 1794 as, on the whole, 
of little importance. It has not yet brought any success to 
the allies, and cannot be carried on with much more energy ; 
therefore, Gentz concludes, it would probably be best to 
let France alone. 87 The volcano in the West, however, did 
not burn out ; on the contrary, the danger to Europe became 
more and more serious. The year 1796 brought the inva- 
sion of Jourdan and Moreau into central and southern 
Germany and Bonaparte's brilliant campaign in Italy; 
1797, the peace of Campo Formio and the opening of the 
Congress of Rastadt ; 1798, the French occupation of Rome, 
the intervention in Switzerland, extensive French prepara- 
tions for a landing in England, and Bonaparte's expedi- 
tion to Egypt ; finally 1800, — after French reverses in 1798 
— two victories that, according to Gentz, were the most 
brilliant which the revolutionary armies ever had gained. 88 
By the end of 1800, France had thus reconquered its great 
European position of former times. It now stood at the 
head of a confederation which embraced almost the whole 
of southern Europe; the landmarks of the Republic had 
been advanced to the Rhine and at its head stood — Bona- 
parte, in Gentz's opinion the first really significant man 
of the Revolution. 89 Besides, the great problem of the new 
territorial arrangements to be made in Germany, the re- 
sult of the peace of Luneville, demanded a settlement, and 
that France would have a hand in this could not be doubt- 
ed for one moment. Apprehensive watchfulness had now 
apparently become imperative, since the Revolution had 
ceased to be a mere intellectual danger. 

The first indications that Gentz was aware of this 
are to be found in two letters to Garve of March and April, 
1798. 90 French politics, he writes to this still highly re- 

S7 Translation of Mallet du Pan, pref., xxxiii ff. 

"Weick, II, 333- 

Si Ibid., II, 372, note. 

90 Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 206, 210. 



76 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [562 

spected friend, have now risen to "such tremendous import- 
ance" that one cannot avoid devoting to them doubled at- 
tention. The year 1798 is even now the most significant 
of all the years of the revolutionary era, and still greater 
things are yet to be expected : the outcome of the expedition 
against England will decide the fate of Europe; if it suc- 
ceeds, and if within the next six months no new conti- 
nental war breaks out, then the tricolor will be waving at 
the Vistula even before the close of the century. Europe 
seems destined to encounter in this present year fresh 
storms and further destruction, and the end of the Revolu- 
tion is not yet in sight. The mention which Gentz makes 
here of a doubled attentiveness to the events in the West 
was not merely a passing idea; he indeed does become ab- 
sorbed more and more in the increasingly complicated in- 
ternational affairs of Europe. Already the llixtorisclies 
Journal of 1799 contained several articles on the matter, 
and in the following years Gentz is well-nigh given up to 
the study of these new problems. He feels that the first 
act of the great drama is ended; if he previously has hoped 
that the Revolution would consume itself, he now realizes 
definitely that this can no longer be thought of. 

The picture that he draws of the European situation 
in the second half of 1800 must, therefore, unavoidably be 
a gloomy one. 91 The war had now lasted eight years, for 
eight years he himself had fought for the good cause, and 
yet — what had been achieved! The Revolution was not 
yet ended; on the contrary, it had established itself in the 
European family and was more dangerous than ever. For 
a moment, it is true, Gentz believed that the Coup rf'fitat 
meant its formal conclusion. 92 But he soon abandons this 
hope, and even while entertaining it, he expected far more 
for the internal conditions of France than for the relations 
of that country to the other powers; for these he regards, 
even after 1799, only with suspicion and concern. What 

"//. /.. 1800, IT, 394 ff., Ill, 788 ff. 
S2 Cf. p. 86f. 



563] CONCEPTION OF THE REVOLUTION 77 

would the future bring? France, he thinks, has been, to 
the present, the centre of Europe and will continue to be 
so for some time to come ; as long as it retains its spirit of 
restlessness and of military agression, Europe will have to 
tremble. The era of blood is then not yet at an end; the 
French sword but rests in the scabbard, and this scabbard 
may be thrown aside at any moment. A warrior state has 
established itself in the western part of the Continent whose 
finances are, it is true, irreparably ruined, whose expans- 
ive powers, however, remain unweakened ; its trade is war, 
and without war it cannot exist. And the present? It is 
bad enough. The Revolution, Gentz states at the end 
of 1800, has destroyed the old political system of Europe, 
it has altered the beautiful balance of power among the na- 
tions, has set might above right, has made war universal, 
and has accustomed the world to usurpation and violence. 
The path to peace leads through numerous further strug- 
gles, and that, he concludes, "is the sad legacy with which 
the closing eighteenth century endows the present genera- 
tion, and perhaps many a one to come." 

As to the secret of the republican successes, it is evi- 
dent that a problem so eminently practical necessarily 
made a strong appeal to a man such as Gentz. He touches 
upon it more than once, most extensively in his work, 
Vber den Ursprung und Charakter des Krieges gegen die 
franzosisehe Revolution, published in 1801, where lie ex- 
presses himself as follows. 9 " He begins with a refernce to 
the very favorable strategic position of France, to the 
fertility of its soil, to its wealth and the efficiency of its 
inhabitants; this, he thinks, explains the riddle in part, 
but, it is true, by no means fully. In the last analysis, 
he finds, the republican successes can be explained only 
from two causes, from the spirit of the Revolution itself 
and from the mistakes of its enemies. In how far, then, 
from the Revolution itself? Not, perhaps, to the extent 
which would have been true if really great talents had been 

93 Weick, II, 306 ff.. 371 ff. 



78 FRIEDKICH GENTZ [564 

at its disposal; Gentz is at best ready to grant that the 
Revolution produced military talent. It was brought about 
by parvenus and mediocre intelligences, and did not until 
Bonaparte appeared give birth to any really great man. 
Of the military talents existing within the nation it did 
make full use, and in this lies one of the causes of its suc- 
cess. It has further carried on the war in an entirely new 
fashion, which will now have to be adopted by other 
European powers. The resources of France were put to 
the severest test and, in many regards, exhausted for a long 
time to come, but despite all waste, it supported itself and 
withstood the attack from all sides, for in time it had 
learned the lesson that a war could be carried on even 
without money. Wherever it went, it found the soil ready 
for its seed : everywhere it met partisans, its first blow 
fell upon a disunited Germany, and the terror which pre- 
ceded its coming did the rest. Above all, it is true, the 
Revolution stirred up the enthusiasm of the French people. 
Even though this might fluctuate, it never really died out; 
at any rate it sufficed, as conditions then were, since the 
enthusiasm of the allied troops always remained within 
narrow bounds. The country had to be saved, the world to 
be freed and avenged, and the conspirators to be punished ; 
forward, then, in the name of freedom ! Who could resist 
such an appeal? And thus the armies of the Republic 
marched against the enemy, poorly drilled and poorly 
clothed, but surrounded by and filled with the magic of the 
revolutionary faith, until gradually there arose a new and 
equally powerful agent of victory : the ambition of invinci- 
bility. In spite of all this splendid energy of the Revolu- 
tion, however, its success, Gentz assumes, never would have 
come to pass, if the Coalition had not made the gravest 
mistakes. An iron destiny had brought this great crisis 
upon Europe ; it was a case, therefore, of either submitting 
to it or of putting everything at stake against it. The 
Coalition chose the policy of resistance, but did not throw 
all its energies into the struggle; it blundered in its choice 
of the moment for opening hostilities, it underrated the 



565] DUTIES OF EUROPE 79 

resources of the enemy, possessed no military leaders of 
real significance and came to no concerted action. The 
result of it all, naturally, was in keeping with the effort. 

But what now? This was, after all, the paramount 
question. Should the fight go on, or was it better to let 
things take their own course? Gentz is for the former. 
But he does not look for success as long as the old methods 
are adhered to; new ways and means must be tried, and 
such he believes to have discovered. 94 The course of the 
revolutionary wars has shown to him what could be done 
by a nation that was ready to make any sacrifices; he de- 
mands, therefore, that the example given here be followed. 
Let public enthusiasm be exhorted, be aroused; let the 
revolutionary arguments be met in print, through sermons 
and popular instruction; let the unfit be eliminated and 
the talented be supported ; and change the methods of war- 
fare ! But this, he thinks, will by no means suffice. What 
is needed, above all, are coalitions that will carry on the 
war with republican energy and will be strong enough to 
insure success. But what coalitions should these be? 
Gentz has in mind, especially, one between Austria and 
Prussia, for this, if once consummated, would not only in 
itself represent a formidable combination, but would also 
bring about the union of the whole of Europe outside of 
France. Prussia must give up its neutrality, this then is the 
advice which Gentz now gives, disagreeing entirely with 
his earlier tendencies. In 1797, 95 and even in the beginning 
of 1799, 9G he still recommended to Prussia a policy of re- 
serve. In May, 1799, however, he seems to wish a more or 
less decisive and warlike line of action on Prussia's part ; 97 
in 1800, he censures Prussia's attitude during the previous 
year, 98 and in 1801, he finally comes out openly in favor of 

^Weick, II, 355 ff., 367 ff., 373 ff., Von dem politischen Zustande von 
Europci vor und nach der franzosischen Revolution, cf. Guglia. Friedrich 
von Gentz, 168 f. 

95 Weick, V, 7, 9. 

™ Brief c v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 3?3- 

"Ibid., I, 332. 

"Hist or. Zeitschr., LXXXIX, 245 ff. 



80 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [5G6 

the Austrian-Prussian coalition. He is even ready to con- 
sent to a temporary suspension of the imperial constitu- 
tion, if thereby a better use could be made of Germany's 
powers; at the outbreak of the revolutionary war, or at 
least during it, he thinks, the Emperor should have been 
officially clothed with the provisional powers of a dictator 
for the southern half of the "Empire'', and the king of 
Prussia likewise, for its northern half." That in the 
future such states as Switzerland should be allowed to 
remain neutral he considers improbable; at any rate, he 
himself would not be able to approve of such a policy. 
Whoever, he declares, does not join the cause of justice of 
his own free will, can and must be forced to do so; for in 
situations like the present, there is but one right to be 
recognized, that of necessity. 

It was for Gentz a matter of course that the one power 
to which, before all others, he looked for help, England 
would in time unite itself with this continental coalition. 
This is even a matter of the heart with him. For, whenever 
he speaks of England, he speaks of it only in hyperboles: 
the rock of justice, the home of religion and of reverence 
for the customs of the fathers, the starting point of all 
beneficent and truly cosmopolitan undertakings, the centre 
of industry and trade, and the born and permanent ally of 
the well understood interests of all nations — all this and 
more England seems to him. 100 That it was also possible 
to hear quite different remarks about this same England, 
is not unknown to Gentz, for he too has heard them ; but 
he purposes to show that such words are but stupid or 
malicious calumny. 101 What then were the charges against 
England? A monopoly of industry and trade, the starva- 
tion of the Continent, the destruction of the freedom of the 
seas? Gentz does not deny that England now, at the end 
of the century, does possess a monopoly of industry and 
trade and a supremacy over the seas; most emphatically he 

°°Weick, II, 369 f. 

100 H. J., 1800, III, 492 ff. 

101 Ibid., 1799, I, 395-439; HI, 380 f.; 1800, III, 496 f. 



567] VIEWS ON ENGLAND 81 

contends, however, that the British power does not threaten 
the rest of Europe outside of France, and calls special 
attention to the fact that this power was only the direct 
result of the Revolution itself. The line of argumentation 
used by him to support this standpoint is about as follows: 
1. The English industrial and trade monopoly, and the 
English maritime supremacy are chiefly the consequences 
of the hopeless inner conditions of France, and, only to a 
subordinate degree, of the ability of the English them- 
selves ; 2. England cannot mean to wish the poverty of the 
Continent in its own interest, for poor neighbors are also 
poor customers; 3. England, will, because of its high de- 
velopment and its lofty principles, never become "really 
menacing" to any state; 4. a substitution of France for 
England would not be advantageous for the interests of 
Europe; the destruction of the English position, without 
at the same time providing for a compensation, would even 
be a calamity ; 5. the ideal condition would be that of an 
equal apportionment of the sea-trade among the three great 
trading nations, England, France and Holland, and of the 
intermediate trade among the trading states of second 
rank; such a condition of equilibrium existed before the 
Revolution and will return as soon as Europe will have 
attained to a true peace. England is, therefore, as it now 
is, the blessing and the last hope of the world. "For this 
reason," Gentz declares, "every thinking person and every 
heart that wishes the human race well must take an active 
interest in the British nation, even though every personal 
interest were ever so far removed; for this reason, no en- 
lightened European will be able to perceive England's 
prosperity without exclaiming with that dying patriot: 
Esto perpetual" 102 

The praise that Gentz thus bestows upon the English 
state and nation is indeed a very high one; it is, however, 
not on that account less genuine. How are we to explain 
it? Certainly not from the fact that Gentz, at this time, 
was coming into closer touch with the British government 

W2 H. J., 1799, HI. 38i. 



82 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [568 

and was received into its service; this may have been of 
some significance, but surely not of fundamental import- 
ance. No, the praise was genuine, coming from a man who 
flattered only when he could do so with conviction. And 
was it, after all, so out of the ordinary to feel admiration 
for the greatness of the British name? Many felt this, why 
then not Gentz as well? Why not he of all others? Eng- 
land was, as he believed, the last bulwark against the 
French flood, and the permanent defender of that European 
balance of power, which was so dear to him; it possessed 
a well-tempered form of government; it breathed by its 
subsidies ever new life into the struggle against the Revolu- 
tion, and had preserved much of the aristrocratic perfume 
of the ancient regime; how could Gentz have failed to adore 
such a country! As a matter of fact, his sympathy for 
England extended — with interruptions — even beyond the 
Revolution and Napoleon: as late as 1819 he defends its 
policies against the attacks of the Abbe de Pradt. 103 Later 
his sympathy, it is true, waned considerably. 

Whether Gentz, by this, showed himself an impartial 
and clear-sighted judge of actual conditions may, of course, 
be doubted. He had early identified himself with a definite 
line of policy, from which he would not and could 
not depart easily later on. Furthermore, the transactions 
of the cabinets were known to him only in outline, or sn 
far as the official reports about them had been made public ; 
on a basis like this, a proper orientation was, however, im- 
possible. Finally, there was what we may call Gentz's 
continentalism. His eyes were always turned, first of all, 
toward the West, for there he saw the lurking danger to 
Germany and to the Continent; but that this same West, 
France, in turn might be looking toward the North and 
feel itself challenged and threatened from that direction, 
he never seriously considered. 

For about ten years, from 1792 to 1801, Gentz thus 
fought against republican France with a pen clipped in hate 
and fear. Then he buried himself in silence for a brief 

1C3 Weick, V, 289 ff., 298 ff. 



569] SUSPENSION OF THE STRUGGLE 83 

moment; he believed he had reasons to assume that the 
Revolution now had ended, and besides, his political affairs 
had temporarily become too much deranged. But in 
1803 he again takes up his rejected pen and plunges into a 
new struggle. As it seems, he has deceived himself: the 
Revolution is, after all, apparently not yet over; so he is 
fighting once more, this time, however, against the ambi- 
tions of one single man, the heir of the Revoltuion, 
Napoleon Bonaparte. 

To show what form this second struggle of Gentz's 
took will be the purpose of the following chapter. 



III. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NAPOLEON 
1. Before the Struggle: 1798-18012. 

On the ninth of November, 1799, Napoleon by the Coup 
d'titat put himself at the head of the French nation; on 
the second of August, 1802, he was elected by a plebiscite, 
consul for life; and on the eighteenth of May, 1804, the 
Senate and the Tribunes proclaimed him emperor of the 
French. 

These three events formed at once the end and the con- 
solidation of the Revolution. Napoleon liked to call him- 
self the child of the latter, and in a certain sense, 
rightly so ; he was, however, as much its subduer as its heir, 
and one may be in doubt as to whether he should be viewed 
more from the one standpoint than from the other. 

The four constitutions of his reign — those of 1799, 
1802, 1804 and 1815 — were formally, at least, founded on 
popular sovereignty. The constitution of 1799 was sub- 
mitted to a plebiscite, of the two of 1802 and 1804 only one, 
but the principal question was placed before the people. 
Two other fundamental principles of the Revolution, those 
of equality and of individual liberty, Napoleon also main- 
tained in a certain sense, and the same may be said of the 
new apportionment of property brought about by the Revo- 
lution; his highly developed system of police supervision 
limited, it is true, this liberty in no inconsiderable measure. 
In the sphere of foreign politics, Napoleon took over from 
the Revolution above all the hostility towards England in 
general, then the idea of invading the British Isles and at- 
tacking the English position in India, the exclusion of Eng- 
lish goods from French territories and the strengthening of 
the trade and war marine of France; to this go back also his 
military tactics, his efforts to build up the French colonial 
system and his desire to convert the Mediterranean into a 
purely French lake. Whether lie took over anything more 
is a question at once difficult to answer and important, the 

84 



571] NAPOLEON AND THE REVOLUTION 85 

solution of which is, as it seems, well-nigh impossible. 
It is undeniable that Napoleon continued the expansion 
policy of the Revolution and that he was, generally, acting 
upon the offensive ; likewise it could be shown that he per- 
sonally liked best of all to be on the field and in battle. 
But this does not yet explain why he entered, as he did, 
upon the career of a conqueror. Did he do so on his own 
impulsion or through the force of circumstances? Eng- 
land's verdict was that the blame lay entirely in Napoleon's 
infamy, and on the Continent many were of the same 
opinion ; Napoleon, on the other hand, pointed to England 
as the real disturber of the peace of Europe. Thus the 
discussion turned back and forth, and the problem is not 
really settled even at the present time. 

If Napoleon was the heir of the Revolution, he was still 
in another sense its overthrower. He restored the 
monarchy, ordered anew the administration, gave support 
to industry, and brought back from their banishment law 
and religion. As has been noted, he held, in a general way, 
to the principle of equality; he preferred, however, the 
soldier to the citizen and naturally saw to it that the im- 
portant posts in the government were filled witli dependable 
men. Republican simplicity soon disappeared under him ; 
even during the Consulate it began to be a legend. Like- 
wise, republican loquacity now grew silent; it especially 
displeased the new head of the state and was anyhow of 
doubtful advantage. 

Napoleon's two-fold relation to the Revolution caused 
Gentz to pass judgment on him quite differently. Imme- 
diately after the Coup d'Etat, Gentz believes him to be the 
man who has subdued anarchy. As early as 1802, however, 
he becomes uncertain, for he has heard that France in the 
meantime made new annexations. From about 1803 on, he 
sees, therefore, in Napoleon little else than the heir of the 
Revolution, especially of its policy of expansion; the per- 
sonal position of the new ruler, it is true, he regards, after 
1804, as legitimatized. During the war of 1813-14, Gentz's 
views take a new turn in that after 1813 he emphatically 



86 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [572 

defends the Napoleonic Empire whose existenec was now 
threatened ; for he now sees in it a dam against the desire 
for expansion of the Eastern powers. 

Gentz mentions Napoleon for the first time in a letter 
of March, 1798, in which he calls him the "blood-dripping" 
creator of the Italian republics and expresses the hope that 
this new celebrity may never rise to the position of dictator 
of France. 1 His next utterances come in the first half of 
1799. Napoleon had, in the meantime, sailed to Egypt; 
what will he accomplish? Gentz awaits in suspense, as 
does everyone else, 2 further news, but considers the expedi- 
tion as hazardous. 3 His interest, nevertheless, is aroused ; 
he is convinced that the young general deserves from now 
on careful watching. And as a matter of fact Napoleon 
began just then to get attention from every quarter. People 
began to see in him the coming dictator of France; Wieland 
expressed this idea publicly as early as March, 1798, and 
again in January, 1799, while others cherished it in secret. 
Gentz knows of these hopes, but at present he is not pre- 
pared to share them. Even in 1794, it is true, he reckons 
with the possibility of a dictatorship in France; 4 the idea 
that the coming dictator is to be a general is, however, 
against liis wishes. Bonaparte's qualities as a statesman, 
he declares in March, 1799, are overrated; he may begin 
revolutions readily enough — as the one of 1797 in Upper 
Italy — but he cannot end them. 5 In August, 1799, Gentz 
is still prophesying for France "an endless, continuous 
series of revolutions and catastrophes." 6 

Things were, however, not destined to come to such a 
pass, for the harvest was ripe and the reaper at hand. Three 
months after this prophesy there indeed came a new revolu- 
tion in France, but it was to be the last for a long time: 
the Goup d'fitat. Gentz expresses himself on it in the 

'Briefc v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 252. 

'H. J., 1799, I, 62, 79. 

*Ibid., I, 390., note. 

'Translation of Mallet du Pan, 146, note. 

*Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 255. 

«H. J., 1799, II, 456. 



573] EARLY ATTITUDE TOWARD NAPOLEON 87 

December number of the Historisches Journal for 1799. 7 
The tone of his discussion is sympathetic and hopeful. He 
sees in the Coup d'fitat the first real revolution since 1789, 
and the transition of the previous form of French govern- 
ment into a dictatorship, which he terms a "provisional" 
one. He considers it possible that torn and devastated 
France now will recover; this recovery, he thinks, will, of 
course, take a long time, but the prospects are good, 
although Napoleon still has to prove that he possesses 
statesmanlike qualities. 8 Gentz does not forget to empha- 
size the fact that Napoleon obtained possession of the gov- 
ernment by unjust means; he hopes, therefore, that his 
dictatorship may form a mere transition to orderly rela- 
tions, that is to "universal justice, security of person and 
of property, the reign of law, stability of government." 9 
Perhaps he is most satisfied by what he believes to be the 
honestly pacific intentions of the new ruler; "for the first 
time," he declares, "since the Republic came into being, the 
desire for peace seems not to be a trick of war or a cloak 
for extortion." 

But Gentz's hopeful frame of mind was not long to 
continue. In the summer of 1802, disconcerting news be- 
gan to arrive from the West ; it was heard that Napoleon 
had been chosen consul for life, that he had annexed Elba 
and Piedmont and had interfered with the internal affairs 
of Switzerland. Worse than this was the fact that France 
laid claim to a controlling influence in the territorial re- 
arrangement of Germany, and even actually exerted it. 
The dreaded spectre of French ambition was, then, once 
more, looming up; again the all-absorbing question was: 
what next? Gentz suddenly awoke from his dreaming, and 
the mood which is now animating him is shown by two of 
his letters to Adam M tiller from September and October, 
1802. 10 Personally he is exceptionally hopeful, for he 

'Ibid., Ill, 436-478. 

'Ibid., 1800, I, 364 ff. 

"Ibid., 1799, III, 477 f. 

w Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 368 ff., 372. 



88 PRIEDBICH GENTZ [574 

is just returning from Vienna with the commission of im- 
perial counsellor in his pocket; but as regards the political 
situation he exhibits grave anxiety. "I am,'' he writes, 
"satisfied with fame and honor; I have not learned much 
that is pleasant or comforting, but much notwithstanding, 
very much; now I really know how deep the wounds of 
Europe are, but I know too where the healing herbs are to 
be found I regard myself as one of the instru- 
ments whereby Europe is again to be raised to its own. 
. . . . There can and must be no peace so long as 
crime goes on unpunished; I would sooner see the world in 
flames than see it perish in this deadly marasmus." Thus 
he writes, it is true, only to a friend. Before the public he 
remains silent, for the time being; as he tells us later, he 
dared do nothing more than "sigh in silence" at the deeds 
of Bonaparte. 11 Soon, however, he is to fight once more. 

2. 1803-1809. 

The new struggle Gentz conducted no longer from Ber- 
lin, but from Vienna. For there he had taken up his resi- 
dence in February, 1803. 

He left, if one is to believe his own statements, the 
scene of his previous activity with a heavy heart; for he 
could not, as he declares, hope ever again to be so loved, 
so honored and so considerately treated as lie had been 
there. As a matter of fact, however, he had then played out 
in Berlin. Until the fall of 1802 he stood, nominally, still 
in the service of the Prussian state ; but after 1800 he was 
only occasionally occupied, and filled his time with literary 
work, with trips to watering-places, complaints at his lack 
of prospects, and wild dissipation. 12 lie had grown thor- 
oughly disgusted with the tedious bureaucratic routine, and 
also with the insignificance of his own position; besides, 
there were unpleasant domestic scenes, ever increasing 
debts, a somewhat shattered personal reputation, and the 
difficulties which the Prussian government now put in the 

"Weick, IV, 130, note. 

12 Fcstschrift en G. Schm oiler's ~o, Gcburtstag, 155. 



575] APPOINTMENT AT VIENNA 89 

way of his activity as a publicist. In this manner, things 
could not go on any longer, that he, himself, saw clearly; 
something, then, had to be done. But what? Gentz 
thought of moving to Vienna, and offered his services there, 
as he himself later tells, 13 in the summer of 1802, appar- 
ently in August, He had become acquainted with Counts 
Stadion and Metternich, the imperial representatives at 
Berlin and Dresden, and thanks to their recommendations, 
to the support of the imperial counsellor Fassbender and, 
above all, the intercession of Count Cobenzl, he succeeded 
in September, 1802, in entering the Austrian service. 

It is not uninteresting to study the intentions and 
expectations entertained on both sides. On the part of 
Gentz, hope was as indefinite as it was boundless. While 
returning from Vienna, he informed Adam Miiller of his 
prospects, and enumerated the alleged main points of 
the contract: an income of 6000 florins, a pension of 4000 
florins, a patent of nobility and the grant of other titles as 
soon as he should manifest his desire for such honors, free 
choice of occupation, and deliverance from all "slavish" 
bureaucratic work; he has, therefore, as he adds, "even 
opportunity for unlimited activities and prospects such as 
would satisfy the wildest ambition." 14 The liberation from 
bureaucratic work he also mentions in a letter to Brinck- 
mann of 1803 ; 13 in his letter of resignation to the king of 
Prussia he remarks that only the one condition had been 
imposed upon him, to move there and to continue Ms lit- 
erary work. 16 Information that is considerably different, 
however, and without doubt more correct, we get in turning 
to the Austrian side. 17 The man who was pushing Gentz's 
appointment there more than any other and finally carried 
it through, was Ludwig Cobenzl, the actual head of the 
Austrian foreign office. Cobenzl had for some time been 

13 ''Tagebiicher" I, 22. 

u Briefe v. a. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 369. 

15 Ibid., II, 128. 

"Schlesier, V. 17 f. 

1T Fournier, Gentz und Cobenzl, 191 ff. 



00 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [576 

convinced that, in the future, Austria's politics must be 
more energetically championed before the public, and now 
believed that he had found in Gentz the right man for this 
task. His plan was to get the latter away from Prussia, 
and to tie him to Austria. There he was, at first, to be 
busied with smaller tasks, until he had shown himself ac- 
climated and fully reliable. After that, he might be taken 
over into the Staatskanzlei as a regular official and his pen 
made use of on a larger scale; he was, however, to remain 
under the directions of the two heads of the foreign office. 
In accordance with this plan, the contract was shaped ; its 
chief points were : 1. Gentz was, without being appointed 
as a regular official, to receive 4000 florins a year and the 
title of imperial counsellor; 2. his duty was "to devote all 
his powers for the best interest of the imperial service, ac- 
cording to the commissions and directions given him, and 
with the most faithful and obedient devotion." To this 
Cobenzl added orally that he intended to be a stern chief 
and hoped he would have to experience no disappointment. 
Gentz, as Cobenzl states, accepted the conditions with the 
keenest pleasure and promised to undertake nothing what- 
soever without the authorization of those in power. 

Gentz had hardly arrived in Vienna when he began to 
throw himself into the whirlpool of society. 18 The first 
fortnight formed "a continual round from dinner to supper, 
from coterie to coterie" ; of business he did not even think : 
it was, as he declared, not to hinder him "from being as 
free, as merry, as wicked, as oratorical, and as poetical as 
we may wish to be." There was no lack of night birds of 
his own type in Vienna, and one of those with whom he 
turned night into day was none other than Stadion. Did 
he find the new surroundings more attractive than the old? 
As it seems, he could not yet become quite clear on this 
point. The women, he states, are very charming, and the 
nir of Vienna in general is possessed of a narcotic charm; 
on the oilier hand, in most of the large houses an exceeding 
emptiness and monotony may be found. Everything is 

ls Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 108 f., in f., 126 f., 140. 



577] APPOINTMENT AT VIENNA 91 

divided into coteries with no points of reunion existing; 
one must, therefore, choose his circle. He himself, is mov- 
ing in those of the Countess Kinsky, of the Princesses Lich- 
nowsky and Gallitzin and of Prince Lobkowitz; in all he 
has more than a half dozen of them, Stadion, however, per- 
haps twenty. In the circles here mentioned are not included 
those of the foreign embassies; in these, too, Gentz was in 
part, a frequent guest : he visited particularly the houses of 
the Russian ambassador, Count Rasumowsky, and those of 
the representatives of England and Sweden, Paget and 
Armfeldt. His feelings represented a mixture of immense 
satisfaction and growing displeasure. "I am honoured, 
feted and caressed," he writes in April, 1803, "on all sides" ; 
but he adds: "my real activity, however, can only begin 
when certain changes have been effected which may perhaps 
be nearer than many think." The spirit of the time, as he 
sees it, too, is causing him distress ; the human race, he re- 
marks with bitterness in the summer of 1803, is just good 
enough to be drowned in a general flood. 19 

Gentz then wished for a new, a real activity. What 
was it to be? At first, he expected, probably, only a share in 
the decisions concerning questions of foreign policy, later 
however, apparently even the position of minister of state 
itself; 20 in addition, he intended, of course, to fight 
Napoleon, the "monster". 21 He hoped and waited, but 
nothing seemed to result. He turned to Cobenzl, only to 
receive the answer that the time for his employment had 
not yet arrived. 22 So he determined to open the fight 
against Napoleon in a different way and upon his own re- 
sponsibility ; with Cobenzl he might settle later on, when a 
fitting opportunity should offer itself. 

Before taking up the details of this struggle, it may be 
best to get at an understanding of its general character. 

The fact that Gentz hated Napoleon from 1803 on is 
not to be explained by a dependence on his part upon the 

19 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 128, 147 f. 

"Ibid., II, 128. 

*Ibid., II, 144. 

22 Aus der alien Registratur der Staatskanzlei, ed. by Klinkowstrom, 7. 



92 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [578 

judgment of public opinion, for at this time Napoleon was 
by no means generally unpopular. The tremendous hatred 
which Europe later conceived for him accumulated but 
gradually; iu England since 1803, in Austria since 1805, 
in Prussia practically since 1806 and in Spain since 1808. 
During the first years of the Consulate, Napoleon was on 
the whole respected and admired; at any rate his rule was 
hailed with satisfaction. In the short interim between the 
peace of Amiens and the renewal of hostilities with Eng- 
land, he even enjoyed the distinction of being an idol of 
English society ; whoever in those days might take a pleas- 
ure trip to Paris wanted to see the First Consul. On the 
occasion of his journey to the Rhine country in 1804, the 
emperor was received with unfeigned admiration, and in 
the states of the later Confederation of the Rhine, this feel- 
ing persisted even much longer. In Prussia, public opinion 
was up to 1805 not only in sympathy with the neutrality 
policy of the government, but even favorably disposed 
towards France and towards the emperor himself; accord- 
ing to Johannes von Miiller, it did not turn decidedly 
against the latter until the middle of October, 1805. 23 
Napoleon had, up to this time, in a certain sense wooed 
Prussia and was, even after 1805, somewhat underrated 
by the Prussian generals. 

This hatred must, therefore, he explained differently. 
Perhaps, then, by a tendency in Gentz towards opposition 
at any cost, or by the unrest which the policy of Napoleon 
aroused in him? It is not improbable that both of these 
factors, to a certain degree, did influence Gentz. To fight — 
only with the pen and with words, but by no means with 
the sword — was indeed a kind of necessity for him; he felt 
it as a pleasant stimulant, provided the excitement was not 
too great, and thought, after Leipzig that, with the triumph 
of the good cause, life had become somewhat tedious. 24 
Likewise there can be no question that for him the calm 
enjoyment of life was much disturbed by the continual war- 

28 Sch1esier, IV, 119. 
"Ibid, I, 169. 



579] GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NEW STRUGGLE 



93 



fare and its consequences ; he had twice to flee from Vienna, 
he wandered about the world from the end of 1805 to the 
spring of 1809 and could, thanks to his anti-Napoleonic 
tendencies, get no official recognition until the latter year. 
On one occasion he himself speaks, half in jest, half 
seriously, on this latter point. It was in the summer of 
1811. He would have liked very much to go to Teplitz in 
order to take care of his body, and incidentally to renew the 
charming acquaintances which he had made there in the 
preceding year; unfortunately, however, he has to remain 
in Vienna' With 4-5000 florins, so he estimates to his 
friend Rahel, he could have managed to stay there "a few 
weeks" ; but he does not happen to have this sum just then. 
"God," he exclaims, "and his destroying angel, Bonaparte, 
are upon us . . . Not to be able to talk with you for a 
few days and not to see the face of the Princess Solms, 
those are privations in return from which I could wish the 
founder of the continental system a hell of his own. 1 ' 25 
Similar feelings may have been entertained by Gentz 
also at other times. However, it would show a slight un- 
derstanding of his character to assume that he allowed him- 
self to be seriously influenced by such motives; they can, 
at all events, not have induced him to take up the fight, 
inasmuch as they arose only during it. 

The real cause of Gentz's antagonism to Napoleon lay 
far deeper: it lay, in the last analysis, in the entire trend 
of his political thinking. Napoleon was to him, from 1803 
on, but the heir of the Revolution, 20 and the Revolution he 
thoroughly abhorred. It is true, he thought to distinguish 
differences between the internal policies of the Revo- 
lution and of Napoleon, but these did not, in his eyes sig- 
nify any advance; in 1805, for instance, he suggests that 
quiet was then reigning in France, but this quiet was, after 
all, nothing but the silence of general servitude and an un- 
limited power of government. 27 In the sphere of interna- 

"Ibid., I, 121 f. 

x Mcm. et left, ined., 4 ff., 56. Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gent.':, IT, 251. 

"Mem. et lett. hied., 87. 



94 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [580 

tional politics, Gentz feared even worse from Napoleon than 
what the Revolution had brought. As early as the summer 
of 1803, he considered the former the storm-cloud which 
hung threateningly over Europe, the common danger of 
the Continent, from which no state felt safe any longer. 28 
At any moment, the new Caesar might set his legions in 
motion and inflict a blow in which more than a third of the 
Continent would participate ; who could think of resisting 
such a power? The fine old balance of power was, as it 
seemed, definitely destroyed. Worse things, it is true, were 
yet to come, and then it was Gentz's controlling idea to pre- 
vent, at any cost, the erection of a universal French mon- 
archy in Europe. 

But how was this to be prevented? Gentz answers: by 
coalitions. Any other means he does not know. He espe- 
cially favors a coalition between Austria and Prussia, and 
to bring this alliance about was the real goal of his fiery 
activity during the years 1803-1809. 29 At first, he does not 
yet think seriously of war; he simply intends to intimidate 
Napoleon through this coalition or others, and even in 
October, 1805, he is convinced that France will yield before 
an Austro-Prussian demonstration. That he could en- 
tertain such illusions is in reality not so strange as it may 
at first seem. Miscalculations of this kind are being made 
again and again; in 1778 and in 1785, Joseph II operated 
in the same way against Frederick the Great and lost the 
game. Only later, from about 1806 on, Gentz also saw 
in coalitions an effective instrument of war. 

Perhaps the best insight into the motives and aims of 
Gentz's struggle against Napoleon may be obtained from 
the following passage in a letter of December, 1804 : "As 
regards public affairs," Gentz writes, "but one idea now 
occupies my attention. There must be effected a union 
between Austria and Prussia ; and I claim it will come. For 
two months I have been working for this day and night, in 

n Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 114. Cf. p. 128. 

29 Fotirnicr, Gentz unci Cobencl, 251 ff. Schlesier, IV, 16, 86. ff., IOO, 
117. Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 251. 259. 



581] GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NEW STRUGGLE 95 

public and in private, with pen and tongue. You shall soon 
get to see something on that subject. If I can say to my- 
self that I have contributed something to this measure, then 
I shall consider my goal as attained and my life as well- 
nigh closed. To resist the French Revolution was my first 
and holiest purpose : it has been victorious, has been com- 
pleted — even crowned ; that is finished. To prevent the fall 
of Europe's independence in consequence of that awful 
revolution — is my present and, of course, my last purpose. 
The union between Austria and Prussia, accompanied by a 
general consolidation of all the remaining forces of Ger- 
many — this highest German and at the same time European 
project — is the only means to attain that end; it is, how- 
ever, also a sufficient, a complete and a thorough one. If 
Germany shall become united . . . then we can say 
farewell to Russia (with which for a thousand good reasons 
I now will have nothing more to do) , can see England fight- 
ing its glorious fight on a sure and grand basis, and can 
laugh at all the threats of France. To subdue haughty, 
terrible, mad, impious, detestable and despicable France by 
a measure, . . . through which alone Germany . . . 
can again become Germany, and to find the means for our 
salvation in the very tiling which can at the same time give 
us the foundation for our future national greatness — what 
German may resist so ravishing and charming a prospect 
as this !" 30 

Gentz's attitude towards Russia was, almost from the 
beginning, one of mingled feelings. 31 To him, Russia was 
the colossus of the North, the natural rival of Austria in 
the East and her possible friend in the West, a backward 
but eventually dangerous power which needed only to ex- 
tend her hand toward France to share with her the mas- 
tery of the Continent and throttle Austria. An alliance 
with such a power he regarded, in general, as a necessity for 
Austria, at least until about 1809. That both powers, if 

30 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 251. 

^Fournier, Gents und Cobensl, 256 f., 260 ff. Schlesier, IV, 88 f., 103, 
157. Briefc v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 196 f., 208 f., 251, 259, 262. Cf. p. 121. 



96 FUIEDRICH GENTZ [582 

allied, would be able to offer successful resistance to 
Napoleon he did not really believe, at least not after Sep- 
tember, 1804; for this, he considered the assistance of Prus- 
sia as indispensable. But the alliance would, at any rate, 
mean a positive strengthening of Austria's power, and then 
— that he emphasizes in 1804 and again in 1814 — a possible 
union of Russia and France had by all means to be pre- 
vented. His estimate of the military value of the Rus- 
sians was, as regarded a campaign in the West, not a high 
one; and scarcely higher was his opinion of their diplomatic 
ability. "We know the Russian geniuses," he writes in 
June, 1804 : all of the average type, or beneath it, generals 
as well as ministers, with the exception of one man, who 
is now, however, out of office. At other times, indeed, im- 
mediately before Austerlitz, for example, he values the 
Russians more highly. What especially aroused him was 
Russia's attitude towards Germany. Already the Rus- 
sian interference in German affairs during 1801-1803 had 
displeased him greatly; he became highly indignant, 
however, at the conceit which the Russian generals, in 
the campaign of 1805, displayed toward the Austrians. 
After Leipzig, when the subjugation of Napoleon seemed 
accomplished, he regarded the Russian colossus hardly as 
anything less than as the rival of today and the enemy of 
tomorrow. As if to heap coals of fire upon his head, 
Emperor Alexander, who apparently knew little of these 
hostile feelings of Gentz, bestowed upon him, at the end of 
1813, the order of St. Anne, calling him at the same time in 
an autograph, ''the champion of law, the defender of the 
true principles of political wisdom and the art of govern- 
ment." 

Gentz kept up relations with England until the time of 
Napoleon's fall, though not always with the same degree of 
intimacy. 32 In the first years of his residence at Vienna he 
acted, as we know, in the capacity of an English agent, 
being reimbursed for his services by occasional remittances. 
After 1800, however, he ceased to act as such in any real 

^Tagebiicher, I, 40, 52 f., 214, 255 f. 



583] GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NEW STRUGGLE 97 

sense of the word, and after 1811, the flow of English 
guineas also seems to have stopped; his value as an agent 
depended naturally upon his connections and his knowledge 
of diplomatic secrets, and as early as 1805 he believed to 
have discovered that in this regard he Avas now less highly 
thought of in London than formerly. But in whatever way 
Gentz's personal wire to London might work, whatever he 
might think of English ministries and English policies, to 
England itself he remained faithfully attached during all 
these years. 33 The policy of the Addington ministry dis- 
turbed him for a moment, but after that he no longer 
doubted that Britain would stand to the end in the service 
of the good cause. At times it would even seem as though 
the fate of England lay closer to his heart than that of 
Austria or Prussia ; when Napoleon was thinking of invad- 
ing the British Isles, he fairly "trembled," as he says him- 
self, for their future. And this devotion lasted, as we know, 
even beyond the days of Napoleon; it was so strong that 
Gentz never entertained the idea that after the elimination 
of the French supremacy, the English control of the seas 
would necessarily be only the more uncontested. 

The methods which Gentz himself used to reacli his 
political aims were practically the old ones of Berlin: 
memorials, letters, verbal conversations and publications. 
The lines of division may here sometimes be hard to de- 
termine; in general, however, they are distinguishable, and 
if we draw these lines, we find in the years from 1803 until 
1815 somewhat less than thirty memorials from Gentz\s 
pen : five in 1803, three in 1804, three in 1805, two in 1806, 
two in 1807, one in 1808, one in 1808-1809, two in 1810, one 
in 1813, three in 1814 and five in 1815. the two war-mani- 
festos, the treatises on the Austrian finances, and 
those on maritime law are not included in this list. 
About half of these memorials were directed to Viennese 
personages, namely three to Cobenzl, one to Archduke 
John, two to Stadion and seven to Metternich; five were in- 

'^Fournier, Gcutz unci Cobenzl, 264 ff. Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 
130, 144, 161, 171 f., 251. 



98 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [584 

tended for London, one for Berlin, and one for St. Peters- 
burg. The correspondence carried on by Gentz during this 
period was of unusual extent. He himself gives the number 
of his "more important" letters written betwen 1803 and 
1807 as over two thousand, and mentions among them let- 
ters to the emperors of Germany and of Russia, the king 
of SAveden, the queen of Prussia, Archduke John, the duke 
of Weimar, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, the later 
Louis XVIII of France, the duke of Orleans and the Prince 
of Wales; also letters to many English statesmen, to the 
Prussians Hardenberg, Haugwitz and Boyen, to the Rus- 
sian Panin, to the Swedes Armfeldt and Brinckmann, and 
lastly to Johannes von Mtiller, Rahel, Goethe and Schil- 
ler. 34 A considerable number of these letters, however, 
were of no political import. Of those belonging to the fol- 
lowing years, letters to Baron Stein, Nesselrode, and 
Pozzo di Borgo, to a number of Austrian generals, to 
Madame de Stael and Friedrich Schlegel deserve to be men- 
tioned. 35 Gentz made, however, now no longer so strong 
attempts to influence public opinion as he had done form- 
erly : the last of his publications — if we except the two war- 
manifestos — fall into the years 1806 and 1807, the most 
important of which were the Fragmente. In a certain 
sense, it is true, Gentz addressed himself to larger circles 
also in his occasional pamphlets on the financial condition 
of Austria, and indirectly through the channels of the Oster- 
nicliischer Beobachter; the last named paper 'stood, at 
times, under his direct surveillance. Nevertheless, in gen- 
eral he remained silent in this regard after 1807, being con- 
vinced that politics were made by the cabinets, and that 
the general public was but a sluggish, spiritless, and rather 
stupid mass, not to be influenced by books. 30 Perhaps, he 
was, in addition, officially warned after the conclusion of 
peace in 1809 against open attacks on Napoleon. 37 To 

34 Schlesier, V, 29 f. 

"Ibid., V, 30. 

*Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 147; I, 280. 

"Ibid., I, 341. 



585] GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NEW STUGGLE 99 

arouse the high society in Vienna and elsewhere, Gentz 
endeavored with unwearying zeal, at least until 1809, be- 
lieving, as he writes to Johannes von Miiller in 1804, that he 
was helping thereby the good cause not a little. 3S 

To these old methods there was added, however, a new 
one : political intriguing, the overthrow of ministries, or at 
least attempts in this direction. It is true, Gentz employed 
this new method almost exclusively against that ministry 
which he found in power at Vienna upon his arrival there, 
and within it against Cobenzl in particular. 39 

What was to follow when the struggle against 
Napoleon should have been ended successfully, may be de- 
rived from the preceding chapter on Gentz's political 
theories, from the citation just made, from the letter 
to Metternich of November, 1813, and, finally, from the 
letters to Johannes von Miiller. 40 Gentz demands — and 
these are the ultimate ends towards which he is working — 
a return to the balance of power; the formation of a new 
federative system in Europe which would offer a guarantee 
of independence to the individual states; a territorial re- 
duction of France; the liberation of Germany from every 
foreign tutelage; a numerical reduction of the German 
states and the consolidation of those remaining into a fed- 
eration in which Austria and Prussia should have the 
leadership, and Austria again should enjoy a certain pre- 
ponderance over Prussia as the primus inter pares: 
finally, the suppression of all revolutionary tendencies by 
the European areopagus, the maintenance of the founda- 
tions of state and society, and a measured progress in minor 
points. 

If we turn to Gentz's judgment of the man Napoleon, 
we must above all keep in mind that this judgment was con- 
siderably influenced by the former's general relations to 
the latter. Any subtle distinction between the politician 
and the man, Gentz was never prone to draw, although 

38 Schlesier, IV, 15. 

39 Cf. p. 

^Schlesier, IV, 19, 21, 48, 157, 167, 179. Cf. p. 147 f. 



100 FEIEDRICH GENTZ [586 

claiming himself to have drawn it in his dealings with 
Cobenzl; 41 besides, in the present case, he materially 
changed his views as soon as the enemy had become harm- 
less. In general, Napoleon was in his eyes an undoubtedly 
extraordinary figure who combined every conceivable wick- 
edness with unusual ability. The epithets which Gentz ap- 
plies to this man between 1803 and 1806 are as long as they 
are dreadful. He calls him immensely ambitious, haughty, 
passionate, extremely provoking, a "faithless, vain, petty 
usurper, by the infamy of contemporaries raised first to 
greatness, then to a frenzy of greatness, an insolent, im- 
pious and villainous tyrant,'- a "stage monarch," a "blood- 
reeking beast," and "idol," "Baal," "Belzebub," and so- 
on. 42 He is especially aroused by Napoleon's bold assump- 
tion of the dignity of emperor. 43 How could a man coming 
from a "branded" family, a "parvenu," like him, think of 
taking to himself such a hallowed title! How could the 
princes of Europe submit to this "boundless infamy," how 
could God in heaven suffer it, even with his incomprehensi- 
ble patience! It was too much; "can you find words," he 
asks Brinckmann, "to express this latest of all pieces of vil- 
lainy?" .More moderate in form, more detailed and interest- 
ing, are Gentz's characterizations of Napoleon in his letters 
to Metternich of 1813 and 1814. 44 In August, 1813, he writes 
in his plastic style concerning the war : "It is the struggle 
with a raging monster, which before it falls, lays waste the 
earth about it, but it is none the less its death-struggle, and 
it can not escape its fate." Then in November, 1813 : "The 
boldest hazard of my life, my obstinate assertion of the per- 
sonal mediocrity of the ex-hero of our time is now crowned 
with a success that I myself never looked for. That he 
was as I said, God indeed revealed to me, and I should have 

41 Briefe r. it. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 249. 

a Mem. et lett. incd., 8, 9, 11, 45, 66. Schlesier, IV, 54, 86, 118. Brief e 
v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentc, I, 291 ; II, 135, 144, 194. 

43 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 194, 212. 

"Metternich-Klinkowstrom, Osterreiclis Theilnahme an den Befrei- 
ungskriegen, 50 f., 97 f., 291. 



587] GENERAL FEATURES OF THE NEW STRUGGLE 101 

died with that conviction, even though he had conquered 
Asia. But that the whole world should so soon see it, com- 
prehend and acknowledge it, I never promised myself. His 
soul was long ago comprehensible enough to me, his intelli- 
gence much later, and then only with great restriction ; but 
his character still defies me. That there is a tremendous 
difference between an iron character and a great one did 
not commend itself to me either. At last every tiling is be- 
coming clear." Finally, in March, 1814: "This man has 
his whole life long done nothing but play a great military 
play with the French, with all Europe, with himself and 
his own fate. He remained the same at the summit of for- 
tune and on the verge of destruction. His language is not 
that of a Nero, nor yet that of a Caesar. The strange phe- 
nomenon which we call Bonaparte can be measured only 
by its own standard. The consequence of all the great mis- 
takes, and therefore of all the great suffering of our time, 
was that Napoleon was ever considered either a demigod or 
a monster, or perhaps as both in one.'' 

The last of these quotations sounds already less hostile, 
and a year later, by the end of July, 1815, Gentz had 
reached a complete change in his judgment. If he now ex- 
presses himself about Napoleon almost sympathetically, 
and certainly with unfeigned emotion, it was not only be- 
cause he had just then received from Adam Miiller a dram- 
atic and inspiring description of the battle of Waterloo 
which did justice to the Emperor: 45 there were other mo- 
tives just as strong. The struggle was now over and the ca- 
reer of the opponent definitely closed ; thus Gentz was able 
to view him in a more objective and historic way, and by 
the tribute that he now pays to Napoleon he proved that he 
united, after all, with his Phseacian inclinations a deeply 
rooted appreciation of heroism. In this tribute he first 
makes acknowledgment of Napoleon's attitude on the 
BclJerophon, and then goes on to say : "It is certain that 
his character never changed for an instant, and that he has 
borne this last catastrophe with unaltered equanimity. The 

* s Ibid., 641 ff. Gentz describes the battle himself. 



102 FEIEDKICH GENTZ [588 

fear of death can never have befallen a man who in the most 
fearful danger ever showed an iron courage, and even on 
the day of the battle of Waterloo so exposed his person that 
no English or Prussian corps could be named which has not 
seen him at least twenty times on that day in the heaviest 
fire and turmoil. If he preferred imprisonment to death, 
he made his choice with forethought; and it can be said 
that from the beginning to the end of his career he has 
thrown his contemporaries one after another, now into 
astonishment and now into rage, that he has outwitted 
them, despised, scorned and bluffed them ; a riddle without 
an answer, a phenomenon without a parallel, an inexhaus- 
tible subject for conjecture, investigation and the despair of 
historians who in the future will desire to give a faithful 
picture of him to the posterity which is to judge him." 40 

After this general orientation, we take up the thread 
of our narrative once more. 

Gentz has, as we know, established himself in Vienna 
and opened his private warfare against Napoleon. For 
some time, no important happenings are to be noted in his 
life; but there occurred a considerable number of minor 
events, and to these — covering the period from the spring of 
1803 to the summer of 1805 — we have now to turn our at- 
tention. 

Gentz is of course very busy during this time, for when 
not busy he becomes bored. He meets many prominent per- 
sonages, such as Fassbender, Stadion, Metternich, Mack, 
Paget, Panin, Rasunowsky, Pozzo di Borgo and Armf eldt ; 
with Cobenzl he has but little to do. Soon he rents a coun- 
try house in Hietzing, one of the suburbs of Vienna, and 
there he gives tea-parties, or he makes short expeditions into 
the mountains. Now and then he might also permit him- 
self the pleasure of a love adventure ; it goes without saying 
that he continues to frequent the drawing-rooms of the 
fashionable world. In general he feels in good spirits. 47 
During the second half of 1804, he begins, it is true, to be 

"Ibid., 686. 
"Tagebiicher, T, 30, 33. 



589] FIRST ACTIVITY AT VIENNA 103 

discontented with conditions in Vienna; 48 at times a feel- 
ing of disgust with the whole world conies over him, and 
once when in such a mood he tells Brinckmann that he is 
ready to fight to the end, but that if it comes to the worst, 
he will bury himself in solitude of the mountains. 49 Still, 
though he suffers all these moments of depression, Gentz 
continues to maintain his old self-reliance. In October, 
1804, he writes to Brinckmann: "I can assure you with- 
out boasting that I have not gone astray for many a day in 
a single political calculation." 50 Likewise in December, 
1804 : "I am highly esteemed by all parties and people in 
Vienna, am loved by many feared by some. . . . The 
archdukes are not more firmly established, not less exposed 
to any unpleasantness of even to a consilio dbeundi than 
I." 31 Once he makes the laudable attempt to pay off, in part, 
his debts; unfortunately, the money is embezzled. 32 How 
he maintained financially his very luxurious mode of life, 
we do not know in detail ; part of the money came, at any 
rate, from the coffers of the foreign office at London. 

Gentz's correspondence was in this period, until the 
beginning of 1806, a very extensive one, especially lively 
with Brinckmann, with Johannes von Miiller and, first of 
all, with London. 53 Five memorials fall in the year of 
1803 : one was addressed to the duke of Weimar and en- 
trusted to Johannes von Miiller for delivery, one dealt with 
the French financial administration, two with the prob- 
ability of a continental war in event of hostilities between 
France and England, and one with England's problems in 
the war which has just broken out. 54 The exact contents 
of these memorials are but little known, for so far they have 
not been found, and Gentz himself speaks of them only in 

u Ibid., I, 37- 

49 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 225. 
">Ibid., II, 231. 
sl Ibid., II, 248. 
"'Tagebiicher, I, 29 f. 
^Tagebiicher, I, 27. 

"Schmidt-Weissenfels, Friedrich Gents, I, 174, f. Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. 
Gentz. II, 130, 159 f. 



104 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [590 

passing. To the duke of Weimar, lie explains the ex 
pediency of working once more toward a union of the Ger- 
man princes, which would now, however, have to be directed 
against France and include Austria as well as Prussia. In 
the memoir on England's duties — it was meant for London, 
but did not actually go there, though it came to the atten- 
tion of the king of Sweden 55 — he gives the advice to start a 
revolt within the cabinets in the interest of the 
European balance of power, or to conquer all possessions of 
the non-European powers outside of Europe, especially 
those of Spain in America. 56 This last idea Gentz touches 
upon again in 1806 ; 57 the problem of the balance of power 
hypnotized him apparently to the extent that he was ready 
to sanction almost anything that promised help. Further 
memorials appeared in the years 1804 and 1805; these, how- 
ever, will be analyzed later. 58 

Outside of Austria, Gentz kept up connections with 
leading personages on the Thames, Spree and Neva. 
Whether he ever seriously shared in the intrigues against 
the Russian minister of foreign affairs, may be left unde- 
cided; a change in St. Petersburg would, however, undoubt- 
edly have pleased him. 59 At Berlin he possessed in Johannes 
von Miiller and, in a certain sense, also in Brinckmann, 
active fellow-champions of his ideas; the Prussian war- 
party, too, was working in harmony with his aims, and at 
its head stood that Prince Louis Ferdinand with whom he 
had been so well acquainted since the end of his Berlin 
period. Especially lively were Gentz's relations with Lon- 
don. Stacks of letters and memorials were sent thither 
through various channels, and at the same time Gentz en- 
joyed confidential relations with Paget, the English repre- 
sentative at Vienna. What information he gave the British 
statesmen, and what measures he advised, we know only 
in part. As long as Addington was in power, his main con- 

5r 'Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 159 f. 

™Ibid., II, 162. 

"Aus dem Nachlasse, II, 10 f. 

58 Cf. p. 112 fif. 

h9 Bricfc 7'. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz. II, 231. Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 476. 



591] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 105 

cern was a fear that England might give in ; and he there- 
fore sends repeated warnings to hold out. Malta, above 
everything else, should not be given up at any price. 60 He 
is happy at the assumption of government by Pitt in May, 

1804, and immediately his notes, letters, and memorials 
begin to pour in. First he presents to the new premier his 
memoir against a recognition of Napoleon's imperial 
title; 01 at the same time or a little later he must, as we 
learn from a letter to Johannes von Miiller of November, 

1805, have warned Pitt not to overestimate Russia and to 
remember that a war against Napoleon at the side of the 
ministry Cobenzl and without the voluntary aid of Prussia 
would be hopeless. 02 Almost identical warnings were sent 
by Paget, but Pitt went his own way. 03 In November, 1804, 
Gentz presented another memorial, this time to the Earl of 
Harrowby, Pitt's secretary of foreign affairs, in which he 
recommended an entente between Prussia and Austria. 64 

If we turn to Gentz's activity as regards Austria itself, 
immediately and above all we hit upon his relations to his 
immediate superior. We know that Cobenzl at first simply 
intended to attach Gentz to Austria, and to make serious 
use of his abilities only later. This time had not yet come 
by the end of 1803, and in fact never came ; for until 1809 
Gentz was never really employed. That he must have felt 
this neglect bitterly is self-evident, and a part of his hos- 
tility against Cobenzl undoubtedly went back to this fact. 
Far more important, however, was that he considered 
the latter as being perhaps the chief obstacle to a successful 
fight against Napoleon, and how this came about will now 
have to be considered. 

When Gentz entered the Austrian service, the govern- 
ment lay in the hands of a ministry composed of three de- 
partments : the departments of foreign affairs, the interior 

m Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 126. 

cl Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 475. 

62 Schlesier, IV, 159 f. 

65 'Pr cuss. Jahrb., CX, 473, 476. 

™ Brief e v. u. a. Fr. Gents, II, 245. 



106 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [592 

and war. At the head of the foreign office stood Counts 
Colleredo and Cobenzl, the former as its nominal, the 
later as its real head; one of the counsellors working under 
them was Collenbach. The head of the department of the 
interior was Count Kollowrat, who had also supervision 
over the financial administration. Finally, the head of the 
war department was Archduke Charles, a brother of 
Emperor Francis and the victor of 1796; next to him in 
position and influence were General Duka and Counsellor 
Fassbender. The competence of these departments seems 
to have been disputed, and a real cooperation between them 
never existed; two were even really hostile to one another. 
The war department, including Archduke Charles, con- 
sidered Austria as too weak, both in a military and financial 
way, to carry on successful war with Napoleon even with 
Russia's aid, and sought, therefore, friendly relations with 
France. The foreign office, on the other hand, though also 
convinced of the weakness of the monarchy and not prin- 
cipally in favor of war, did not consider a war if fought in 
union with Russia, as entirely hopeless. The Emperor sided 
at first chiefly with the peace party. Since the peace of 
Amiens, the real opposition to Archduke Charles and his 
group was formed of a number of persons of high rank and 
social standing who passed under the name of the "Anglo- 
maniacs" ; among them were men such as Panin, Rasumow- 
sky, Paget, Armfeldt, and Pozzo di Borgo, the ladies of the 
aristocracy, French emigrants and others. The program of 
this party was the coalition of Europe against Napoleon. 

Cobenzl had been entrusted with the conduct of foreign 
affairs in October, 1800, but did not actually enter upon his 
duties until September, 1801. He possessed considerable 
diplomatic experience, being especially well acquainted 
with the conditions in St. Petersburg, where for twenty 
years he had been the representative of the court of Vienna, 
and the advocate of an Austro-Russian alliance. As the 
protrf/r and pupil of Kaunitz, as a former confidant of 
Joseph II, and on account of his long diplomatic career, 
he really belonged to that earlier period of Austrian 



593] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 107 

diplomacy in which the antagonism to Prussia had formed 
the leading idea of the Austrian cabinet. In St. Petersburg 
he had acted as an enemy of Prussia, and it was now to be 
seen whether he would retain his old policies in the new 
position. Times had changed, it is true; the European 
situation was now of a different character, and Cobenzl 
himself did not enjoy the same measure of respect and con- 
fidence from the now reigning emperor as from his prede- 
cessor. 

The task which lay before the new chief of the Austrian 
foreign office was an unusually difficult one. On three 
sides, the Austrian monarchy bordered on great states : in 
the north and east on Russia, in the east on Turkey, in the 
north on Prussia, and in the south, in Italy, on the out- 
posts of France ; on three sides, then, it was exposed to dan- 
gerous attacks. Prussia, it should be said, was in an equal- 
ly exposed position ; she had, however, lived in peace with 
France since 1795 and was at this time even courted by this 
power. Russia was geographically protected and could 
easily come to an understanding with France. Austria's 
position could, then, not be termed enviable : all around her 
only rivals and elements of possible conflicts and nowhere 
a friend unless it were across the sea. To the west, the 
danger was probably as great as ever ; Napoleon, it is true, 
still held back and besides, his death or a new revolution 
might completely change the situation there. Not less 
serious were the dangers which threatened from Russia and 
Prussia. Although a direct attack on the monarchy itself 
did not seem probable, or at least not imminent from this 
side, yet attempts at new territorial annexations would in 
this case, if once completed, in all probability be of a perma- 
nent character. If there was any way out of this dangerous 
isolation, it had to be sought in an alliance with one or sev- 
eral of the great powers, and then the choice practically lay 
between France and the late Coalition. The natural course 
was to seek a union with the latter; it was necessary, how- 
ever, in striving for it to proceed with the utmost caution. 
France must not be aroused, at least not before everything 



108 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [594 

was in readiness for a conflict; for if it came to war, the 
first blow would fall upon Austria. In order to meet it in 
time, hostilities must not begin until the Russian forces 
were near enough and the very important question of Eng- 
lish subsidies had been settled. We shall see that the policy 
of the Austrian minister held almost exactly to this line of 
reasoning. 05 

Cobenzl came to Vienna with the conviction that 
Austria's salvation lay in an alliance with Russia, and im- 
mediately made overtures in this direction to the Russian 
ambassador, Count Murawief ; his object was not to bring 
on war, but to prevent a further expansion of France. The 
sounding had no results. In the beginning of 1803, Cobenzl 
made a second attempt to approach Russia, sending even 
an archduke to St. Petersburg; this move was also without 
results. A fundamental change in Russian politics was, 
however, at hand. Russia's relations with France had in 
the meantime cooled considerably, and new connections 
were now desirable; since Prussia intimated a desire to 
maintain her neutrality, the Czar suggested at Vienna in 
the autumn of 1803, that the time might have arrived to 
consider a union of the two imperial courts for the protec- 
tion of their mutual interests against the robber republic. 
Cobenzl was pleased at this readiness to come to an under- 
standing; nevertheless, he took up the suggestion only with 
the greatest caution and did not, for the time being, allow 
himself to be moved to any decisive step. What considera- 
tions guided him here can best be seen from the instructions 
of November, 1803, given to the new Austrian ambassador 
at Berlin, Count Metternich. G(! The late extension of Frencli 
influence over Switzerland, Holland and Parma, Cobenzl 
explains, may have the object of strengthening the position 
of the First Consul in France itself, but it may also form 
the beginning of a despotic Frencli hegemony in Europe; in 
the latter case, it is an evil against which there is but one 

"'"'Fournier, Gentc nnd Cobenzl, 29 f., 75 ff., 140 ff. 
"Ibid., 203 ff. 



595] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 109' 

means : the coalition of the powers. England, and finally 
also Russia, are ready for such a step; Prussia, it is true, 
can not at present be depended upon. Austrian interests 
clearly demand a cooperation with Russia, and the only 
question is how far such joint action shall go and what 
object it shall have. To give it an offensive character would 
be inadvisable, since in the event of war, the first attack 
would be directed against Austria, and Napoleon was 
always better prepared to fight than either Austria or 
Russia ; besides, the main part of the Russian army would 
have to be employed in watching Prussia. Thus Cobenzl, 
although declaring himself for a cooperation with Russia, 
emphasizes the necessity of great consideration toward 
France ; he was inclined most of all to favor a neutral posi- 
tion and dilatory measures without, however, letting the 
possibility escape of establishing closer relations with 
Russia. Caution and the desire to avoid all compromising 
actions characterize his policy more than anything else, for 
he has other purposes than to make Austria dependent upon 
the movements of the Russian cabinet ; perhaps, he declares, 
Bonaparte is after all not so insatiable as England would 
have him to be, perhaps he may yet be induced to modera- 
tion, and then it would be Austria's task to mediate between 
the powers. As for England, that power, he concludes, 
must be watched with mistrust ; Britain seems to have the 
dangerous intent of turning the threatened French invasion 
back upon the Continent, and to this, Russia's atention will 
have to be called in no uncertain fashion. Cobenzl held to 
the standpoint outlined in these instructions for the next 
two months : the negotiations with Russia were continued, 
but at the same time France received the most considerate 
treatment. In this way things went on without any essen- 
tial changes and to the increasing dissatisfaction of Metter- 
nich, Stadion, the Vienna war-party and the Czar, until the 
spring of 1804, when new events forbade the continuance 
of these dilatory tactics. Napoleon acted as though wish- 
ing to annex the Cisalpine Republic to France and to come 
to an intimate understanding with Bavaria ; besides, the 



HO FRIEDRICH GENTZ [590 

cooling of the relations between Paris and St. Petersburg 
had now developed into a scarcely concealed breach. Co- 
benzl realized the impossibility of further temporizing. He 
made a futile attempt at coming to an understanding with 
Prussia and then determined — on November 6, 1804 — to 
form a defensive alliance with Russia against France. The 
die was cast, and immediately Cobenzl showed that his pre- 
vious hesitations had in no wise been the result of natural 
indecision ; he demanded and obtained the reorganization of 
the war ministry; Duka was replaced by General Mack, 
Fassbender removed and Archduke Charles' competency re- 
duced. Eight months later Cobenzl took the last step. In 
March, 1804, the French ambassador at Vienna officially an- 
nounced that the acceptance of the crown of Lombardy by 
Napoleon was imminent, and in June of the same year the 
Ligurian Republic was incorporated into the French em- 
pire. The danger for the Austrian possessions in Upper- 
Italy had thus become a direct one, and now — July 7, 1805 
— Emperor Francis decided, on the recommendation of the 
foreign office, to join the English-Russian alliance. This 
step meant an abandonment by the Austrian cabinet of its 
previous defensive attitude, and the effects of the new policy 
became apparent almost immediately: a few weeks later, 
the French army that had been standing on the shores of 
the Channel started towards the Rhine. 

All the negotiations referred to above were carried on 
with the utmost secrecy as they should, for the present, re- 
main a secret, and above all never come to the knowledge of 
Napoleon; it is even possible that Cobenzl let drop, in addi- 
tion, certain misleading hints. 67 The plan of secrecy was 
logically quite correct, except for the fact that it was sure 
to have very serious attendant results : since no one knew 
exactly what was happening, many would not even believe 
that anything at all was in progress, at least not anything 
good. The war-party became first suspicious, and then 
aroused, as did Gentz, who in the meantime had risen to the 

"Tagebiicher, I, 39. 



597] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 111 

position of one of its leaders. He knew, as lie tells later, 6S 
extremely little of the negotiations that were being carried 
on with Russia; but this little satisfied him that Cobenzl 
plainly had in mind to reject Russia's offer, that he would 
not trouble himself about Prussia's support, and that he 
was ready to allow destruction to overtake the state. Such 
conduct was surely unheard-of, almost high treason in fact, 
and the good of the country demanded that ft be stopped as 
quickly as possible. Since Cobenzl might still be open to 
arguments, Gentz proceeded to address a number of 
memorials to him. 69 Almost at the same time, however, he 
adopted also other and most extreme measures : he sounded 
the alarm, denounced the minister in letters, 70 aroused 
society against him wherever it was not already so disposed 
or did not belong to the opposite party, and sought to obtain 
Cobenzl's removal from office, first from the Emperor 
through Archduke John (autumn of 1804), then from Pitt 
(autumn of 1804 and end of 1805), and through Czartory- 
ski even from the Czar (end of 1805 ). 71 Years later he 
confessed his mistake. 72 He was, as he remarks in his 
diaries, less and less in touch with Cobenzl and at last not 
at all so, and had been left by him in "complete and wrong- 
ful ignorance" about the negotiations with Russia; Collen- 
bach had even absolutely shunned him. From Fassbender 
and Archduke John he had heard the little they themselves 
knew, and further, but entirely misleading, information had 
come to him through Paget. The really more reliable 
sources had remained closed to him, and thus he had fallen 
"from one misconception into another." The justification 
is lame indeed. In reality Gentz opposed Cobenzl almost 
from the start with prejudiced mind ; he judged him by his 

es Ibid., I, 39- 

69 Cf. p. 112 ff. 

™Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 173, 194 f., 258. Schlesier, IV, 16. 
74 f., 143, 155. 

71 Fournier, Gentz und Cobenzl, 245, 262, 288 ff. Prcuss. Jahrb-, CX, 
476, 479. Schlesier, IV, 145 f. 

™Tagebiicher, I, 39 ff. 



112 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [508 

St. Petersburg antecedents and would take neither the time 
nor the trouble to wait and see how Cobenzl would act in 
his new situation. 73 Waiting was always hard for him, and 
he was, it must be remembered, a publicist. 

Whom Gentz wished to place at the head of the Aus- 
trian foreign office is not quite clear. As it seems, he pro- 
posed to Pitt in 1805, Prince Trauttmannsdorf, an adherent 
of the Prussian alliance and a former temporary head of 
foreign affairs. 74 Incidentally he may have thought also of 
Archduke Charles, who, however, appealed to him as not 
at all significant, or, perhaps, of Archduke John. 75 His 
innermost desires, however, were bent upon quite a dif- 
ferent man : Metternich. He had, so he writes to Brinck- 
mann in January, 1805, just explained to Archduke John 
that as eventual successor to Cobenzl, no one else could be 
seriously considered; Metternich's youth, he adds, may, 
however, stand in the way of this plan. 70 

What course of politics Gentz considered in particular 
as the most advantageous for Austria, can be seen from his 
memorials and letters written during this time. 

The first of these is the Memoire sur la nvcessite de ne 
pas rcconnaitre le titre imperial de Bonaparte, which was 
presented to Cobenzl on June 6, 1804. 77 Gentz is of the 
opinion that Napoleon's recognition, if possible, should be 
omitted or refused, and this for two reasons: in the first 
place, because the authority and power of the First Consul 
would thereby be increased; in the second place, because 
the Revolution would thus receive European sanction. Up 
to the present time, he thinks, the rule of Bonaparte could 
be regarded as a praiseworthy attempt to suppress anarchy, 
and from this point of view he himself has regarded it until 
now; but that is no longer possible, since the question of 
founding a Bonaparte dynasty has arisen. The French 

13 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 128. 

^Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 476. 

™Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 258. Schlesier, IV, 59, 75. 

™Briefe v. a. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 259 f. 

"Mem. et lett. ined., 1-28. 



599] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 113 

people, it is true, do not seem to protest against this plan, 
and Bonaparte himself is seeking above everything else, the 
approval of public opinion and its leaders ; but by this very 
fact the latter identifies himself with one of the chief prin- 
ciples of the Revolution, that of the sovereignty of the peo- 
ple. Bonaparte is the product as well as the representative 
of the revolutionary tendencies; to recognize him would, 
therefore, mean to sanction these. And granted that he 
were thus recognized, what would be the consequence of 
such a step? The magic of the supreme power would be 
destroyed; no throne could be considered safe any longer; 
a general levelling would probably result, and every future 
revolution would find its excuse in advance. The best move, 
Gentz concludes, would thus be to refuse Bonaparte the 
desired recognition ; if, however, this be unavoidable, then 
let it be given only in concert with other powers, especially 
with Russia, and only in return for concessions. 

The next memorial is addressed to Archduke John; it 
was delivered to him on September 6, 1804, and was to 
reach, if possible, the ear of the Emperor himself. 78 In con- 
tent, it is one of the most valuable and best-written of all 
the works of Gentz. The ideas brought forth in it are as 
follows. Even a cursory review of the international situa- 
tion of Europe shows it to be unsatisfactory and serious. 
That the Revolution has now definitely come out victorious 
and in all probability will pursue its ravages even farther, 
is bad enough ; but it is far more serious that the European 
balance of power has now become a mere fiction. The Con- 
tinent is unmistakeably trending towards a double uni- 
versal monarchy : the East will, unless a bar is interposed 
at the eleventh hour, fall to Russia, the West and South to 
France, and central Europe to both powers together. In a 
certain sense these changes, which must be expected from 
the future, have already taken place. Italy, Switzerland, 
and all northern and western Germany are already nothing 
but French dependencies, and the terror of the French name 

"Fournier, Gentz und Cobensl, 242-292. 



114 FRIEDKICH GENTZ [600 

has become the chief and only political impulse of all gov- 
ernments. In addition to this there stands at the head of 
France's collossal power a sinister, passionate and insati- 
able man who from all appearances is reaching out for con- 
trol of Europe. England and Russia have so far main- 
tained their independence; Prussia, however, already 
awaits with each rising sun its death-sentence. Austria 
lies at present still outside of the French circle, but its 
situation is likewise highly precarious. The former buffer- 
states toward France exist no longer; they have even be- 
come tentacles with which the French octopus holds the 
Habsburg monarchy in its embrace. On all sides, Austria 
now borders upon avowed or secret enemies; its influence 
outside of Germany is no longer noticeable, and should 
there come about that most dangerous of all political com- 
binations, an alliance between France and Russia, then 
Austria's end would no longer be far off. The danger is 
therefore great, and the only means to escape it is a change 
in the entire political system. If Austria does not want to 
rush straight to its destruction, it must come out from its 
isolation and that too without delay. In other words, it 
must form alliances, and an alliance with Prussia would 
have most to recommend it. The influence of such a move 
would extend not only to the political situation but also to 
the spheres of trade, industry, and general culture in both 
countries; it would also bring about a consolidation of the 
"Empire", would hold Bonaparte in check and make possi- 
ble a rehabilitation of the independence of Holland and 
Switzerland. To bring this alliance to pass presents, it is 
true, a most difficult political task ; nevertheless, an at- 
tempt ought to be made. If this should fail, then the time 
will have arrived to think of different combinations, in the 
first place of a union witli Russia. France is, in this con- 
nection, not to be considered, because its power is so colos- 
sal that an Austria allied with it would be condemned to 
play the part of a second. The alliance with England is 
desirable under any circumstances ; it is, however, not abso- 
lutely necessary in case Prussia could be won over, and 



601] OPPOSITION TO COBENZL 115 

without Prussia, it is not sufficient. There remains, then, 
next to the Prussian alliance, as the only effective one, that 
with Kiissia : this might prevent war altogether, and would, 
if war should break out, afford some certain guarantee of 
success. But it is just this alliance which, in spite of Bus- 
sia's willingness, is now avoided or at least not sought for 
by Austria. A ministry which evinces such an absolute 
lack of wisdom and courage can naturally achieve no re- 
sults, and it is only to be hoped that it will soon make wav 
for personages who are ready to enter upon a different 
course. Energy, patriotism, other men and other measures 
— these are the things which Austria now needs. Only in 
this way, Gentz concludes, shall we succeed, "in not only 
lifting ourselves from our present degradation, but in even 
reaching a glorious height whence we shall be a model for 
those about us who, too, have fallen, the protectors and 
avengers of the oppressed and the terror of the oppressors.'' 
The annexation of Genoa by France caused Gentz to 
send Cobenzl, in June, 1805, a protest against Austria's at- 
titude. 79 France's act, he exclaims, is a violation of the 
principles of international law ; at any rate, it remains in- 
valid until the "corps politique de l'Europe" will have given 
it its sanction. Why, Gentz asks, was no protest made? 
There existed no danger of war; Bonaparte does not want 
any at this time, and would certainly have yielded to pres- 
sure. 

Gentz's last memorial to Cobenzl was instigated by an 
article in the Moniteur and presented in August, 1805. 80 
Gentz had for some time noticed the influence on public 
opinion exerted by the Napoleonic press and felt great 
disgust; now his patience was at an end. How could the 
cabinet of Vienna contemplate such conduct in idleness? 
Did the fact still remain concealed from it that the French 
government had for years been tyrannizing public opinion 
in Europe? Most emphatically, therefore, he urges Cobenzl 
at last to make a solemn protest against such methods. 

n Mem. et lett. ined., 59-70. 
"'Ibid., 71-78. 



116 FEIEDRICH GENTZ [(102 

Ideas similar to those of the preceding memorials are 
to be found in the Projet d'une declaration de Louis X VIII 
con/tre le titre imperial usurpe par Bonaparte of 1804 and 
in the Lett re a 8a Majeste Je Roi de Suede of 1805 ; cn only 
the second of these writings, however, is of importance. On 
the whole this is a compliment to the king on account of his 
attitude towards Napoleon ; yet it contains, at the same 
time, interesting and animated statements of Gentz's vieAvs 
on the old European regime, on the Revolution, on Na- 
poleon's relations to it, and on certain points of interna- 
tional law. Gentz begins with the remark that he is not 
writing for the general public, for that feelingless, super- 
ficial, and frivolous plebs; he is addressing rather the very 
small group of people still standing for "truth, principles, 
and honor," and among them he counts the king. He then 
turns to the general situation. We live, so he states, in a 
time when the old order of things is making way for a new, 
and it must be assumed that this change was foreseen by 
Providence. But was the change destined for the present 
era, and was it to be carried out in the fashion in which it is 
now being carried out? Gentz believes that both questions 
are to be answered in the negative. According to him, it 
was a later period for which all that was intended which is 
now being realized, and for this reason he declares it to be 
the duty of all well-meaning people to call a halt on the 
further destruction of the old order of things. The Revolu- 
tion has gone far enough; it has completely changed the 
face of France and will soon reach the ends of the civilized 
world. All hands, then, to the rescue! Above all, courage 
and determination to conquer or to die sword in hand ! The 
duty of the rulers will be to lead on the warriors and 
mutually to support one another: they should promote sen- 
sible progress, but must oppose unyieldingly every attempt 
to overthrow the foundations of society. In this way it may 
be possible to preserve that which is essential in the 
glorious old system. 

ni Ibid., 29-40, 79-104. 



603] OPPOSITION TO GOBENZL 117 

The effect of these memorials was rather slight. Gentz 
probably did not himself expect too much from them, if we 
are to take his own word for it. 82 Cobenzl resented them ; 83 
Archduke John, on the other hand, accepted them with ap- 
proval and appears to have defended their ideas before the 
Emperor. 84 The sketch of a proclamation of the later Louis 
XVIII, and the letter to the king of Sweden were given 
wider publicity, as they were copied in foreign newspapers 
and even circulated in manuscript form, 85 and may have 
had a certain influence. 

We have arrived at the summer of 1805. War has not 
yet broken out, but is on its way, even though this is not 
known to everyone. Gentz is in eager expectation and full 
of wise speculations as to what has to be done. The char- 
acter of these speculations may be seen from letters to 
Johannes von Miiller. 86 

In July, 1805, Gentz sends to his friend in Berlin a 
rather pessimistic effusion which contains a resume of the 
whole political situation. He mourns over the lethargy 
prevailing at Vienna and expresses the fear that Napoleon 
may use the Austrian war preparations as a pretext for an 
attack. After further remarks on the reorganization of 
the war department and Emperor Francis' aversion to war, 
he turns to the ministry and in particular to Cobenzl. He 
is astonished that Austria has not opened negotiations with 
Russia and that a defensive agreement only has been 
sought. Again he characterizes an alliance with Prussia 
as the only way to salvation; Cobenzl puts no importance 
upon it, and for this reason others must be placed at the 
helm : "until this ministry is rooted out, no good can come 
about." Gentz finally throws out the idea of starting with 
Johannes and Adam Muller "a counter-revolution in the 
highest sense of the word" ; what he understands by this, 

S2 Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 194 f. 
^Tagebiicher, I, 40. 
84 Fournier, Gentz und Cobenzl, 134 f. 
8 -"'Schmidt-Weissenfels, Friedrich Gentz, I, 177 f., 192. 
86 Schlesier, IV, 47-118. 



118 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [001 

indeed we do not bear, and at any rate the idea had no con- 
sequence. 

By the end of August, all Austria resounded with 
preparations for war. What will be the outcome? Gentz 
is not entirely sure, but believes that the intention should 
be armed mediation. Bonaparte, he declares, wishes war 
only as long as there is no risk, and for this reason he now 
avoids it; besides, he is personally no longer the man that 
he was at the time of the Coup d'Mat. The chances of the 
coalition in the event of war, Gentz, it is true, does not con- 
sider as very favorable: Prussia, he states, has not been 
won; Russia is without a single capable general or states- 
man; and Austria possesses generals of second rank only. 

By the beginning of September, Gentz is at last con- 
vinced that war is inevitable. He admits he has not ex- 
pected this: "an almost miraculous combination" has 
caused this change in the situation. He looks for good re- 
sults from the mission of general Meerveldt to Berlin, but 
is worried lest the proper instructions have not been given 
him; lie should wish to have it explained to the king of 
Prussia that he could prevent the war by merely assuming 
an appearance of friendliness to the Coalition. In order to 
be sure he therefore gives Meerveldt a memorial conceived 
in this spirit. 87 On the whole he views the future calmly ; 
"the star of the tyrant is on the wane," he will surely yield. 
In similiar fashion Gentz expresses himself also in the mid- 
dle of September. Yet he considers the Russian support 
as insufficient and asks Johannes von Muller to bethink 
himself whether there was no way of inducing the king of 
Prussia to join the coalition; he himself believes much 
could have been done along this line by personal meetings 
of the sovereigns, missions of archdukes and direct corre- 
spondence. 

Early in October, Gentz writes for the last time in a 
really optimistic tone. The sending of Meerveldt and of 
Haugwitz to Berlin and Vienna respectively satisfies him. 

"Schlesier, IV, ioo. 



605] ULM AND AUSTERLITZ 119 

Prussia's policy of neutrality is aparently wavering and 
will soon be abandoned. Napoleon now probably experi- 
ences a bad hour, for the "theatrical monarch" has never 
seen moments such as these; perhaps he may even get a 
stroke of apoplexy. A capable ministry would have an 
exceptional opportunity to exploit his embarrassment. 

Thus wrote Gentz in the beginning of October, and 
never was he more sadly mistaken. Napoleon had no 
thought whatever of allowing himself to be intimidated. By 
the end of August the army concentrated at Boulogne re- 
ceived orders to march to the Rhine, where the emperor him- 
self would join it. It reached this first goal somewhat 
earlier than had been expected outside of France; then it 
wound itself through the passes of the Black Forest and its 
northern extremity, moved, by forced marches, through the 
present Baden and Wurtemberg and before the middle of 
October, reached, in converging lines, the upper Danube. 
There, at Ulm, fell the first blow; Mack, the hope of the 
Viennese war-party, had to surrender on October 19 with 
about 30,000 men. The effect of the capitulation was im- 
mediate and great: the road to the heart of Austria now 
lay open to the French, and within the camp of the enemy 
doubt and despair had taken up their abode. Napoleon 
energetically pressed forward, and by the beginning of No- 
vember he was approaching the gates of Vienna. 

Ruin, then, had arrived. It had been the hope this 
time to overthrow the colossus, and now what a terrible 
disillusionment — Hannibal ante portas! Gentz heard the 
reports from the seat of war in a sort of daze ; he was deeply 
agitated, almost beside himself, and the victim of the most 
contradictory emotions. At one time he gives up everything 
as lost and speaks of flight to Tartary, of imprisonment, 
even death; then again the elasticity of his temperament 
seems to assert itself. To friends in Berlin and London he 
may send hopeful letters asking them not to let their spirits 
fall, everything may yet turn out favorably ; 8S but when he 
writes in this way he is only trying to draw himself as 

si Mitteil. d. Instituts f. Osterr. Geschichtsf., VII, 124 ff. XXI, 122 ff. 



120 FRIEDRICII GBNTZ [000 

well as others out of despondency. In reality he soon saw 
the situation in its worst light, and his hatred for the 
originator of all this misery now knew no bouuds. 'The 
ruin of my life," he writes on October 23 to Johannes von 
Miiller, "is for me an evil of such magnitude that every- 
thing which now may happen can but slightly affect me. 
Whether they drive me into Tartary or shut me up in the 
Temple or shoot me, is all one to me. But that Bonaparte 
was not beaten, that the Electors were not punished by new 
shame, not to be victorious — at a moment when all the 
meaning of life depended on victory not to win — to read in 
their accursed newspapers the triumphant accounts of these 
hell-hounds — the rejoicing of their partisans in Germany — 
that absorbs the mind and leaves no room for any other 
feeling of pain." 89 Again, in the same way, on November 3 : 
"The misfortune which has come upon us is really of a kind 
to crush the soul and suspend the powers of thinking . . . 
What I cannot comprehend is how I ever could have had 
any hope, ... If the emperor of Russia is firm he can yet 
maintain and save us; but if his courage falls in the 
slightest degree, or if he does not keep enough of it to give 
us a great deal, then peace is unavoidable or else the down- 
fall of Europe is sealed." 90 Finally on November 8 : "In 
two hours I shall leave Vienna You may appre- 
ciate the dreadful and heart-rending feelings which lie back 
of these words. . . . The king of Prussia is now in the 
truest sense of the word the arbiter of the life and death of 

Europe If he but wavers all is lost, and this time 

never to be regained Since yesterday — but why 

should I picture it to you? I assure you that my tears 
choke me when I attempt it. I am keenly convinced that 
the end of the world has come, and that I shall feel myself 
going down into my grave as soon as I leave my threshold. 
Farewell, I can write no more." 91 

As the enemy drew nearer to the capital, it became 
necessary to think of moving the seat of government farther 

89 Schlesier, IV, 125 f. 
"'Ibid., IV, 128 ff. 
"Ibid., IV, 136 ff. 



607] ULM AND AUSTERLITZ 121 

east. Toward the end of the first week of November, in a 
dark and cold night, the court, Cobenzl, and the foreign 
ambassadors, therefore, left Vienna for Briinn. Gentz 
accompanied them; but with what feelings did he travel 
this bitter road ! The darkness which lay heavily and un- 
cannily on the fields along the wayside, the noise of the 
numerous coaches and wagons, the fear of running into the 
hands of reconnoitering parties of the enemy, finally the 
piercing consciousness of entering upon a future which 
would, perhaps, be blacker than the night — all this cut 
deep and infinitely painful furrows into his already gloomy 
mind; "the journey to the grave," so he writes a few days 
later to the faithful Adam Miiller, "can not be worse than 
this for me." 92 Briinn was, however, reached in safety, and 
on November 17 Gentz proceeded to Troppau in order to 
await there the further course of events. His mood re- 
mained, on the whole, the same. The defeats rested heavily 
upon him ; he was in despair but not utterly so. 93 The 
Russians, he states, have fought with distinction; 20,000 
Austrians are still intact, the armies are now arrayed 
against one another, and a decisive battle must ensue dur- 
ing the next few days. It is true, he adds: "Bonaparte 
himself is on the scene." He now stands on a somewhat 
better footing with Cobenzl, for on September 14 a sort of 
reconciliation between the two men seems to have taken 
place; 94 he can, however, not yet forgive him his policy. 
"Now," he writes, "the importance, the nullity, yet the in- 
famy of this ministry which in other days I designated so 
often to the various cabinets of Europe as the real source 
of our common destruction, stands out in all its terrible 
aspects." Colloredo has been dismissed, to Gentz's great 
joy, but that does not satisfy him ; he would have liked to 
see Cobenzl removed as well, and hopes for an intervention 
on the part of the Czar. He still expects Haugwitz's mis- 
sion to yield important results. 

^Briefe sw. Fr. Gentz u. A. H. Miiller, 62. 
"■Schlesier, IV, 141 ff. 
^Tagebiicher, \, 41. 



122 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [60S 

Napoleon had in the meantime reached Vienna, and 
after crossing the Danube pushed the greater part of his 
army forward in a northeasterly direction. On November 
30, the two armies stood opposite each other near the little 
town of Austerlitz in Moravia, and there two days later 
the famous battle took place which broke the third coali- 
tion and sent Pitt to an early grave. 

Gentz received the news of the terrible defeat during 
the night of December 3. How he took it is shown by a 
note which he apparently wrote the same night, and which, 
at any rate, he cannot have written much later; the note 
reads: "Je viens de recevoir a l'instant une estaffette 
d'Olmuetz du 10. — accablante, affreuse, dechirante. Tout 
est perdu, mon cher Comte; nous sommes detruits, 
aneantis, en plein deroute." 95 Again he had to flee, and 
this time the route to be taken was hardly less difficult and 
dangerous than it had been a few weeks before; he wem 
northeast, passed the still somewhat unsafe Sudetes and 
made his first stop at Breslau, from where he journeyed on 
the Dresden. His state of mind varied : he is in despair, 
rouses himself again, collapses once more and ends in reso- 
lution as well as apathy. On December 10 he declares 
proudly: "Everything remains as it was: — I, who am also 
a power, make no peace, nor any truce, and the worse 
things go, the more sacred do I feel my duty to be, not to 
yield." 96 But then hopelessness and relaxation gain the 
upper hand. On December 14 he writes: "The play is 
coming to its close, my dear friend, and soon it will be said : 
Et nunc, spectatores, plaudite! .... Nothing matters to 
these dirty rascals. . . . Oh, if they only could have per- 
ished, what a pleasure the overthrow of our monarchy 
would be! But to lose the provinces, honor, Germany, 
Europe and — the Zichys, the Uquarts, the Cobenzls, the 
Collenbachs, the Lamberties, the Dietrichsteins and all the 
rest, to have to keep these, no satisfaction, no revenge, not 
one of these dogs hanged or quartered — that is beyond en- 

05 Schlcsier, IV, 166. 

™ Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 290. 



609] ULM AND AUSTERLITZ 123 

durance No one can tell whether Bonaparte has 

not decided to take revenge [on Prussia] for the last two 

months Some evil or other is impending upon 

northern Germany." 97 Somewhat more quietly does Gentz 
express himself about his plans on December 16. 98 He 
thinks it to be unlikely that he will ever return to Vienna, 
where he would hardly be tolerated any more; as to St. 
Petersburg, he does not care to go there, partly on account 
of its climate, partly because next to cold, death and the 
French he hates nothing so heartily as the Russians. He 
shows contempt for the Austrians, but has a feeling of 
sympathy for them as well, and to see them scorned by 
these Eussian "barbarians" is more than he can endure. 
If everything should go to ruin, he might settle somewhere 
in the Tyrol or Carinthia, and there live in communion with 
the plants and the stars; what proconsul or tyrant may 
rule, shall then not matter to him. At present he is ready 
to continue the fight along the old lines and meets, early 
in 1806, Stadion's suggestion that he use more caution with 
the remark that he can and will not be silent. 99 Pitt's 
death does not seem to have moved him very greatly; he 
only casually refers to it and states that the British states- 
man had, years before the end, passed the zenith of his 
fame and usefulness. 100 

Gentz stayed in Dresden to the end of June, 1806, and 
then again from the middle of July to the end of September ; 
the last days of June and the opening days of July he spent 
in Teplitz, which from then on he loved so much. In the 
first two weeks of October, we find him at the Prussian 
army headquarters in Thuringia, whither he went on an 
invitation from Haugwitz. After a further brief stay in 
Dresden and Teplitz, he went to Prague and this was to 
remain his headquarters from then on until February, 1809. 
On the 18th of this month he received a communication 

97 Schlesier, IV, 153 ff. 

"Ibid., IV, 166 ff. 

"'Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 273. 

™Ibid., CLII, 273 f. 



124 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [610 

from Count Stadion which summoned him to Vienna, and 
from this time dates his second residence in the capital city 
of the Austrian monarchy; this residence lasted, with some 
interruptions, until his death. 

The time from the beginning of 1806 to the beginning 
of 1809 stands out, therefore, as a distinct period, and we 
must, consequently, treat it as such. 

On the whole, Gentz remained, during these three 
years, his old self with all his virtues and weaknesses : lie 
is ever active and pleasure-seeking, ever hating and loving, 
scolding and flattering, now ready to fight and full of 
animal spirits, now again depressed and blase, but yet 
always interested in everything that is happening in the 
world, and in animated contact with a great number of per- 
sons distinguished by rank, talent, or beauty. His life was 
not exactly very Avell regulated, but pleasant and interest- 
ing. At times he experienced lack of money, as for instance 
in 1806 j 1 01 but in general he seems not to have suffered in 
this regard, thanks to English assistance which was again 
afforded him in 1807, and to occasional remittances from 
St. Petersburg. 102 When he did suffer from lack of money, 
it did not trouble him very greatly, 103 for he was used to 
debts and to hand-to-mouth existence. His mode of life 
was, with the exception of short periods of financial de- 
pression, almost as luxurious as it had been at Vienna; at 
I lie close of 1808, he even fixed up a house in Prague such 
as lie had "hardly had in his best days in Vienna," and 
made his trip from Breslau to Dresden in 1806 accompanied 
by two couriers, a valet, two horses owned by himself and 
three carriages. 104 The summer months he spent in Tep- 
litz; in the years 1807 and 1808, his stay in this favoured 
place lasted more than sixteen weeks. He found there 
everything his many-sided nature desired and needed: the 
ere me of Viennese society, a galaxy of charming women of 

wl TagcbucJier, I, 46, 49. 
1<a Ibid., I, 47, 51 f- 
m Ibid., T, 46, 40. 
le, Ibid., I, 57, 43- 



611] IN EXILE 125 

rank and wealth, distinguished visitors from Prussia and 
the "Empire," an army of haters of Napoleon, a mild clim- 
ate and the lovely scenery of the entire European land- 
scape. The character of the natives, too, appealed to him. 
"I cannot describe to you," he assures Adam Miiller in the 
summer of 1807, "how well I have felt since I have been 
staying in Bohemia. The honesty of the Austrians, their 
faithfulness and active sympathy with Prussia's misfor- 
tune without a single exception, their good wishes for the 
future, their very positive good-will, their hope and confi- 
dence — all this has endeared them to me anew. . . . Long 
live southern Germany !" 105 At one time, it is true, he was 
on the point of leaving at the very height of the season and 
despite all these splendid features, all on account of a 
dreadful storm; only a solemn oath on the part of his 
landlord that under the zenith of Teplitz no such natural 
phenomenon had been observed for a hundred years, was 
able to turn him from his purpose. 100 

Within this outward life, however, Gentz busied him- 
self restlessly to attain the aim that still was his, first and 
last : the liberation of Europe from French oppression. His 
actions and plans in this direction may, again, be learned 
from his personal and political letters, his publications and 
his diaries. 

Turning to Gentz's personal correspondence we find a 
number of not uninteresting remarks pertaining to the 
present and future. 107 At the head stands his hatred for 
Napoleon ; "toward him,'- so runs one of these remarks, 
"toward him alone should all our hatred be directed and 
devoted in the full conviction that nothing stands in the 
way of the world's peace save his existence alone." Yet, in 
spite of this, he again feels some confidence in the future, 
and conjures his friends to persist in the struggle. Austria, 
it is true, had in the meantime made peace with Napoleon 

™Briefw. sw. Fr. Gentz u. A. H. Miiller, 117. 
lm Ibid., 101 f. 

™Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 273, 280, 285 f. Briefw. zw. Fr. 
Gentz u. A. H. Miiller, 106. 118, 152 f. 



126 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [612 

and could, therefore, at present no longer be considered; 
but, as to the future, to hope was not impossible, for at the 
end of December, Cobenzl and Collenbach had at last re- 
signed from office, and now the clever, decisive Stadion 
stood at the head of the foreign office at Vienna. At any 
rate, Russia and England were still at war with France; 
how if the Prussian cabinet and king were now forced to 
make common cause with them? Gentz had formerly fought 
this idea most emphatically, when it had proceeded from 
these two powers; 108 now he himself accepts it for the 
moment and sees "most decisive scenes enacted in northern 
Germany" : Haugwitz, Lombard, and Lucchesini at the 
wheel, the country is a levee en masse against France and 
the king forced to resistance, or — Prussia laid at the feet 
of the tyrant. A fight then to the end, a duel without 
mercy, and one single purpose: victory or destruction; 
possibly the latter, but also victory, perhaps, for Gentz 
has, even now, an instinctive faith, as may be seen from the 
introduction to his Fragmented that the palm would ulti- 
mately fall to him who remained firm and watchful to the 
end. His immediate object, it is true, now seems to be an 
acceptable, "reasonable" peace, which would give an op- 
portunity of organizing everything anew and carrying on 
the struggle later, with better chances of success; in this 
way, at least, he replies to an inquiry from St. Petersburg 
sent to him in May, 1806. The Oubril treaty between Russia 
and France of July, 1806 — which, it is true, was not ratified 
— was a heavy blow to him ; he comments upon it in these 
words: "now everything is over, everything is dead and 
gone." And in this mood of almost unconditional hopeless- 
ness he remains until the beginning of 1809. The most 
dreadful aspect of the situation, he states in October, 1807, 
is its "final character" and the absence of all prospects for 
a reversal. He dares entertain hopes only for the more 
remote future; as to the present, nothing is to be expected 
any more from it, not even from Spain. Only at the head 

108 Schlesier, IV, 117, 159. 
109 Cf. p. 128. 



613] 



IN EXILE 12' 



of a few hundred thousand men could one speak to 
Napoleon a word that would carry weight, but this ultima 
ratio of all negotiations with him— where is it? 

Gentz published during these years the following three 
works : Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte des poli- 
tischen Gleichgewichts in Europa; Authentische Darstel- 
lung des Verhdltnisses zwischen England und Spanien vor 
und bei dem Ausbruche des Kriegs zwischen den beiden 
Mdchten; and Observations sur la negotiation entre V An- 
gleterre et la France en 1806. 110 Of these the first men- 
tioned is the most important. 

The Fragmente make up a somewhat heterogeneous 
whole. Their text was written in the months of September 
and October of 1805, their introduction, however, in the 
beginning of 1806, and the whole work was published in the 
summer of 1806. The political situations at the times when 
these parts originated were thus quite different, and to 
this is attributable the differences of tone pervading the 
whole work : the text is still optimistic, the introduction, 
however, even though decided, is filled with forebodings. 
The latter only is of interest here and it may be well to 
make clear its general character by means of a few cita- 
tions. Gentz first submits the question from whom help 
may be expected, and finds that there is no counting either 
on governments or on public opinion ; one hope only is left, 
the small group of "the strong, the pure and the good." To 
these he turns, therefore, demanding of them in incisive 
and fiery words to hold out. "You to whom these words 
are first addressed," he writes, "you the lone pride of our 
country, you who are high of purpose and subdued by no 
misfortune, Germans worthy of the name — be not weary, 

despair not The real task of liberation must be 

performed on German soil. Here the restoration must be- 
gin just as here the ruin was accomplished and destruction 
brought to its completion. Europe fell through Germany ; 
through Germany it must rise again Our inward 

"°Weick, IV, 1-199; HI, 1-370. Mem. et lett. ined., 105-220. 



128 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [614 

and fatal dissension, the distraction of our great strength, 
the mutual rivalries of our princes and the mutual en- 
strangement of their peoples, the extinction of every 
genuine feeling for the common interests of the nation, the 
dormancy of national spirit — these have been the con- 
querors, these the destroyers of our freedom, these our 

deadly enemies and the enemies of Europe Divided 

we fell; onlj- united can we rise again You must 

fight as long as there is breath left in you Remem- 
ber how even in idle sports every untimely rest is dan- 
gerous for those who have started in the race, and how 
the maxim of the victorious is to press on toward the goal 
with ceaseless and ever renewed energy. In your career, to 
pause is fatal. As soon as you stop, you lose your power, 
the sleep of hopelessness overcomes you, and the night 
which surrounds you on all sides settles down upon you 
with all its horrors. The more persistently, the more 
earnestly you press forward, the more surely will your 
weariness leave you, the sooner hopes bearing the freshness 
of morning dawn will spring up in you." 111 The text of the 
Fragmente itself gives an historical retrospect of the events 
of the years just past, and from it we may be allowed to 
quote at least the following passage : "Whether Bonaparte 
has really conceived the idea of a universal monarchy in his 
proud and gloomy soul, and in what shape he has conceived 
it, and how far he has carried it in his imagination, and 
when and how he has thought to realize it — all this only 
the future will reveal. This much is clear and certain, how- 
ever: for six dreadful years he has done without intermis- 
sion that which lie had to do with the worst designs in view, 
and he has succeeded in taking steps which seem to fore- 
bode in no uncertain way the most dreadful and desperate 
outcome possible." 112 

Besides these publications, the following memorials 
belong to this period : Ubcr die Ursachen <lrs unglilcklichen 

ln Weick, IV. 29 ff. 
m Ibid., IV, 69. 



615] IN EXILE 129 

Ganges dcs letzten Feldzugs (spring of 1806), which is 
known to us only fragmentarily; 113 a second, Sur les 
moyens de mettre un terme aux malheurs et aux dangers de 
V 'Europe et sur les principcs d'une pacification generate 
(summer of 1806) ; 114 a third, addressed to the Russian 
minister Budberg and to the Czar (spring of 1807) ; 115 a 
fourth, on the Russian war-manifesto (spring of 1808), 
which was sent to Canning and is also unknown; 110 and 
lastly a fifth, Was iriirdc das I fans Osterreich unter deit) 
jetzigen Umstdnden zu beschliessen haben, um Deutschland 
auf cine dauerhafte Weise von frernder Gcwalt zu befreien? 
(close of 1808 and beginning of 1809 ). 117 To give the con- 
tents of these memorials in detail does not lie within the 
province of our present consideration. It may, however, be 
mentioned thatGentz again demands anAustro-Prussian al- 
liance as the foundation for an enduring European peace, 
that he terms the liberation of Germany the most important 
common interest of Europe, that he projects the plan for 
a new German federal constitution and advises Austria to 
transfer its center of gravity towards Hungary. 118 Most 
interesting perhaps are the propositions made in the 
memorial to Budberg of April, 1807, that is to say, of the 
time between Eylau and Friedland ; they have as their pur- 
pose to force Austria either to join the Russian-Prussian 
combination, or to make peace at once and save her strength 
for a later struggle. 

The number of prominent persons with whom Gentz, 
came in contact during this period was, according to his 
own testimony, "enormous." Among them he mentions 
Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, the dukes of Weimar 
and Coburg, with whom he plunged into "endless enjoy- 
ment and frivolities," many names from the Bohemian no- 

m Schlesier, IV, 207 ff. 

lu Ans dem Nachlasse, II, 7-99. 

""Martens, Recueil des Trailcs, VI, 479 (abridged). 

116 Tagebiicher, I, 53. 

"'Aus dem Nachlasse, II, 109-158. 

™Ibid., it, 156 ff., 135 ff-, 97- 



130 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [616 

bility, the Princess of Solnis, a sister of Queen Louise, who 
for several years was destined to stand at the head of those 
whom he adored, Madame de Stael and A. W. Sclilegel, 
certain Prussian and Russian generals, Wintzingerode, 
Metternich, and, lastly, Baron Stein. 119 Gentz met the 
latter for the first time at Dresden in August, 1806, and 
saw him again in January, 1809, at Prague, where they dis- 
cussed plans for the future in daily conversations. 120 Stein 
went from Prague on to Brtinn, and received there, through 
Gentz, an invitation from Stadion to come to Vienna. 121 
Gentz always speaks of Stein with high regard, and the 
latter's resignation in 1808 concerned him much; he was 
even prepared to grant him "the dictatorship in the real, 
ancient Roman sense of the word over everything which has 
to be undertaken for the salvation of Germany." 122 Stein 
for his part was not quite so enthusiastic over Gentz; he 
acknowledged, however, his courage and political loyalty. 
Whether the two men influenced one another and if so, in 
how far, is not easy to determine and would certainly re- 
quire minute investigations. 

That this intercourse of Gentz's was not politically un- 
important is clear enough and is confirmed by Napoleon's 
attitude toward him. As a rule Napoleon paid but slight 
attention to foes of Gentz's rank ; at times, however, he did 
proceed against such, as for example against the unfor- 
tunate Palm. His attention was turned tow r ard Gentz by 
the Prussian war-manifesto of 1806, which he attributed to 
him, at least for a time, and one of his bulletins of 1806 
denounced to the world this wretched writer. In the sum- 
mer of 1808, Napoleon received word, through his agents, 
that there was located in the Bohemian baths a band of 
confederates who had relations with London and Vienna 
and were under the leadership of this same Gentz; the 
presence of Madame de Stael was also properly empha- 

119 Tagebiicher, I, 44 ff. 

""Ibid., I, 58 f. 

121 Schmidt-Weissenfels, Friedrich Gents, I, 302. 

i:H Pertz, Leben des Ministers Freiherrn vom Stein, II, 331. 



617] IN EXILE 131 

sized. 123 The result was that he immediately ordered the 
suppression of Gentz's correspondence with this lady, and 
renewed his attacks upon the conspirator through the 
French and German press that was dependent upon him. 
Nothing further, however, came of it, for a course such as 
had been pursued against Palm or Stein was then not to 
be thought of in dealing with Austria. 

As concerns Gentz's more official relations to the 
powers of the old Coalition, those with Prussia were of 
predominant importance. Especially interesting is the 
journey which he undertook in October, 1806, and at 
Haugwitz's invitation, to the Prussian headquarters in 
Thuringia. 124 His stay there lasted ten days, from the 
3rd to the 12th of October, and during this time he had 
numerous conversations with leading Prussian personages 
such as with the duke of Brunswick, with Counts Kalkreuth 
and Gotzen, the Marquis Lucchesini, Lombard, and Haug- 
witz; the last three formed the trio which Gentz, half a 
year before, had wished death on the wheel. From Haug- 
witz he learned at once the alleged reason for his invita- 
tion : his visit was desired in order that he might be con- 
vinced of the purity and expediency of the present Prus- 
sian policy. In further conversations, Haugwitz explained 
the objects of this policy in detail and touched, at the same 
time, once more upon the motive for calling Gentz : what 
was desired of him, so Haugwitz explained, was less his 
counsel or his help as a publicist than his good will in 
general ; Prussia was accused of unreliability and duplicity, 
without having deserved it at all, and this suspicion Gentz 
could aid in destroying at Vienna and elsewhere. Finally, 
Haugwitz asked whether Gentz was in a position to give 
any information about the intentions of the Austrian cab- 
inet. To this Gentz replied in the negative, adding that it 
would perhaps be more to the purpose to let the past rest 
and to hope for a justification in the eyes of the public from 

m Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 315. 

"■"His journal on this voyage is published in Mem. et lett. ined., 221-346. 



132 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [618 

Prussia's present attitude. The succeeding days were spent 
principally iu conversation with Lombard, with whom 
Gentz had become acquainted earlier at Berlin. Lombard 
first spoke at length on the necessity of the former Prussian 
policy of neutrality, in which lie himself had taken a leading- 
part, and then gave Gentz the plan of a letter from the king 
to Napoleon with the request that he read it and give his 
opinion on it. Gentz acquiesced in the request and raised 
various objections. Later Lombard presented a second 
sketch, that of the Prussian war-manifesto, the composi- 
tion of which had also been entrusted to him. Again Gentz 
made unfavorable criticisms, and on his suggestion certain 
passages were stricken out, such as those concerning the 
affairs of the duke of Enghien, and the attempts at in- 
liuencing the later Louis XVIII to renounce his claims to 
the throne; also others concerning the English control of 
the seas and the probable attitude of Austria. Finally, 
Gentz undertook the translation of the manifesto into Ger- 
man, without, however, being in full agreement with either 
its form or its contents. From certain indications he con- 
cluded that the impression which his presence at the Prus- 
sian headquarters was bound to make upon the outside 
world had been the real basis of his invitation. 

In connection with this journey there are still other- 
instances to be mentioned in which Gentz came into touch, 
in a more or less official way, with Prussian men of prom- 
inence. On his own testimony, he formed, in September, 
1806 — that is to say immediately before this journey — a 
connecting link between Berlin and Vienna 125 and urged 
in July, 1806, the king of Sweden to desist from war with 
Prussia. 12 ' 1 In January, 1807, he negotiated with Count 
Gotzen on his own responsibility concerning the temporary 
occupation of the Prussian fortresses in Silesia by Austrian 
troops.. 127 

Gentz's relations with London remained active, al- 

'"Schlesier, IV, 262. 

^Briefe v. 11. a. Fr. ?•. Gentz, IT. 455. 

^Tagebiicher, I, 51. 



619] war of 1809 133 

though we have but little information as to the reports and 
suggestions that he sent there. The most important of 
what we do know is a letter to Canning, written in June, 
1808. 12S Gentz offers in this two suggestions : England is 
either to leave the Continent to itself, to bring Spanish 
America into its own power and in this way to weaken 
Spain directly and Napoleon indirectly — or, in case she 
should contemplate holding to the Continent, to work in 
conjunction with Austria. Incidentally we also hear that 
he sends expositions of his views to the English press. 129 

Thus three years of a restless, but on the whole not un- 
pleasant exile had passed by, when the long awaited hour of 
Gentz's official recognition struck at last. In February, 
1809, Stadion, CobenzFs successor, called him to Vienna, 
and from this dates a new period in his life : he now entered 
the inner circle of the Staatskanzlei, which he was never to 
leave again. 

Austria once more rose against Napoleon early in 
1809, and when war was already as good as certain, Gentz 
received the commission of writing the war-manifesto. As 
Napoleon drew nearer Vienna for a second time, Gentz 
fled to Dotis, where the court and the high dignitaries were 
staying; at the end of October, he went on to Prague. In 
February, 1810, we find him, however, again at Vienna. He 
had a share in the protracted peace negotiations of the 
summer of 1809, or better, in the struggles and intrigues 
among the various parties at court and within the govern- 
ment pertaining to these negotiations. If we should at- 
tempt to form an exact estimate of his activity during this 
time, from his own accounts 130 and from other materials, 131 
we should find that Gentz considered a really dishonorable 
peace as unacceptable, but urged the conclusion of a peace 
under conditions which could be endured ; when Napoleon 
had modified his original demands, Gentz insisted upon 
accepting them. 

• °*MitteU. d. Instituts f. Osterr. Geschichtsf., XXI, 148 ff. 
^Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 274. 
™Tagebiichcr, I, 70-208. 
"'Deutsche Rundschau, CXXXXIV, 223-251. 



134 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [620 

But what was now to become of himself? As early as 
1806 and again in 1808, he had attracted Napoleon's atten- 
tion, and in July, 1809, even one of his letters to Count 
Stadion fell into the hands of the French. 132 Something 
unpleasant was surely to be expected, and hence Gentz 
asked his English friends to find him a suitable place of 
refuge in England. 133 

3. 1813-1815. 

The years 1810-1812 form a period of rest in Gentz's 
life. The insatiable apostle of war and one-time conspirator 
is now living most of the time in comparative quiet at 
Vienna, where at last he begins to receive official recogni- 
tion ; occasionally we find him in Teplitz. He has suspended 
the struggle against Napoleon for the time being and is 
silent. Even toward his friends he is now rather uncom- 
municative, although this apparent fact may be due to the 
loss of the greater part of the letters that he wrote to them 
during this time. 

The political situation of Europe and especially that of 
Austria had, in the meantime, changed essentially. The 
disastrous outcome of the war of 1809 imposed upon 
Austria the necessity of a complete break, at least for the 
present, with her previous policy, and of seeking a union 
with France. Stadion was, therefore, released and Metter- 
nich, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, took his place. In 
the spring of 1810 the marriage of Napoleon with a daugh- 
ter of Emperor Francis took place and by this marriage 
there was added to the political bonds between the two 
countries a dynastic one as well. For the time being the 
cabinet of Vienna felt, therefore, assured and even flattered, 
and in a certain sense rightly so, for the French marriage 
was indeed an Austrian success. Whether this was good 
politics for the future, was, however, less certain. A clear- 
ing up of the European atmosphere on a large scale had not 

^Ibid., CXXXXIV, 234. 
13:, Guglia, Friedrich v. Gents, 230. 



621] at Vienna 1810-1812 135 

yet been attained; on the contrary, the huge conflict which 
for years had divided Europe into two camps, had now in 
reality become even more tremendous. After having at- 
tached Italy and the petty German states to himself, after 
having thrice conquered Austria and rendered Prussia 
almost defenseless, Napoleon found England still in arms, 
Spain in open rebellion, and Russia on the point of slip- 
ping from his grasp. It was rather probable that he would 
not give up his fight with England and the Spanish insur- 
gents. With Russia he might get along for some time yet ; 
but it was also possible that matters there might come to 
an open break, and in such an event Austria was in danger 
of being drawn into the vortex. 

The immediate effect of these conditions on Gentz's 
situation was that he had to wait and remain silent; such 
conduct was perhaps even imposed upon him officially. 134 
He had for a long time been personally acquainted with 
Metternich, and from all appearances did not now find it 
hard to work under him. During the years 1810 and 1811, 
he was employed by him only from time to time, and then 
for the most part on financial treatises; 135 after 1812, how- 
ever, Metternich entrusted to him strictly political work 
as well, and Gentz himself later designates the end of this 
year as the beginning of his real political activity. 136 In 
1812 he writes, upon his own initiative, two treatises on 
maritime law in which he defends the English standpoint ; 
their method of argumentation is essentially historical, 137 
and the fact that Gentz could thus still champion the in- 
terests of England shows that the injunction to silence laid 
upon him could not have been absolute. On the whole 
his life is, during these three years, somewhat uneventful. 
He repeatedly asserts that he still stands where he did, so 
far as principles and inclinations are concerned, but con- 

1M Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, I, 341. 

135 Tagebiicher, I, 214, 255, 234. On pp. 229 ff. Gentz mentions, however, 
such an order. 

1M Schlesier, V, 320 f. 
m Mcm. et left, hied., 347-452. 



130 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [622 

fesses that he lias learned to be more quiet, more just, more 
tolerant and more cool-headed. 138 

Gentz raises no objections to Napoleon's marriage with 
Marie Louise after it has been decided upon ; he favors it, 
however, only for political and not for any human rea- 
sons. 139 The death of Queen Louise touches him deeply and 
he remarks not unjustly that by it Prussia has lost the only 
great decoration which it still possessed. 140 The fate of the 
Prussian state itself concerns him rather little; he, a Prus- 
sian by birth, goes even so far as to call, without any show 
of emotion, his native state a "dying machine". 141 As to 
England, his views now have changed; his attitude toward 
this power is, for the time being, markedly less favorable 
than formerly, and he defends this turn by referring to the 
change of conditions. 142 According to him, England should 
fall in with the other powers and come to terms with 
France; her present relations to the Continent must end, 
for they are, to a degree pitiable as well as antagonistic to 
the common interests. 148 The fact that by this time English 
newspapers and magazines had become well-nigh inaccessi- 
ble to Continental readers seriously inconvenienced 
him. 144 To his still greater discomfort, however, the Eng- 
lish remittances ceased to come during 1809; 14 "' by favoring 
a speedy conclusion of peace in 1809 Gentz had become 
jxrsona non grata to the powers at London and was now 
to be punished for his independent attitude. 140 In 1811, it 
is true, remittances from England seem to have arrived 
once more. 147 Personally Gentz is mostly on the move; in 
October, 1810, for instance, he informs Brinckmann where 
letters will reach him: "on the route from Dresden to 

13S Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 306 f. 

139 Fournier, Gentz und Wessenberg, 35 f. 

140 B)'iefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I. 309. 

U1 lbid., I, 309. 

" 2 Fournier, Gents und Wessenberg, ■$-. 

"'Ibid., 2,7, 45- Brief e v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, I, 305. 

w Bricfc v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 314, 317. 

u *Tagebilchcr, I, 214. 

ue Preuss. Jahrb., CX, 495. 

'"Tagcbiiclicr, I, 255 f. 



G23] at Vienna 1810-1812 137 

Vienna, either in Vienna itself or in Prague, or in Teplitz, 
or in the country somewhere near this route. " 14S The 
charming Teplitz attracted him above everything else, and 
should we care to look in upon him there, we might enjoy 
the spectacle of this ever young gallant and man of society 
in devoted and boundless adoration of the many bright 
lights in the heaven of feminine grace. 149 

Almost three years had passed, in this fashion, after 
the conclusion of peace, when the great turn of affairs 
which Gentz was hoping for finally came, although he 
was not divining its coming and did not hail it with joy. 
Napoleon at last definitely broke with the Czar, and in the 
summer of 1812, actual hostilities began. Gentz deplored 
this renewal of the conflict between the leading powers on 
the Continent as a pernicious disturbance of the European 
peace, and was especially aroused over the Russian procla- 
mation urging the formation of a German legion; to take 
a step such as this, he declared in full harmony with his 
political theories, was tantamount to inviting foreign sub- 
jects to render a verdict on their own governments. 150 He 
hoped for French reverses, 131 but heard, during the next 
months, only this much, that the armies of the emperor 
were irresistably moving toward Moscow. After the mid- 
dle of November, reports of Napoleon's embarrassment 
came in, and by the middle of December Vienna heard of his 
flight from Russia and the dispatch of an Austrian nego- 
tiator to Paris. The moment was, as Gentz rightly ob- 
served, "immensely critical." The question was : what was 
Austria to do now? For the time being, everybody was in 
darkness as to that; Metternich might, perhaps, have given 
some light, but preferred to remain silent, partially even 
toward Gentz. 

While Napoleon was making energetic preparations 
for a new campaign, Gentz began once more to wield his 

liS Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gentz, II, 313. 
u9 Ibid., II, 288 ff., 313, 422. 
im Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 443 f. 
151 Tagebiicher, I, 260 ff. 



138 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [624 

pen with the old vigor. What was he striving for? If we 
survey his activity from the spring of 1813 to the summer 
of 1814, we may, as regards his policies, divide it into four 
periods: 1. spring, 1813, until the battle of Bautzen, 
May 20-21 ; 2. from Bautzen to the Austrian declaration of 
war against France, middle of August ; 3. from the declara- 
tion of war to the battle of Leipzig, October 18; 4. from 
Leipzig to the conclusion of peace in 1814. 

The lines of division between these periods are marked, 
as will be seen, by events of a more or less military char- 
acter, and this fact is not without significance as to the con- 
ception of the Gentz of this period. Gentz is, by this time, 
no more the old rash idealist ; he has rather become a man 
open to the realities of life, a Realpolitiker who cares first 
of all for success. Caution now guides his actions. He 
carefully weighs the chances of each side from case to case 
before deciding in favour of any line of policy and is ready 
to change political tactics as soon as conditions change ; he 
has learned that to avoid risking the loss of everything a 
statesman may, at times, have to leave his tracks and take 
up another road. 

Gentz retained, during this period, his general political 
aims, especially that of the European balance of power; yet 
he pursued them less vigorously, for he directed his atten- 
tion now no less to the particular interests of Austria than 
to those of Europe in general. His immediate aim was, at 
first, to make the Habsburg monarchy independent of 
France, to reduce the French power to its proper limits and 
have some of the territories ceded by Austria and Prussia 
during the last years restored to them; this being accom- 
plished, the European balance of power would, of course, 
re-establish itself automatically. Soon, however, as early 
as in the summer of 1813, Gentz began to become markedly 
distrustful of Russia and Prussia and to emphasize more 
and more, in like gradation, the special interests of 
Austria. He has, on account of this, been harshly criticised, 
and his political attitude during the campaign of 1814 does 
indeed deserve some criticism; however, if we try to do him 



625] activity in 1813-1814 139 

justice, we can not seriously accuse him of having left his 
colors. He was ready, then as ever, to fight for his prin- 
ciples, provided that the fight was not hopeless and others 
acted with him; but it was just this provision which, as he 
thought to discover, remained unfulfilled. If he now, in 
the spring and summer of 1813, counselled avoiding war, if 
he later opposed its continuance and emphasized the spe- 
cifically Austrian interests, he did so from fear of Napoleon 
and — of Austria's allies. 

Until about the end of May, 1813, Gentz's utterances 
breathe a rather decided, though not a warlike, spirit. He 
urges Nesselrode at St. Petersburg, in case of war breaking 
out once more, to put before Austria the alternative of 
either declaring its neutrality or of binding itself secretly 
to co-operation with Russia. 152 Similar in their purport, 
but clearer and more detailed are his remarks to Wessen- 
berg, then Austrian envoy at Munich, dating from March 
and May of the same year. 153 Gentz's paramount idea 
there is that of the necessity of common action between the 
three eastern powers; Austria, he states without any sign 
of disapproval, made declarations to Russia and Prussia 
which are such as to bind her to both. Of almost equal im- 
portance is the thought of inducing Napoleon to make con- 
cessions without recurring to war; Gentz seems to assume 
that this plan might be realized, though he does not ex- 
pressly say so. The concessions referred to would consist, 
in the main, in the ceding of Germany, Italy and Spain; 
should Napoleon refuse to agree to them, then Austria 
would, after its declarations, have to join Russia and Prus- 
sia. Austria must, at any rate, avoid all dilatory measures 
and prepare for war. As to England, Gentz declares it 
was to be hoped that this power would not make peace im- 
possible by taking up an obstinate attitude. Even on Maj 
2, the day of the battle of Gross-Gorschen, he w T rites that 
Austria was to join the allies irrespective of a possible early 
reverse. 

152 Lettres et papiers du chancelier comtc de Nesselrode, V, 27 ff. 
153 Fournier, Gents und Wessenberg, 62-66, 74. 



140 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [620 

In the meantime, Napoleon had again appeared in Ger- 
many and opened the campaign in Saxony at the head of a 
somewhat composite but strong army. On May 2 there 
followed the battle of Gross-Gorschen, and on May 
20-21 that of Bautzen, both of which were victories for the 
French; on June 4, an armistice of several weeks was con- 
cluded between the belligerents, and during it both sides 
tried to get support from the rear and to win over Austria. 
Cobenzl's aims before 1805 had, then, at last become more 
than a dream : Austria was now the mediator between the 
rival powers, holding the balance of decision in her hands. 
Which of the contesting parties was the better to side with 
was not clear yet ; Napoleon might be the stronger at pres- 
ent, but every passing hour must reduce his superiority. 
Austria's interests demanded, therefore, that the pros and 
cons be weighed in the most careful manner, and this task 
Metternich now took in hand with the objectivity of the 
cool calculator. 

That the two Napoleonic victories did not fail to im- 
press Gentz may be seen from his letters written to Metter- 
nich and Wessenberg during May, June and July, 1813. 
They re-established to him, for the present, the military 
reputation and general prestige of the emperor; and from 
this he drew forthwith conclusions. In the beginning of 
June he frankly acknowledges Napoleon's "immense mil- 
itary superiority" and "art", declaring that the prospects 
of the allies were far from splendid ; even if Austria should 
join the latter, the issue of the war would, to him, remain 
"very doubtful", and this the statesmen at Vienna might 
well take into account before coming to any decision. 154 
Should Austria decide upon war against Napoleon, so he 
explains, in the beginning of July, to Wessenberg, it would 
have to concentrate its main army on the Elbe, while at the 
same time an army of some 60,000 men might be formed in 
Bavaria to be pushed forth toward the Austrian left 
flank. 155 

Gentz considered, nevertheless, this superiority as but 

""Ibid., 74 ff. Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 446. 
,55 Fournicr, Gentz und Wessenberg, 82. 



627] activity in 1813-1814 141 

a temporary one. Napoleon, he writes to Metternich in 
June, 15 " long ago passed the zenith of his career and is now 
on the road to "certain ruin" ; Austria has, therefore, but to 
find out whether his ruin will be hastened more by war or 
by keeping peace, and Gentz believes that this question 
must be answered in favour of the first side of the alterna- 
tive. Should Austria, he states, join the allies and the war 
be continued, Napoleon would only be given an opportunity 
of inflicting a deadly blow on the Habsburg Empire while 
he still possesses the power to do so ; that, however, would 
mean the postponement of the liberation of Europe. On 
the other hand, could the present crisis be passed without 
bloodshed, then Austria and the Continent might save their 
forces for a later and decisive struggle. To pass the crisis 
peacefully does to Gentz, it is true, not mean to allow 
present conditions to continue. These conditions must be 
changed, on that point, he thinks, everybody in Austria is 
agreed ; and they must be changed by means of diplomatic 
negotiations with France tending toward a settlement of 
the crisis through French concessions. But of what kind 
should these be? Gentz answers the question extensively 
in a letter to Metternich of the middle of June. He there 
distinguishes — it is true, not very clearly — between the 
concessions to be granted by France in return for a 
"truce", that is a temporary peace, and those of the per- 
manent peace. The first would comprise the dissolution 
of the duchy of Warsaw, a "restitution" of Prussia by the 
cession of Magdeburg and the evacuation of Hamburg, 
finally the cession to Austria of at least the Illyrian prov- 
inces; Gentz would, perhaps, be satisfied even with the 
granting of the first of these three points. A permanent 
peace, on the other hand, would have to be preceeded by 
France's renunciation of every direct and indirect influence 
over Germany, eastern and central Italy. Whether Gentz 
seriously expected that Napoleon would consent to such 
concessions is hard to say. In general, he seems to ignore 

^Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 446 f. 



142 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [628 

the possibility of a refusal on the part of Napoleon; at 
times, however, as for instance in the middle of June, he 
shows that he takes this possibility into account. 157 

Gentz nowhere suggests, at this time, that Austria 
should negotiate with Napoleon separately ; he undoubtedly 
thinks of a joint action of the three eastern powers. Some- 
what varying, however, are his views on the particular man- 
ner and the intensity of this action. In a letter to Metter- 
nich of June 5, for instance, he appears to be rather uneasy 
lest Austria might have become too intimate with Russia 
and Prussia, and again, five days later he emphasizes the 
great importance of Austria's co-operation with these 
powers; 158 possibly this wavering resulted from his having 
received, in the interval between the two letters, certain 
information from Metternich that is unknown to us. On 
the whole, it may be said that Gentz at that time, did not 
wish Austria seriously to bind itself in any way, and on 
this account he gravely criticises Metternich for concluding 
the treaty of Reichenbach. 159 Austria, he states, is en- 
tirely free to act as she sees fit; she is now the "center of 
protest" against the Napoleonic hegemony, and when the 
time shall have come for Europe to order her affairs 
definitively, this settlement will be arrived at under Aus- 
trian leadership. 160 

At the beginning of June, Gentz went to Ratiborzitz 
in Bohemia in order to watch, at short range, the course 
of events ; for there or near by had gathered the sovereigns 
and prime ministers of the three eastern powers. Soon, he 
boasts to Rahel: "I have chosen this place as my head- 
quarters because I am situated here in the midst of all the 
great transactions, and am yet enjoying all the comforts 
and pleasures of life. ... I know everything; no one 
on earth knows what I know of contemporary history, for 

'"Ibid., CLII, 453. 

™Ibid., CLII, 447, 450. 

M Ibid., CLII, 460. 

™Ibid-, CLII, 446. Fournier, Gentz mid Wessenberg, j~, note. 



G29] activity in 1813-1814 143 

nobody ever was or can be in such deep intimacy with 
so many leading parties and individuals' 7 . 101 In this, of 
course, he exaggerates. Much, no doubt, but certainty not 
everything reached his ear; what he did learn often came 
to him indirectly. Metternich does not seem to have taken 
him into his innermost confidence; at any rate, he failed 
to inform Gentz properly about Austria's negotiations with 
Russia and Prussia in the spring of 1813 as well as of the 
later conclusion of the truce and the treaty of Reichen- 
bach. 162 On the other hand, it is perfectly probable that 
Gentz met, at Ratiborzitz, many persons of the first rank 
and importance, and some of these he must have met in a 
semi-official way; among them were W. von Humboldt and 
Nesselrode with whom he conferred concerning the agree- 
ment of Reichenbach. In the middle of June Gentz was 
received by the Czar, and one of his letters to Metternich 
contains a report of the conversation carried on by the two 
men. 163 Gentz found the Czar ready to make advances 
to Austria and spoke, in his turn, frankly about the gen- 
eral situation as he saw it. It was important, he explained, 
not to forget that the attitude of the three eastern powers 
to the war-question were rather different: to Prussia the 
war was one of necessity, almost of despair; to Russia 
half a matter of honour, and half one of political calcu- 
lations; to Austria, finally, a pure problem of business. 
Metternich had, at any rate, to act simply and purely 
"as an Austrian minister", and this the Czar, Gentz added, 
would probably agree to. The main point was that the 
three powers should stand together, to make effective their 
attitude of protest against the present conditions and 
against "tout systeme d' enrahissement et de preponder- 
ance''; this protest should form "the fundamental law of 
every anti-Napoleonic policy and an almost certain basis 
for the gradual restoration of the balance of power and 
order in Europe." Finally, Gentz remarked that the ques- 

M1 Schlesier, T. 126 ff. 

^Deutsche Rundschau, CLII, 447, 451 f., 460. 

m Ibid., CLII, 455 ff. 



144 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [G30 

tion as to the continuation of the war should be decided 
upon only by Russia, Prussia and Austria in common. 

In the middle of July Gentz went with Metternich to 
the congress held at Prague ; he was not allowed admittance 
to its sessions, but otherwise, Metternich treated him not 
without confidence and gave him, at the end of July, the 
commission to prepare a war-manifesto. 104 As the trans- 
actions in Prague did not result in anything, Austria in the 
second week of August declared war against France. A 
few days later, Metternich left Prague, and returned to the 
army. Gentz remained there for the time being, and not 
until December did he go to the headquarters of the allies. 
The three months which he thus spent in the Bohemian 
capital made up, perhaps, the period of his life in which 
for the first time he felt completely happy; another like 
period came with the Congress of Vienna. According to 
his own testimony he was at this time "the intermedi- 
ary in all important political relations between Vienna 
and the headquarters, the channel of all authentic news, 
the centre of all diplomatic circles and of all diplomacy;*' 
he was "highly honored" at Prague, his name had become 
"great", his health left nothing to be desired, he had money 
in plenty and the Emperor deigned to nominate him as 
court counsellor. 105 If these statements are correct, Gentz 
was then the actual civil head of the government in Prague ; 
at any rate, he was one of its heads, especially since the 
censorship of the press in that city lay in his hands. At 
one time he gives Rahel a pretty description of his various 
duties and activities: "Today," he writes, "I have already 
the following behind me — the correction of the papers — a 
trip to the general in command and an hour's conversation 
with him — the dispatch of a courier to Linz and Teplitz — 
and an hour ago, receiving a special courier from Teplitz, 
whom Metternich sent me this morning, and the re-dis- 
patching of this courier to Vienna. It is now three 

1M Tagebucher, I, 264 f. 
"'Ibid., I, 266 f. 



631] activity in 1813-1814 145 

o'clock." 166 In ithe beginning of October, Stein came 
through Prague and offered Gentz, according to his state- 
ment, a place in the commission, formed for the administra- 
tion of the territories about to be conquered. 167 Up to 
Metternich's departure from Prague, Gentz had "many 
important conversations" with him, "particularly about 
German affairs;'' it is not without interest to hear him 
assert that the main content of these conversations was 
the new spirit of Prussia, as well as the fear that the 
fall of Napoleon might bring, instead of a restoration, a 
second revolution. 168 As Gentz himself says, it was he 
who first expressed these fears, and from this we may con- 
clude that they were at that time no longer new with him ; 
apparently, they had formed one of his chief reasons for 
opposing war in June of this year. 

In the beginning of December, Gentz left Prague to 
go to the headquarters of the allies at Freiburg i. B. and 
took there part in the discussions concerning a inarch of 
the allies through Switzerland. 109 In January, 1814, he 
returned to Vienna, where up to the convening of the 
congress a series of duties occupied him: he kept up a 
lively correspondence with Metternich and drafted several 
memorials to him, of which however only a single one is 
known ; he exercised the censorship of the political news- 
papers supplying them, at the same time, with articles, 
translated manifestos, held the position of informant to 
the Hospodar of Wallachia, Caradja, for which he had 
been recommended by Metternich in 1812, and fulfilled, 
finally, his old duties of social intercourse. 

In passing, we may call attention to a remark that 
Gentz makes, in his diaries, on his journey from Prague to 
Freiburg. 170 As he tells us, he ascended the "high moun- 
tain" over which the road leads near Schwabisch-Hall on 

1 16C Schlesier, I, 150. 
^Tagebiicher, I, 268. 
ies Ibid., I, 269. 
ie9 Ibid., I, 272. 
™Ibid., I, 271 f. 



146 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [632 

foot and without any discomfort, and concludes from this 
that his strength and health must be good. As a matter of 
fact, we may gather from this report only this much, that 
Gentz must, by this time, have arrived at a rather high 
degree of physical inactivity and feebleness, for there are no 
"high mountains" whatever in Swabian Franconia. In- 
deed, he was so used to a comfortable, luxurious life that 
in 1813 he could write concerning his stay in Prague, quite 
after the fashion of a beatus possidetis : "One of the best 
French cooks . . . accompanied me everywhere. My do- 
mestic life was entirely as I wished it, it was all that an 
unmarried aristocrat could desire in the way of comfort 
and elegance." 171 

From the declaration of war by Austria to the battle 
of Leipzig, Gentz's sympathies are on the side of the allies. 
This not only his official position demanded, but the gen- 
eral situation as well; Napoleon had not shown himself 
reasonable at Prague and it was, therefore, necessary to 
bring him to his senses by further blows. The victory of 
Leipzig, he greets with enthusiasm. 172 After it, however, 
he wishes peace to be concluded, and the proposals of the 
allies to France in November, 1813, containing the offer 
of the Khine and Alpine boundaries were quite in harmony 
with his views. As they were not seriously considered by 
Napoleon, nothing was left to do but to renew the war; 
the question was, however, with what intensity war should 
be waged, and what was to be its ultimate purpose. Gentz 
held the opinion that it was necessary to keep always in 
view a speedy conclusion of peace, and accordingly he 
fairly overwhelms Metternich with urgent requests to seize 
every opportunity in this direction; above all, he wishes 
him to paralyse the evil influence of Bliicher and other 
"madmen." 173 Anything but "war of annihilation, - " he 

in Ibid., I, 271. 

172 Metternich-KHnkowstr6m, Osterreichs ThcUnahmc an den Befrciunfjs- 
kriegen, 89 f., 92. 

™Ibid., 220, 233 ff., 238 ff., 247, 267 f., 274, 283, 316, 325 ff. 



633] 



activity in 1813-1814 147 



exclaims, anything but an overthrow of Napoleon and a 
restoration of the Bourbons, for all that would only tend 
to strengthen the position of the non-Austrian members of 
the Coalition! 174 Metternich would do best to establish 
direct relations with Napoleon and discuss with him alone 
the foundations of future peace. 175 

The best insight into Gentz's views and feelings at 
this time may be gained from a memorial of February, 
1814, and two letters of November, 1813, resp. March, 1814, 
all of which were directed to Metternich. 176 

The first of these letters has reference to the impend- 
ing territorial rearrangement of Europe but throws, at 
the same time, a strange light on the state of mind into 
which Gentz gradually had come. Austria and Russia, he 
now proposes, are first to arrive at an understanding as 
to the future territorial extension of the European powers 
in general, and of Germany in particular, and secretly to 
obtain England's approval of these arrangements. Then 
Prussia, Bavaria, Sweden, the petty states of Europe and 
England as well are formally to be "invited" to join the 
two afore mentioned powers, which they can hardly refuse 
to do. When this is attained, Russia will withdraw from 
further negotiations. Austria and Prussia, however, will 
conclude alliances with one another, and also each with the 
remaining German states, which will form the back-bone of 
the new German federation; these alliances are later to be 
confirmed by all the non-German powers. The number of 
states in the new German union is not to be more than 
sixteen. "In this way, therefore," Gentz concludes, "the 
great question, as a matter of fact, would be settled by 
Austria alone with the assistance of Russia and Eng- 
land, . . . but in the eyes of the world everything would be 
so handled and ordered as though Austria and Prussia had 
completed the task in common. This outward appearance 
is as necessary to present and future peace and quiet as 

17 *Ibid., 270 f., 210. 

m Ibid., 293. 

™Ibid., 98-103, 248-262, 280. 



148 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [G3± 

is the actual exclusion of Prussia, Sweden, Bavaria, and 
all the other powers of secondary rank from every decision 
of importance." To this Gentz adds the remark that 
Austria's position in the future German federation would 
have to be that of the primus inter pares. 

The memorial deals with the question of Napoleon's 
removal. Gentz does not deny a general right of inter- 
vention of the powers in France, but he denies most de- 
cidedly that this right should extend to the dethroning of 
a legitimate sovereign, and as such he now regards Napol- 
eon. Whether the latter, he declares, attained his power 
in an unjust manner cannot be so quickly determined, at 
any rate he has long ago ceased to be, so far as the French 
people are concerned, an usurper; besides, he has been 
recognized as sovereign by all European powers save Eng- 
land, and a recognition of this kind cannot simply be 
annulled. If it were planned to leave it to the French 
people to decide whether Napoleon should continue to be 
their sovereign, this would be, after all, nothing but a rec- 
ognition of popular sovereignt}-. The Bourbons have no 
further claim to the French throne; their restoration is to 
the advantage of Russia and England alone, and is, there- 
fore, urged by these two powers. There may perhaps be 
some doubt as to whether Austria would be able to prevent 
the return of the Bourbons; but if the allied armies shall 
once have reached Paris, this will certainly no longer be 
possible. 

From the second letter referred to above, the following 
passage may be quoted: "My policy becomes daily more 
egotistic and downright Austrian. The word Europe has 
become a horror to me. A common revenge is no longer 
to be thought of. The greatest desire I have is to see the 
Coalition buried at once. Then I should wish that we 
were grown so great and so strong that everyone would 
have to tremble before us and to court our favor; I would 
not hasten into new alliances; only Bavaria, Wurtemberg 
and those who are to rule in Lombardy and Piedmont, and 
if possible Switzerland, would I unite with us; what is to 



635] ACTIVITY IN 1813-1814 W9 

become of Russia, Prussia, France and England so far as 
we are concerned, the next years will have to decide I pot 
no trust in any of these powers, and give none of them 
credit for good intentions toward us. Furthermore 
would not yield to Russia a single farm in Gahcia, and 
would do my utmost to take Warsaw from her. 

Gentz's attitude has, then, by this time become de- 
cidedlv distrustful of the allies and almost friendly to Na- 
poleon If we wish to understand it, we shall have to trace 

it back to its motives. 

One of these motives and perhaps the strongest one, 
was Gentz's old anxiety about the balance of power^ He 
strove, as we know, in the last analysis, for a Euiopean 
federal system, and considered such a system without this 
balance of power as absolutely inconceivable; tie after 
however, he believed to be threatened or even eliminated 
ILe the beginning of the century by France and Russia 
Franc, wa/now weakened, and in the future rt .might 
be further weakened; Russia, therefore, was left, and 
Russia alone, as the European peril, the same Russia that 
bad been and would be Austria's particular rival i. l Poland 
and the Balkan peninsula. Was France, then, to be so 
completely conquered that Russian supremacy must be- 
come unavoidable? Would that not but mean giving up 
one master for another? And even in case Russia were not 
able to get for herself the leadership of Europe, her posi- 
tion would, nevertheless, be extremely dangerous to certain 
o her powers; for who could guarantee that Russia might 
not aU at once extend her band to France? Everything 
mist, therefore, be avoided which might strengthen his 
"olossus, and the restoration of the Bourbons be prohib- 
ited; for if accomplished this restoration won d essentia y 
help toward a Russian-French rapprochement. Prussia 
he thinks, has the same dangers to fear from a return of 
the Bourbons; unfortunately, however, the Prussian cab 
inet is well-nigh powerless against the radical demands of 
"Meuernicl.-Klinkowstrom. Osterrekhs TheUmhme an do, Befrehw 
kriegen, 257 f., 287 f. 



150 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [630 

certain elements, first of all against those of the army. 178 
As to England, he is afraid that in the new Europe the old 
leaning of the British cabinet toward Russia might be- 
come a source of great inconvenience to the balance of 
power and, therefore, especially to Austria; besides, Eng- 
land too is interested in the return of the Bourbons. 170 
Taking into account all these considerations, it must be 
granted that Gentz was right, from his standpoint, in 
changing his political tactics after the victory of Leipzig. 
Other circumstances demanded other means. The powers, 
as he was convinced, were pursuing a policy of self-inter- 
est; Austria was, therefore, compelled to do the same, for 
only in this way could she still hope to get her rights. 

So far, then, Gentz maintained his old position. He 
soon leaves it, however, in so far as he looses all sense of 
moderation in championing these new diplomatic tactics. 
His desire to spare France and not allow Russia to gaiu 
in strength was logical and comprehensible; his plans 
looking toward new conditions in Germany, on the other 
hand, are entirely incompatible with a system whose funda- 
mental idea was the equality of the powers and a common 
regulation of all European questions. They must be ex- 
plained differently, and their proper explanation is to be 
found in a somewhat new element in Gentz's nature : his 
new Austrian patriotism. In this, therefore, we are to 
see the second cause of his attitude in 1814. Originally a 
cosmopolitan with certain pan-German tendencies, Gentz 
had gradually yielded to the influence of his Viennese en- 
vironments and his hatred of Russia, to arrive finally at a 
solid Ostreichertum, with which was doubtless mingled 
what Bismarck once termed "Ressortpatriotismus" ; it be- 
gan to manifest itself in him even before 1813, and after 
Leipzig it reached its full vigor. 180 

In comparison with these motives, others are hard- 
ly worthy of consideration, as for instance Gentz's personal 

™Ibid., 257. 

"'Ibid., 238, 258, 287 f. 

™lbid., 248, 271, 280. 



637] CONGRESS OF VIENNA 151 

relations to Metternich. As far as the material which is 
available permits of conclusions, it must be acknowledged 
that Gentz always speaks of his chiefs policy only in the 
most respectful terms; he does not, however, hesitate to 
offer substantial criticism. The relations between the two 
men were, at least until 1815, far less those of dependence 
of one upon the other than those of two sovereign powers, 
except for the fact that every decision naturally rested 
with Metternich. Gentz has been termed, at times, Metter- 
nich's clerk, and again his prompter ; but in reality he was 
neither the one nor the other. Metternich until then never 
seems to have taken him into his innermost confidence, and 
Gentz himself often mildly complains about this atti- 
tude. 181 

While Gentz was thus protesting against the continua- 
tion of the war, the allies gradually pressed on toward 
Paris and there forced Napoleon to abdicate. With this 
the war against the latter was temporarily ended. 

The tremendous task of European reorganization which 
was now to be undertaken fell to the Congress of Vienna. 
As its secretary, and as Metternich's assistant, Gentz was 
initiated into many of the secrets as well as frivolities of 
these nine months and he felt, there, quite in his element. 
To attempt to describe his activity in detail, however, 
would take us too far; he himself says but little about it, 
for the hundred pages of his diary dealing with the time 
from July, 1814, to May, 1815, give scarcely more than 
some insight into the social life of the congress. Suffice it 
to say, therefore, that in general he adhered to his ideas of 
1814. In the beginning of 1815 he worked out a Projct 
de Declaration, which has great similarity to the treaty 
of the Holy Alliance of September 16, 1815, if this be 
stripped of its specific religious character. 182 According 
to Gentz's own statement, this project was read to the 
Czar by Castlereagh toward the end of the congress, and 
the latter was moved to tears by it; it is, therefore, not 

lsl Ibid., 119 f., 127 f., 350. 
1S2 Tagebiicher, I, 443 ff. 



152 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [038 

impossible that the declaration had a certain influence 
upon the conclusion of the Holy Alliance itself. 

When Napoleon had returned from Elba, Gentz was 
entrusted with the drafting of a proscription against 
him. 183 Then war broke out anew; but before Europe had 
recovered its breath, the news of Waterloo and of the com- 
plete destruction of the imperial army arrived. Gentz 
seems to have taken a relatively small interest in the Avar, 
except that he was fearful of a farther shifting of the 
balance of power in favor of Russia and Prussia. The 
news of Napoleon's escape from Elba came to him on 
March 7 through W. von Humboldt. 184 His sympathies 
were plainly divided, even inclining perhaps to Napoleon ; 
he would have preferred to see the threatened renewal of 
the European conflict nipped in the bud and this with the 
least possible sensation. After Waterloo his fears got the 
upper hand ; he praises Napoleon's attitude in the battle, of 
which Adam Miiller had given him an inspiring descrip- 
tion, 185 he criticises Bliicher's and Wellington's march to 
Paris and protests against the restoration of the Bour- 
bons. 180 He would gladly have seen a regency under Marie 
Louise, but finally does not oppose the recognition of 
Louis XVIII. 187 Called to Paris, he took part in the con- 
clusion of peace, again guided by the desire to preserve as 
far as possible the integrity of France. 

A half year later Gentz made public the motives which 
had actuated him during the peace negotiations and de- 
fended them against the angry Gorres. 188 He is of the 
opinion that the principle of the European balance of 
power no longer demanded any additional weakening of 
France's position, as would result, for instance, from a 

1S3 Ibid., I, 364. 
M Ibid., I, 363. 

™Briefw. ziv. Fr. Genie u. A. H. Miiller, 180 ff. 

188 Metternich-Klinkowstrom, Osterreichs Theilnahme an den Befreiungs- 
kriegen, 664 f. 

™Ibid., 666 f. Briefw. zw. Fr. Gentz u. A. II. Miiller, 203. 
1M Schlesier. TT, 403. 



639] THE HUNDRED DAYS 153 

forced concession of Alsace and Lorraine. The interests 
of an enduring European peace seem to him even to forbid 
such a step ; for, he declares, if this step were to be taken, 
every king of France would, under the pressure of public 
opinion, seize the first opportunity of winning back what 
had been lost. This argument had, no doubt, much in its 
favor, for after 1870 France indeed followed the very 
policy that Gentz here foretells. On the other hand, there 
were important considerations against it, and these Gentz 
seems entirely to have overlooked : if France were allowed 
to keep Alsace and Lorraine, there would be no guarantee 
that the very possession of these provinces might not in- 
vite the French to make an attempt at winning the entire 
left bank of the Rhine. The whole question was, at that 
time, in a certain sense still an academic one, and not 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century was it made 
evident that here both men, Gentz as well as Gorres, were 
equally in the right and equally in the wrong. It is, how- 
ever, not impossible that in Gentz's case still other unex- 
pressed motives may have been at work, as for instance; 
those which aimed at bringing Austria in time into the 
good graces of the Bourbons. 



Europe's struggle against its foremost man was now 
definitely ended. Napoleon himself sailed to St. Helena 
accompanied by a small suite, and there six years later he 
ended his unique life. The white banner of the Bourbons 
was floating once more from the Tuileries, for the king had 
again taken up his residence in the midst of his good 
people. Finally, the armies of the allies marched back to 
their garrisons and their homes. There was peace, at last, 
in all the lands, that sweet peace which so long had been 
hoped for. At spinning-parties, over their glasses, or at 
home by the warm fireside, however, people were telling 
for more than a generation of the strange hosts which, dur- 
ing the long years of war, had passed through the country ; 
most of all, it is true, they told of him whose iron hand 
had been lying on Europe during these fifteen terrible and 
ever memorable years. 

For Gentz too the struggle against his great enemy 
was now over, a struggle that, in its final stage, had hardly 
deserved this term. It never occurred to him to mourn his 
fate, and he passes over with indifference or scorn lamenta- 
tions such as those of Las Cases, Montholon and Gour- 
gaud. The era of Bonaparte, at last, belonged to the past 
and might so continue; now more important things were 
to be considered than the fate of the "ex-hero of the age." 
"You must know," Gentz writes in 1824, "that Bonaparte 
is as good as forgotten among us, and in Germany only a 
few curse or praise him, .... and they too not from 
conviction but from sheer malignity." 189 

The end of all struggle, however, had not yet come to 
Gentz. Although the great storm had subsided and a 
second Napoleon was not likely to appear in the immediate 
future, the revolutionary spirit had not been extinguished 

ua Briefe v. u. a. Fr. v. Gents, II, 340 f. 

154 



641] CONCLUSION 155 

entirely and soon Gentz thought that he heard the roll of 
thunder once more. Again he rushed into battle, but this 
time the struggle was to end differently. Europe had, after 
all, progressed during the last thirty years, and Gentz him- 
self realized in time that "neither art nor force can stop 
the turn of the world-wheel" ; so he became more and more 
depressed, especially after 1825, without, however, losing 
interest in life entirely. In 1831 he sums up the result of 
this second struggle against the revolutionary tendencies 
in the words : "I find myself .... suffering from an 
actual mentally diseased condition which is making notice- 
able progress in me. The chief features of this condition 
are continually recurring unrest and deep sorrow at the 
shaping of conditions which are driving us more and more 
to the wall, — the bitter consciousness that I can do nothing 
against it, that I am daily becoming more estranged from 
the new order of things, that my role is played and the 
fruit of forty years of labor as good as lost, — multiplied 
troubles, irreparable losses in my income brought on by 
political catastrophes, — my place in society which for some 
years I have too greatly cultivated and from which, now 
that I am tired of it since it disturbes me in the only 
pleasure I still have, I do not know how to free myself, — 
discontent with myself and with the world, — the feeling of 
increasing age and the fear of death which you, of course, 
know; are these not enough to make one sick?" 190 

Soon after this confession Gentz died, a weary and 
embittered man. For some time he seemed forgotten ; then, 
however, he slowly rose once more out of this night of 
oblivion, and it is safe to say that his name will continue 
to be remembered. A historic figure of the first rank, it is 
true, he never was ; one may even hesitate to give him sec- 
ond rank, since the influence which he exercised on the 
course of events has, after all, been but a small one. Judged 
by the whole make-up of his nature, however, lie undoubt- 
edly deserves to be called a very remarkable personage. 

m Schlesier, I, 216 f. 



156 FRIEDRICH GENTZ [642 

His life extended over three distinct historic periods : those 
of the Revolution, of Napoleon and of the Reaction, and in 
all of them he had, fundamentally, one and the same aim : 
to fight against whatever was revolutionary and aggres- 
sive; but if we should attempt to find for him a place in 
history which would be his own more than any other, it 
could only be that of an opponent of the first Napoleon. 
Comparable to a brilliant comet the name of this extra- 
ordinary man stands on the firmament of historical fame, 
sending forth its lustre from age to age. There is the 
sparkling head: that is he himself, the little Caporal, the 
tamer of the Revolution, the Emperor ; behind it, however, 
there follows an immense tail of duller light: the com- 
panions and enemies of the great conqueror, and with these, 
with the group of anti-Napoleonic ideologues Gentz must, 
more than with any other group or period, historically be 
classed. 



INDEX 

Addington, 97, 104. 

Alexander, czar of Russia, 62, 96, 98, 108, 109, ill, 121, 129, 137, 143, 151. 

Ancillon, 11, 60, 61. 

Armfeldt, 91, 98, 102, 106. 

Austerlitz, 96, 122. 

Bautzen, 138, 140. 

Bliicher, 146, 152. 

Bourbons, 14/ff., 152. 

Brandes, 55, 56, 58. 

Brinckmann, 28, 61, 98, 103, 104, 112, 136. 

Budberg, 129. 

Burke, 381., si, 581, 62, 6^. 

Canning, 129. 

Caradja, 145. 

Charles, archduke of Austria, 106, no, 112. 

Cicero, 31, 32ft., 36, 5off., 57, 59- 

Cobenzl, 24, 65, 89f., 91, 97, 99, 102 iosff., 112, 115, 117, 121, 122, 126, 140. 

Collenbach 106, in, 122, 126. 

Colloredo, 106, 121. 

Czartorisky, III. 

Dresden, 122, 123, 124, 130, 136. 
Duka, 106, 1 10. 

Fassbender, 89, 102, 106, in. 

Francis, emperor of Austria, 62, 98, 106, no, 117. 

Francois, 74 

Frederick the Great, 9, 13, 14, 94. 

Frederick William II, king of Prussia, 14. 

Frederick William III, king of Prussia, 120, 126. 

Freiburg i.B., 145. 

Garve, 31, 35, 36, 37, 51, 57, 59, 75. 
Gentz 

character, 22ft". ; 

correspondence, 62f., 75 f., 98, 103, 104, I25ff., I32f. ; 

life, sketch of, II. ; 

memorials, 63, 97I, i03f., 105, ii2ff., 118, I28f., 135, 148.; 

place in history, 9f., 155I ; 

political theories, 3off. ; 

publications, 37, 61 f., 77, 98, I27f., 135. 

157 



158 PRIEDRICH GENTZ [644 

Girtanner, 56, 58. 

Gorres, 30, i52f. 

Goethe, 17, 18, 21, 98. 

Gotzen, 131, 132. 

Gourgaud, 154. 

Graun, 28, 29. 

Grenville, 63. 

Gross-Gorschen, 139, 140. 

Gustavus IV, king of Sweden, 98, 104, 116, 132. 

Hardenberg, 98. 

Harrowby, 105. 

Haugwitz, 61, 98, 118, 121, 123, 126, 131 f. 

Herz, 57. 

Holy Alliance, I5if. 

Humboldt, W. von., 24, 60, 143, 152. 

Ivernois, 62. 

John, archduke of Austria, 30, 97, 98, ill, 112, 113, 117. 

Kant, 11, 21, 23, 31, 41. 
Kollowrat 106. 

Las Cases, 154. 

Leipzig, 92, 96, 138, 146. 

Lombard, 126, 131 f. 

Louis XVI, 67. 

Louis XVIII, 98, 116, 132, 152. 

Louis Ferdinand, prince of Prussia, oof., 98, 104, 129. 

Louise, queen of Prussia, 98, 136. 

Lucchesini, 61, 126, 131. 

Mack, 102, no, 119. 

Makintosh, 61, 70. 

Mallet du Pan, 21, 57 f., 59, 61. 6sf., 73, 74. 

Marat, 68, 69. 

Marie Louise, empress of the French, 134, 136, 152. 

Meerveldt, 118. 

Metternich, 9, n, 29, 89, 97, 99, 100, 102, 108, 109, 112, 130, 134, 

135, U7< UO, 141. 142, 143, 144- 145. I46ff., 151- 
Mirabeau, 35, 57. 
Montesquieu, 31. 35, 51. 
Montholon, 154. 
Mounier, 61. 

Midler, Adam Heinrich, 24, 27. 40, 64, 87, 89, 121, 125. 
Midler, Johannes von, 28, 92, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, \17ft. 
Murawief, 108. 



645] index 159 

Nesselrode, 98, 139, 143. 

Paget, 91, 102, 104, 105, 106, in. 
Panin, 61, 98, 102, 104, 106. 
Peace of 

Luneville, 75 ; 

Schonbrunn, 133, 136; 

Paris (1815), 152. 
Pitt, 62, 63, 105, in, 112, 123. 
Posselt, 56. 

Pozzo di Borgo, 98, 102, 106. 
Prague, 123, 130, 133, 137, I44f., 146. 

Rahel, 25, 93, 98, 142, 144. 
Rasumowsky, 91, 102, 106. 
Ratiborzitz, I42ff. 
Reiehenbach, 142. 
Robespierre, 35. 
Rousseau, 31, 35, 51, 69. 

Schiller, 17, 21, 98. 

Schlegel, A. W., 26, 130. 

Schlegel, Fr., 26, 98. 

Schloezer, 21, 56. 

Sieyes, 68, 69. 

Stadion, 61, 89, 9of., 102, 109, 123, 124, 126, 134. 

Stael, 98, 130. 

Stein, 98, 130, 145. 

Teplitz, 93, 123, I24f., 134, 137, 144. 
Trauttmannsdorf, 112. 
Trouve, 74. 

Ulm, 119. 

War of 

1805 ugff. ; 

1809 133; 

1812 137; 

1813-1814 I37ff-; 

1815 152. 
Waterloo, 101, 102, 152. 
Wessenberg, 139, 140. 



y^. 



VITA 
Paul Friedrich Keiff, is the son of the late Dean 
C. F. Reiff, and was born at Basel, Switzerland, May 30, 
1870. Having received his first education in the Gym- 
nasium of Stuttgart, Wurtemberg, he attended the univer- 
sities of Tubingen, Berlin, Erlangen and Basel, where he 
studied theology, philosophy and history; in 1901 he ob- 
tained the degree of Ph.D. at Basel. In January 1000, he 
emigrated to the United States. From 1900 until 1902 he 
studied German literature and philology at Harvard Uni- 
versity, and served, from 1902 to 1908, as instructor of 
German at the University of Wisconsin, at Washington 
University and at Purdue University. During the follow- 
ing two years lie was engaged upon literary work, and 
from 1910 to 1912 lived at Urbana, Illinois, being enrolled 
as a graduate student of history. 



ERRATA 

i. Page 30, line 11, for "at" read "the". 

2. Page 39, line 3, for "Burke," read "Burke." 

3. Page 53, toward end of note 1, for "January 21st, 1792" read "Janu- 

ary 21st, 1793". 

4. Page 54, line 27, for "couse" read "cause". 

5. Page 55, line 20-21, for "Z. L. Huber" read "J. L. Huber". 

6. Page 61, line 16, for "Office" read "office"; 

line 2z, for "Ubel" read "tlber" ; 

line 24, for "Herra" read "Herrn"; 

line 25, for "Nationalerzichung" read "Xationalererziehung". 

7. Page 62, line 17, for "Entstchung" read "Enstehung"; 

line 33, for "Teutsche" read "teutsche". 

8. Page 67, line 14. for "overpupulation" read "overpopulation". 

9. Page 77, line 2j, for "refernce" read "'reference", 
ro. Page 88, note 12, for "70," read "70.". 

ii. Page 89, note 13, for "Tagebiicher", omit quotation marks. 

12. Page 97, line 31, for "the" read "The". 

13. Page 125, line 3, for "entire" read "central". 

14. Page 126. line 13, for "is" read "in". 

15. Page 136, line 28, for "mostly" read "much". 

16. Page 141, line 6, for "first" read "second". 

17. Page 143, line 31, for "enrahissement" read "envahissement". 

18. Page 153, line 1, for "concession" read "cession". 



FRIEDRICH GENTZ 

an Opponent of the 
French Revolution and Napoleon 



BY 
PAUL F. REIFF, Ph.D. 



Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 

of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate 

School of the University of Illinois 



CHAMFAIGN-URBANA 

FLANIGAN-PEARSON CO. 
1912 



